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Profile: David Papineau (King's College London)
  1. Matteo Mameli, David Papineau & Ulrich Stegmann, Kcl/Lse Msc in Phs.
    Altruism and Groups Many animals display altruistic behaviour (=df behaviour that benefits conspecifics more that the agent). Until the 1950s this was explained as good for the group if not the individual. (Ardrey, Wynne-Edwards, lemmings.) BUT won’t groups of altruists always be invaded by selfish animals?
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  2. David Papineau, A Fair Deal for Everettians.
    It is widely supposed that the Everettian account of quantum mechanics has difficulties with probability. In this paper I shall argue that those who argue against the Everettian interpretation on this basis are employing a double standard. It is certainly true that there are philosophical puzzles about probability within the Everettian theory. But I shall show that orthodox metaphysics has even worse problems with probability than Everettianism. From this perspective, orthodox metaphysicians who criticise Everettians about probability are a classic case (...)
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  3. David Papineau, Anthony Holden Bigger Deal: A Year on the New Poker Circuit 337pp. Little Brown, London. £17.99.
    Who would have thought it? Poker has become a mass-audience spectator sport. Names like Chris ‘Jesus’ Ferguson, Phil ‘Unabomber’ Laak, and Dave ‘The Devilfish’ Ulliott may not be familiar to all readers of the TLS, but on any normal night you can see these top poker professionals on the nether reaches of the satellite channels, as they bluff and bully their way to pots worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Like their counterparts in tennis and golf, they tour the world, (...)
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  4. David Papineau, Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem.
    Materialism is the view that mental states are one and the same as physical states. (This is different from saying they are caused by physical states, or eliminated by physical states.) Dualism in the view that mental states are extra to the physical realm. Kripke’s metaphor: if materialism is true, not even God could make a world physically just like ours but with no sensations, feelings or thoughts.
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  5. David Papineau, Confusions About Consciousness.
    Consciousness has suddenly become an extremely fashionable topic in certain scientific circles. Many thinkers are now touting consciousness as the last unconquered region of science, and theorists from many different disciplines are racing to find a "theory of consciousness" which will unlock this final secret of nature. I am suspicious about all this enthusiasm. I think that much of the brouhaha is generated by philosophical confusion. In the end, I fear, there is no special secret of consciousness, and no special (...)
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  6. David Papineau, Forums Forum.
    I am lucky to have two such penetrating commentators as Robert Kirk and Andrew Melnyk. It is also fortunate that they come at me from different directions, and so cover different aspects of my book. Robert Kirk has doubts about the overall structure of my enterprise, and in particular about my central commitment to a distinctive species of phenomenal concepts. Andrew Melnyk, by contrast, offers no objections to my general brand of materialism. Instead he focuses specifically on my (...)
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  7. David Papineau, Handout.
    Any way of assigning numbers to propositions so as to satisfy the axioms constitutes an interpretation of the probability calculus. In general there are two kinds of interpretation, subjective and objective. The subjective interpretation understands X's probability for P as the degree to which X believes P. Objective probabilities apply specifically to propositions which claim that a certain kind of result will occur on a certain kind of repeatable trial, such as that a coin will come down heads when tossed, (...)
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  8. David Papineau, John Campbell Reference and Consciousness 267pp. Clarendon Press, Oxford. £40 (Paperback, £14.99).
    How does thought latch onto reality? Our minds have the ability to reach out and refer to items in the external world. I can think about the tree outside my study window, say, or about Margaret Thatcher, or about solar neutrinos. But how is the trick done? How can my thoughts refer to things beyond themselves? We tend to take the mind's referential powers for granted, but they are enormously difficult to explain. Whole philosophical systems have foundered on the problem (...)
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  9. David Papineau, Methodology.
    Probab ility (probability; subjective and objective probability; the Principal Principle; independence and correlation; conditional probability; material, indicative and subjunctive conditionals; correlation and causation; screening off; Simpson’s paradox; Bayes’ theorem; Bayesian updating).
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  10. David Papineau, Mind and Brain.
    Materialism is the view that mental states are one and the same as physical states. (This is different from saying they are caused by physical states, or eliminated by physical states.) Dualism in the view that mental states are extra to the physical realm. Kripke’s metaphor: if materialism were true, not even God could make a world physically just like ours but with no sensations, feelings or thoughts.
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  11. David Papineau, Preface By.
    Russell’s place in the public eye was maintained by a steady stream of writing for the general reader. He no longer held any academic position, and needed to support himself and his family by his pen. While he continued to do some technical work in philosophy, more of his energies were devoted to journalism and other popular writings. He was in great demand. His distinctive prose and dry wit enabled him to puncture the fusty assumptions of contemporary thinking, and his (...)
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  12. David Papineau, Phenomenal Concepts Are Not Demonstrative.
    In this paper I want to explore the nature of phenomenal concepts by comparing them with perceptual concepts. Phenomenal concepts have been drawn to the attention of philosophers by recent debates in the philosophy of mind. Most obviously, their existence is demonstrated by Frank Jackson’s thought-experiment about Mary, the expert on the science of colour vision who has never had any colour experiences herself. It is widely agreed that, when Mary does first see something red, she acquires a new concept (...)
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  13. David Papineau, Paradoxes of Confirmation.
    We often want to say that inductive evidence supports some conclusion more or less strongly. This is often put as a matter of "e confirms h", where confirmation comes in degrees.
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  14. David Papineau, Quassim Cassam The Possibility of Knowledge 234pp. Clarendon Press, Oxford. £00.00.
    Philosophers like asking questions about knowledge. What is it exactly? Why do we value it so much? And do we have any? Ideally they would like an account of the nature of knowledge that shows sceptical doubts about its existence to be unmotivated. Unfortunately two millenia of effort have not produced much in the way of agreed results.
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  15. David Papineau, Realism Under Threat.
    The empirical evidence often justifies belief in scientific theories. For instance, the great wealth of chemical and other relevant data leaves us with no real alternative to believing that matter is made of atoms. Similarly, the natural history of past and present organisms makes it irrational to deny that life on earth has evolved from a common ancestry. Again, the character and epidemiology of infectious diseases effectively establishes that they are caused by microbes. Peter Lipton did much to illuminate (...)
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  16. David Papineau, Scenes From My Philosophical Development.
    My first university was in my home town, Durban, in the mid-1960s. I was doing a mathematics degree but most of my friends were doing arts subjects. Sartre and Marx were the thinkers of the moment and my friends would press their (mostly illegal) writings on me. Ideologically I was entirely sympathetic, but intellectually they didn’t do much for me—too obscure, too difficult, too dogmatic. In my final year I chanced on Ayer’s The Problem of Knowledge. It wasn’t exactly relevant (...)
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  17. David Papineau, Truth and Meaning.
    If L had a finite number of sentences ‘s1’, . . ., ‘sn’, he would have been happy to define s is true as s is ‘s1’ and s1, or ‘s2’ and s2 . . . or . . . or ‘sn’ and sn.
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  18. David Papineau, The Sense of Being Stared At, and Other Aspects of the Extended Mind By Rupert Sheldrake Crown Publishers, New York; 362 Pp.
    Does your dog know when it is time for walkies, even if you are in a different room when you decide to take it out? Can you sometimes tell that you are being stared at, even when your kibitzer is some distance away and completely hidden? If so, Rupert Sheldrake (www.sheldrake.org) would like to hear from you. He has compiled a database of over 5,000 such cases, and would be glad to learn of any more.
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  19. David Papineau, Kripke's Proof That We Are All Intuitive Dualists.
  20. David Papineau (forthcoming). Choking and The Yips. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    IntroductionSporting skills divide contemporary theorists into two camps. Let us call them the habitualists and the intellectualists. The habitualists hold that thought is the enemy of sporting excellence. In their view, skilled performers need to let their bodies take over; cognitive effort only interferes with skill. The intellectualists retort that sporting performance depends crucially on mental control. As they see it, the exercise of skill is a matter of agency, not brute reflex; the tailoring of action to circumstance requires intelligent (...)
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  21. David Papineau (forthcoming). Can We Really See A Million Colours. In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), The Nature of Phenomenal Qualities. OUP.
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  22. David Papineau (forthcoming). There Are No Norms of Belief. In T. Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief.
    This paper argues that there is no distinctive species of normativity attaching to the adoption of beliefs.
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  23. Philip Goff & David Papineau (2014). What's Wrong with Strong Necessities? Philosophical Studies 167 (3):749-762.
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  24. David Papineau (2014). The Presidential Address: Sensory Experience and Representational Properties. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):1-33.
    This paper is about the nature of conscious sensory properties. My initial thesis is that these properties should not be equated with representational properties. I argue that any such representationalist view is in danger of implying that conscious sensory properties are constituted by relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time; and I add that, even if this implication can be avoided, the broadness of representational properties in any case renders them unsuitable to constitute conscious properties. In (...)
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  25. David Papineau (2013). But Not Irreducible. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. 126.
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  26. David Papineau (2013). Causation is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. 126.
    In this paper I argue that causation is an essentially macroscopic phenomenon, and that mental causes are therefore capable of outcompeting their more specific physical realizers as causes of physical effects. But I also argue that any causes must be type-identical with physical properties, on pain of positing inexplicable physical conspiracies. I therefore allow macroscopic mental causation, but only when it is physically reducible.
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  27. David Papineau (2013). In the Zone. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 73:175-196.
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  28. David Papineau (2013). Ll The Poverty of Conceptual analysisI. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. 166.
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  29. David Papineau (2012). Can We Be Harmed After We Are Dead? Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):1091-1094.
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  30. David Papineau (2012). Philosophical Devices: Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities, and Sets. Oxford University Press.
    Part I: Sets and Numbers. Naive Sets and Russell's Paradox ; Infinite Sets ; Orders of Infinity. -- Part II: Analyticity, a prioricity, and necessity. Kinds of Truths ; Possible Worlds ; Naming and Necessity. -- Part III: The Nature and Uses of Probability. Kinds of Probability ; Constraints on Credence ; Correlations and Causes. -- Part IV: Logics and Theories. Syntax and Semantics ; Soundness and Completeness ; Theories and Godel's Theorem.
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  31. R. M. Hazen, A. Bekker, D. L. Bish, W. Bleeker, R. T. Downs, J. Farquhar, J. M. Ferry, E. S. Grew, A. H. Knoll, D. Papineau, J. P. Ralph & J. W. da SverjenskyValley, Needs and Opportunities in Mineral Evolution Research.
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  32. D. Papineau (2011). A epistemologia da ciência. Crítica.
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  33. David Papineau (2011). Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):175.
    In this paper I want to consider whether the 'phenomenal concepts' posited by many recent philosophers of mind are consistent with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. The paper will have three sections. In the first I shall explain the rationale for positing phenomenal concepts. In the second I shall argue that phenomenal concepts are indeed inconsistent with the private language argument. In the last I shall ask whether this is bad for phenomenal concepts or bad for Wittgenstein.
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  34. David Papineau (2011). The Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge. In Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the a Priori? Open Court. 61.
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  35. David Papineau (2011). What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? Philosophia 39 (1):5-19.
    It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an ‘explanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. I argue that this agreed view is quite mistaken. The feeling of a ‘explanatory gap’ arises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind–brain relation in a dualist way.
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  36. David Papineau (2011). What is X-Phi Good For? The Philosophers' Magazine 52 (52):83-88.
    When philosophers study knowledge, consciousness, free will, moral value, and so on, their first concern is with these things themselves, rather than with what people think about them. So why exactly is it so important to philosophy to discover experimentally that people differ in their views on these matters? We wouldn’t expect physicists to throw up their hands in excitement just because somebody shows that different cultures have different views about the origin of the universe.
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  37. David Papineau (2010). A Scandal of Probability Theory. In Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, & Reality. Oup Oxford.
     
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  38. David Papineau (2010). Can Any Sciences Be Special? In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press. 179--197.
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  39. David Papineau, Naturalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The term ‘naturalism’ has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century. The self-proclaimed ‘naturalists’ from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook and Roy Wood Sellars. These philosophers aimed to ally philosophy more closely with science. They urged that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural’, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the (...)
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  40. David Papineau (2010). Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):375-385.
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  41. David Papineau (ed.) (2009/2008). Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
     
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  42. David Papineau (2009). Pysicalism and the Human Sciences. In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  43. David Papineau (2009). The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
     
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  44. David Papineau (2009). The Poverty of Analysis. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):1-30.
    I argue that philosophy is like science in three interesting and non-obvious ways. First, the claims made by philosophy are synthetic, not analytic: philosophical claims, just like scientific claims, are not guaranteed by the structure of the concepts they involve. Second, philosophical knowledge is a posteriori, not a priori: the claims established by philosophers depend on the same kind of empirical support as scientific theories. And finally, the central questions of philosophy concern actuality rather than necessity: philosophy is primarily aimed (...)
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  45. David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà (2009). A Thirder and an Everettian: A Reply to Lewis's 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty'. Analysis 69 (1):78-86.
    Peter J. Lewis's in 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty' argues that accepting the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics requires you to be a 'halfer' about Sleeping Beauty. This paper will argue that Everettians do not have to be halfers. It is perfectly cogent to be both an Everettian and a thirder.
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  46. David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà (2009). Reply to Lewis: Metaphysics Versus Epistemology. Analysis 69 (1):89-91.
    Peter J. Lewis argued that the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics implies the unpopular halfer position in the Sleeping Beauty debate. We retorted that it is perfectly coherent to be an Everettian and an ordinary thirder. In a recent reply to our paper Lewis further clarifies the basis for his thinking. We think this brings out nicely where he goes wrong: he underestimates the importance of metaphysical considerations in determining rational credences.
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  47. David Papineau, Consciousness and the Antipathetic Fallacy.
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  48. David Papineau (2008). Explanatory Gaps and Dualist Intuitions. In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 2008--55.
    I agree with nearly everything Martin Davies says. He has written an elegant and highly informative analysis of recent philosophical debates about the mind–brain relation. I particularly enjoyed Davies’ discussion of B.A. Farrell, his precursor in the Oxford Wilde Readership (now Professorship) in Mental Philosophy. It is intriguing to see how closely Farrell anticipated many of the moves made by more recent ‘type-A’ physicalists who seek to show that, upon analysis, claims about conscious states turn out to be nothing more (...)
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  49. David Papineau, Introduction.
    We are all physicalists now. It was not always so. A hundred years ago most educated thinkers had no doubt that non-physical processes occurred within living bodies and intelligent minds. Nor was this an anti-scientific stance: the point would have been happily agreed by most practicing scientists of the time. Yet nowadays anybody who says that minds and bodies involve non-physical processes is regarded as a crank. This is a profound intellectual shift. In this essay I want to explore its (...)
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  50. David Papineau, Kripke's Argument is Ad Hominem Not Two-Dimensional.
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