Search results for 'Pairing problem' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke van Horn (2011). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.score: 216.0
    Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Paul Audi (2011). Primitive Causal Relations and the Pairing Problem. Ratio 24 (1):1-16.score: 180.0
    There is no doubt that spatial relations aid us in pairing up causes and effects. But when we consider the possibility of qualitatively indiscernible things, it might seem that spatial relations are more than a mere aid – they might seem positively required. The belief that spatial relations are required for causal relations is behind an important objection to Cartesian Dualism, the pairing problem. I argue that the Cartesian can answer this objection by appeal to the possibility (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke Van Horn (2011). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349 - 360.score: 156.0
    Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Kevin Burns (2004). Bar-Gain Boxes: An Informative Illustration of the Pairing Problem. In. In A. Blackwell, K. Marriott & A. Shimojima (eds.), Diagrammatic Representation and Inference. Springer. 379--381.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Sally Diveley & F. Michael Rabinowitz (1974). Modality and the Transformation Problem in Paired-Associate Learning of Children. Journal of Experimental Psychology 103 (5):907.score: 70.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Raanan Lipshitz, Daphna Leshem Levy & Keren Orchen (2006). Is This Problem Likely to Be Solved? A Cognitive Schema of Effective Problem Solving. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (4):413 – 430.score: 54.0
    The present study tested the existence of a cognitive schema that guides people's evaluations of the likelihood that observed problem-solving processes will succeed. The hypothesised schema consisted of attributes that were found to distinguish between retrospective case reports of successful and unsuccessful real world problem solving (Lipshitz & Bar Ilan, 1996). Participants were asked to evaluate the likelihood of success of identical cases of problem solving that differed in the presence or absence of diagnosis, the selection of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Beverly C. Pestel (1993). Teaching Problem Solving Without Modeling Through “Thinking Aloud Pair Problem Solving”. Science Education 77 (1):83-94.score: 50.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Michael Nelson (2005). The Problem of Puzzling Pairs. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):319 - 350.score: 40.0
  9. Robin Dunbar (2010). Part III: Evolving Bonds of Sociality-8 Deacon's Dilemma: The Problem of Pair-Bonding in Human Evolution. Proceedings of the British Academy 158:155.score: 40.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. E. H. Porter Jr (1941). An Investigation of the Alleged Function of Emphasis in a Simple Discrimination Problem. Journal of Experimental Psychology 28 (1):77.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. A. B. Slomson (1971). Review: C. C. Chang, H. Jerome Keisler, Applications of Ultraproducts of Pairs of Cardinals to the Theory of Models; C. C. Chang, A Note on the Two Cardinal Problem. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (2):338-339.score: 40.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Simone Gittelson, Alex Biedermann, Silvia Bozza & Franco Taroni (2013). Modeling the Forensic Two-Trace Problem with Bayesian Networks. Artificial Intelligence and Law 21 (2):221-252.score: 38.0
    The forensic two-trace problem is a perplexing inference problem introduced by Evett (J Forensic Sci Soc 27:375–381, 1987). Different possible ways of wording the competing pair of propositions (i.e., one proposition advanced by the prosecution and one proposition advanced by the defence) led to different quantifications of the value of the evidence (Meester and Sjerps in Biometrics 59:727–732, 2003). Here, we re-examine this scenario with the aim of clarifying the interrelationships that exist between the different solutions, and in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Alexey Kryukov (2007). On the Measurement Problem for a Two-Level Quantum System. Foundations of Physics 37 (1):3-39.score: 30.0
    A geometric approach to quantum mechanics with unitary evolution and non-unitary collapse processes is developed. In this approach the Schrödinger evolution of a quantum system is a geodesic motion on the space of states of the system furnished with an appropriate Riemannian metric. The measuring device is modeled by a perturbation of the metric. The process of measurement is identified with a geodesic motion of state of the system in the perturbed metric. Under the assumption of random fluctuations of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Shu-Hsien Liu (1972). The Confucian Approach to the Problem of Transcendence and Immanence. Philosophy East and West 22 (1):45-52.score: 30.0
    The problem of transcendence and immanence is a central issue in every great religious tradition. It is indeed the understanding of the relation between the transcendent and man that determines the character of a religious faith. The transcendent, However, May assume different forms; it need not always be a supreme personal God in the judaeo-Christian sense. In the confucian tradition, Heaven is the transcendent; hence the problem of transcendence and immanence becomes the problem of heaven and man. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2013). The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie and Plantinga. In Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. Wiley-Blackwell. 19-33.score: 27.0
    J.L. Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil is a failure, as even he came to recognize. Contrary to current mythology, however, its failure was not established by Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. That’s because a defense is successful only if it is not reasonable to refrain from believing any of the claims that constitute it, but it is reasonable to refrain from believing the central claim of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, namely the claim that, possibly, every essence (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Massimo Pigliucci (2013). The Demarcation Problem: A (Belated) Response to Laudan. In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. 9.score: 27.0
    The “demarcation problem,” the issue of how to separate science from pseu- doscience, has been around since fall 1919—at least according to Karl Pop- per’s (1957) recollection of when he first started thinking about it. In Popper’s mind, the demarcation problem was intimately linked with one of the most vexing issues in philosophy of science, David Hume’s problem of induction (Vickers 2010) and, in particular, Hume’s contention that induction cannot be logically justified by appealing to the fact (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (2013). Why the Demarcation Problem Matters. In Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem.score: 27.0
    Ever since Socrates, philosophers have been in the business of asking ques- tions of the type “What is X?” The point has not always been to actually find out what X is, but rather to explore how we think about X, to bring up to the surface wrong ways of thinking about it, and hopefully in the process to achieve an increasingly better understanding of the matter at hand. In the early part of the twentieth century one of the most (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Robert Francescotti (2013). The Problem of Animal Pain and Suffering. In Justin McBrayer Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. 113-127.score: 27.0
    Here I discuss some theistic responses to the problem of animal pain and suffering with special attention to Michael Murray’s presentation in Nature Red in Tooth and Claw. The neo-Cartesian defenses he describes are reviewed, along with the appeal to nomic regularity and Murray’s emphasis on the progression of the universe from chaos to order. It is argued that despite these efforts to prove otherwise the problem of animal suffering remains a serious threat to the belief that an (...)
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Philippa Foot (1967). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Oxford Review 5:5-15.score: 24.0
    One of the reasons why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. When we think of a baby about to be born it seems absurd to think that the next few minutes or even hours could make so radical a difference to its status; yet as we go back in the life of the fetus (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Moti Mizrahi (2014). The Problem of Natural Inequality: A New Problem of Evil. Philosophia 42 (1):127-136.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I argue that there is a kind of evil, namely, the unequal distribution of natural endowments, or natural inequality, which presents theists with a new evidential (not logical or incompatibility) problem of evil. The problem of natural inequality is a new evidential problem of evil not only because, to the best of my knowledge, it has not yet been discussed in the literature, but also because available theodicies, such the free will defense and the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Massimo Pigliucci (2013). What Hard Problem? Philosophy Now (99).score: 24.0
    The philosophical study of consciousness is chock full of thought experiments: John Searle’s Chinese Room, David Chalmers’ Philosophical Zombies, Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room, and Thomas Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ among others. Many of these experiments and the endless discussions that follow them are predicated on what Chalmers famously referred as the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness: for him, it is ‘easy’ to figure out how the brain is capable of perception, information integration, attention, reporting on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. James R. Beebe, Logical Problem of Evil. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    The existence of evil and suffering in our world seems to pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a perfect God. If God were all-knowing, it seems that God would know about all of the horrible things that happen in our world. If God were all-powerful, God would be able to do something about all of the evil and suffering. Furthermore, if God were morally perfect, then surely God would want to do something about it. And yet (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. David Robb (2013). The Identity Theory as a Solution to the Exclusion Problem. In S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe & R. D. Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    This is about a proposed solution to the exclusion problem, one I've defended elsewhere (for example, in "The Properties of Mental Causation"). Details aside, it's just the identity theory: mental properties face no threat of exclusion from, or preemption by, physical properties, because every mental property is a physical property. Here I elaborate on this solution and defend it from some objections. One of my goals is to place it in the context of a more general ontology of properties, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Nate Charlow (2014). The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.score: 24.0
    I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivism that does not.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Alessandro Lanteri, Chiara Chelini & Salvatore Rizzello (2008). An Experimental Investigation of Emotions and Reasoning in the Trolley Problem. Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4):789 - 804.score: 24.0
    Elaborating on the notions that humans possess different modalities of decision-making and that these are often influenced by moral considerations, we conducted an experimental investigation of the Trolley Problem. We presented the participants with two standard scenarios (‹lever’ and ‹stranger’) either in the usual or in reversed order. We observe that responses to the lever scenario, which result from (moral) reasoning, are affected by our manipulation; whereas responses to the stranger scenario, triggered by moral emotions, are unaffected. Furthermore, when (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Kelly Becker (2008). Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.score: 24.0
    Epistemic luck has been the focus of much discussion recently. Perhaps the most general knowledge-precluding type is veritic luck, where a belief is true but might easily have been false. Veritic luck has two sources, and so eliminating it requires two distinct conditions for a theory of knowledge. I argue that, when one sets out those conditions properly, a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism emerges.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. David J. Chalmers & Brian Rabern (2014). Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Nesting Problem. Analysis 74 (2):210-224.score: 24.0
    Graeme Forbes (2011) raises some problems for two-dimensional semantic theories. The problems concern nested environments: linguistic environments where sentences are nested under both modal and epistemic operators. Closely related problems involving nested environments have been raised by Scott Soames (2005) and Josh Dever (2007). Soames goes so far as to say that nested environments pose the “chief technical problem” for strong two-dimensionalism. We call the problem of handling nested environments within two-dimensional semantics “the nesting problem”. We show (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Nicholas Unwin (1999). Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):337-352.score: 24.0
    Expressivists, such as Blackburn, analyse sentences such as 'S thinks that it ought to be the case that p' as S hoorays that p'. A problem is that the former sentence can be negated in three different ways, but the latter in only two. The distinction between refusing to accept a moral judgement and accepting its negation therefore cannot be accounted for. This is shown to undermine Blackburn's solution to the Frege-Geach problem.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Marc Ereshefsky (2010). Darwin's Solution to the Species Problem. Synthese 175 (3):405 - 425.score: 24.0
    Biologists and philosophers that debate the existence of the species category fall into two camps. Some believe that the species category does not exist and the term 'species' should be eliminated from biology. Others believe that with new biological insights or the application of philosophical ideas, we can be confident that the species category exists. This paper offers a different approach to the species problem. We should be skeptical of the species category, but not skeptical of the existence of (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Anil Gomes (2011). Is There a Problem of Other Minds? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.score: 24.0
    Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Daan Evers (2014). Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.score: 24.0
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Cameron Buckner (forthcoming). The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mindreading. Mind and Language.score: 24.0
    Philosophers have worried that research on animal mind-reading faces a “logical problem”: the difficulty of experimentally determining whether animals represent mental states (e.g. seeing) or merely the observable evidence for those states (e.g. line-of-gaze). The most impressive attempt to confront this problem has been mounted recently by Robert Lurz (2009, 2011). However, Lurz’ approach faces its own logical problem, revealing this challenge to be a special case of the more general problem of distal content. Moreover, participants (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Chris Tucker (2009). Evidential Support, Reliability, and Hume's Problem of Induction. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):503-519.score: 24.0
    Necessity holds that, if a proposition A supports another B, then it must support B. John Greco contends that one can resolve Hume's Problem of Induction only if she rejects Necessity in favor of reliabilism. If Greco's contention is correct, we would have good reason to reject Necessity and endorse reliabilism about inferential justification. Unfortunately, Greco's contention is mistaken. I argue that there is a plausible reply to Hume's Problem that both endorses Necessity and is at least as (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Earl Conee (2013). The Specificity of the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):751-762.score: 24.0
    In “Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem,” Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an acceptable account of the justificatory status of beliefs in certain examples. In response, first I will describe the generality problem that is specific to process reliabilism and two other sorts of problems that are essentially the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Graham Oddie & Dan Demetriou (2007). The Fictionalist's Attitude Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):485 - 498.score: 24.0
    According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie’s approach (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Qilin Li, Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the Gettier Problem.score: 24.0
    In this paper, it is argued that there are (at least) two different kinds of ‘epistemic normativity’ in epistemology, which can be scrutinized and revealed by some comparison with some naturalistic studies of ethics. The first kind of epistemic normativity can be naturalized, but the other not. The doctrines of Quine’s naturalized epistemology is firstly introduced; then Kim’s critique of Quine’s proposal is examined. It is argued that Quine’s naturalized epistemology is able to save some room for the concept of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Michael Wheeler (2008). Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, Situated Robotics and the Frame Problem. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):323 – 349.score: 24.0
    The frame problem is the difficulty of explaining how non-magical systems think and act in ways that are adaptively sensitive to context-dependent relevance. Influenced centrally by Heideggerian phenomenology, Hubert Dreyfus has argued that the frame problem is, in part, a consequence of the assumption (made by mainstream cognitive science and artificial intelligence) that intelligent behaviour is representation-guided behaviour. Dreyfus' Heideggerian analysis suggests that the frame problem dissolves if we reject representationalism about intelligence and recognize that human agents (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Rivka Weinberg (2008). Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):3 - 18.score: 24.0
    Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Alan Hájek (2007). The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem Too. Synthese 156 (3):563--585.score: 24.0
    The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Jared Bates (2005). The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium. Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.score: 24.0
    In 1955, Goodman set out to 'dissolve' the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudoproblem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is -- in a way to be explained -- itself an inductive method, and thus renders (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Brent G. Kyle (2013). Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.score: 24.0
    The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But, whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier problem arises because (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. John D. Norton (2013). A Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction. Synthese 191 (4):1-20.score: 24.0
    In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of the nature of induction, I argue that the celebrated “problem of induction” can no longer be set up and is thereby dissolved. Attempts to recreate the problem in the material theory of induction fail. They require relations of inductive support to conform to an unsustainable, hierarchical empiricism.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Michael A. Bishop (2010). Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.score: 24.0
    The generality problem is widely considered to be a devastating objection to reliabilist theories of justification. My goal in this paper is to argue that a version of the generality problem applies to all plausible theories of justification. Assume that any plausible theory must allow for the possibility of reflective justification—S's belief, B, is justified on the basis of S's knowledge that she arrived at B as a result of a highly (but not perfectly) reliable way of reasoning, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2013). Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.score: 24.0
    : A key consideration in favour of animalism—the thesis that persons like you and me are identical to the animals we walk around with—is that it avoids a too many thinkers problem that arises for non-animalist positions. The problem is that it seems that any person-constituting animal would itself be able to think, but if wherever there is a thinking person there is a thinking animal distinct from it then there are at least two thinkers wherever there is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Julien Murzi & Ole Thomassen Hjortland (2009). Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem: Reply to Raatikainen. Analysis 69 (3):480-488.score: 24.0
    It is sometimes held that rules of inference determine the meaning of the logical constants: the meaning of, say, conjunction is fully determined by either its introduction or its elimination rules, or both; similarly for the other connectives. In a recent paper, Panu Raatikainen (2008) argues that this view - call it logical inferentialism - is undermined by some "very little known" considerations by Carnap (1943) to the effect that "in a definite sense, it is not true that the standard (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Nicholas Unwin (2001). Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):60-75.score: 24.0
    A difficulty is exposed in Allan Gibbard's solution to the embedding/Frege-Geach problem, namely that the difference between refusing to accept a normative judgement and accepting its negation is ignored. This is shown to undermine the whole solution.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25 - 51.score: 24.0
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Nicholas Maxwell (1972). A New Look at the Quantum Mechanical Problem of Measurement. American Journal of Physics 40:1431-5..score: 24.0
    According to orthodox quantum mechanics, state vectors change in two incompatible ways: "deterministically" in accordance with Schroedinger's time-dependent equation, and probabilistically if and only if a measurement is made. It is argued here that the problem of measurement arises because the precise mutually exclusive conditions for these two types of transitions to occur are not specified within orthodox quantum mechanics. Fundamentally, this is due to an inevitable ambiguity in the notion of "meawurement" itself. Hence, if the problem of (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Gabriel Vacariu & Vacariu (2013). The Mind-Brain Problem in Cognitive Neuroscience (Only Content).score: 24.0
    (June 2013) “The mind-body problem in cognitive neuroscience”, Philosophia Scientiae 17/2, Gabriel Vacariu and Mihai Vacariu (eds.): 1. William Bechtel (Philosophy, Center for Chronobiology, and Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science University of California, San Diego) “The endogenously active brain: the need for an alternative cognitive architecture” 2. Rolls T. Edmund (Oxford Centre for Computational Neuroscience, Oxford, UK) “On the relation between the mind and the brain: a neuroscience perspective” 3. Cees van Leeuwen (University of Leuven, Belgium; Riken Brain Science (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Dan López de Sa (2014). Lewis Vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many. Synthese 191 (6):1105-1117.score: 24.0
    Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000