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  1. Paolo Cherubini (2008). Brief Notices. Speculum 83 (1):257.
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  2. Andrea Manfrinati, Pierdaniele Giaretta & Paolo Cherubini (2008). Conditionals and Conditional Thinking. Mind and Society 7 (1):21-34.
    In this paper, we claim that the problem of conditionals should be dealt with by carefully distinguishing between thinking conditional propositions and conditional thinking, i.e. thinking on the basis of some supposition. This distinction deserves further investigation, if we are to make sense of some old and new experimental data concerning the understanding and the assertion of conditional sentences. Here we will argue that some of these data seem to refute the mental models theory of conditional reasoning, setting the ground (...)
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  3. Massimiliano Carrara, Paolo Cherubini & Pierdaniele Giaretta (2007). Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part II”. Mind and Society 6 (1):35-39.
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  4. Massimiliano Carrara, Paolo Cherubini & Pierdaniele Giaretta (2006). Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I”. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 5 (2):167-171.
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  5. Paolo Cherubini & PN Johnson-Laird (2004). Does Everyone Love Everyone? The Psychology of Iterative Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 10 (1):31 – 53.
    When a quantified premise such as: Everyone loves anyone who loves someone, occurs with a premise such as: Anne loves Beth, it follows immediately that everyone loves Anne. It also follows that Carol loves Diane, where these two individuals are in the domain of discourse. According to the theory of mental models, this inference requires the quantified premise to be used again to update a model of specific individuals. The paper reports four experiments examining such iterative inferences. Experiment 1 confirmed (...)
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  6. Paolo Cherubini, Alberto Mazzocco, Simona Gardini & Aurore Russo (2001). A Re-Examination of Illusory Inferences Based on Factual Conditional Sentences. Mind and Society 2 (2):9-25.
    According to mental model theory, illusory inferences are a class of deductions in which individuals systematically go wrong. Mental model theory explains them invoking the principle of truth, which is a tendency not to represent models that falsify the premises. In this paper we focus on the illusory problems based on conditional sentences. In three experiments, we show that: (a) rather than not representing models that falsify the conditionals, participants have a different understanding of what falsifies a conditional (Experiment I); (...)
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