Search results for 'Particulars' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Andrew M. Bailey (2012). No Bare Particulars. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.score: 24.0
    There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Robert K. Garcia (2013). Bare Particulars and Constituent Ontology. Acta Analytica (2):1-11.score: 24.0
    My general aim in this paper is to shed light on the controversial concept of a bare particular. I do so by arguing that bare particulars are best understood in terms of the individuative work they do within the framework of a realist constituent ontology. I argue that outside such a framework, it is not clear that the notion of a bare particular is either motivated or coherent. This is suggested by reflection on standard objections to bare particulars. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Martin Schmidt (2008). On Spacetime, Points, and Bare Particulars. Metaphysica 9 (1):69-77.score: 24.0
    In his paper Bare Particulars, T. Sider claims that one of the most plausible candidates for bare particulars are spacetime points. The aim of this paper is to shed light on Sider’s reasoning and its consequences. There are three concepts of spacetime points that allow their identification with bare particulars. One of them, Moderate structural realism, is considered to be the most adequate due its appropriate approach to spacetime metric and moderate view of mereological simples. However, it (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Daniel Giberman (2012). Against Zero-Dimensional Material Objects (and Other Bare Particulars). Philosophical Studies 160 (2):305-321.score: 24.0
    A modus tollens against zero-dimensional material objects is presented from the premises (i) that if there are zero-dimensional material objects then there are bare particulars, and (ii) that there are no bare particulars. The argument for the first premise proceeds by elimination. First, bare particular theory and bundle theory are motivated as the most appealing theories of property exemplification. It is then argued that the bundle theorist’s Ockhamism ought to lead her to reject spatiotemporally located zero-dimensional property instances. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Richard Brian Davis (2013). Are Bare Particulars Constituents? Acta Analytica 28 (4):395-410.score: 24.0
    In this article I examine an as yet unexplored aspect of J.P. Moreland’s defense of so-called bare particularism — the ontological theory according to which ordinary concrete particulars (e.g., Socrates) contain bare particulars as individuating constituents and property ‘hubs.’ I begin with the observation that if there is a constituency relation obtaining between Socrates and his bare particular, it must be an internal relation, in which case the natures of the relata will necessitate the relation. I then distinguish (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Richard Davis (2008). A Puzzle for Particulars? Axiomathes 18 (1):49-65.score: 24.0
    In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red1—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red1 is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Richard E. Aquila (1979). Mental Particulars, Mental Events, and the Bundle Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (March):109-120.score: 24.0
    I argue, First, That the bundle theory is compatible with certain views of mental states as alterations in an underlying substance. Then I distinguish between momentary and enduring experiencers and argue that the bundle theory does not imply the possibility of experiences apart from experiencers, But at most apart from enduring experiencers. Finally, I reject strawson's claim that the bundle theory implies that some particular person's experience might instead have belonged to some other person. Regarding experiences as events rather than (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David S. Brown & Richard Brian Davis (2008). A Puzzle for Particulars? Axiomathes 18 (1):49-65.score: 24.0
    In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red1—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red1 is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Nathan Wildman (forthcoming). Load Bare-Ing Particulars. Philosophical Studies:1-16.score: 24.0
    Bare particularism is a constituent ontology according to which substances—concrete, particular objects like people, tables, and tomatoes—are complex entities constituted by their properties and their bare particulars. Yet, aside from this description, much about bare particularism is fundamentally unclear. In this paper, I attempt to clarify this muddle by elucidating the key metaphysical commitments underpinning any plausible formulation of the position. So the aim here is primarily catechismal rather than evangelical—I don’t intend to convert anyone to bare particularism, but, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Niall Connolly (forthcoming). Yes: Bare Particulars! Philosophical Studies:1-16.score: 22.0
    What is the Bare Particular Theory? Is it committed, like the Bundle Theory, to a constituent ontology: according to which a substance’s qualities—and according to the Bare Particular Theory, its substratum also—are proper parts of the substance? I argue that Bare Particularists need not, should not, and—if a recent objection to ‘the Bare Particular Theory’ (Andrew Bailey’s ‘New Objection’) succeeds—cannot endorse a constituent ontology. There is nothing, I show, in the motivations for Bare Particularism or the principles that distinguish Bare (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Hilan Bensusan & Eros de Carvalho (2011). Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract Particulars. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 26 (2):155-163.score: 21.0
    In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Howard Engelskirchen (2010). Powers and Particulars: Adorno and Scientific Realism. Journal of Critical Realism 3 (1):1-21.score: 21.0
  13. K. Campbell (1983). Abstract Particulars and the Philosophy of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (June):129-41.score: 21.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Johanna Seibt (2010). Particulars. In Roberto Poli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Theories and Applications of Ontology. Springer. 23--55.score: 20.0
    According to the standard view of particularity, an entity is a particular just in case it necessarily has a unique spatial location at any time of its existence. That the basic entities of the world we speak about in common sense and science are particular entities in this sense is the thesis of “foundational particularism,” a theoretical intuition that has guided Western ontological research from its beginnings to the present day. The main aim of this paper is to review the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Markku Keinänen (2011). Tropes – The Basic Constituents of Powerful Particulars? Dialectica 65 (3):419-450.score: 18.0
    This article presents a trope bundle theory of simple substances, the Strong Nuclear Theory[SNT] building on the schematic basis offered by Simons's (1994) Nuclear Theory[NT]. The SNT adopts Ellis's (2001) dispositional essentialist conception of simple substances as powerful particulars: all of their monadic properties are dispositional. Moreover, simple substances necessarily belong to some natural kind with a real essence formed by monadic properties. The SNT develops further the construction of substances the NT proposes to obtain an adequate trope bundle (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Theodore Sider (2006). Bare Particulars. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.score: 18.0
    One often hears a complaint about “bare particulars”. This complaint has bugged me for years. I know it bugs others too, but no one seems to have vented in print, so that is what I propose to do. (I hope also to say a few constructive things along the way.) The complaint is aimed at the substratum theory, which says that particulars are, in a certain sense, separate from their universals. If universals and particulars are separate, connected (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Bertrand Russell (1911). On the Relations of Universals and Particulars. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 12:1 - 24.score: 18.0
    The purpose of the following, paper is to consider whether there is a fundamenital division of the objects with which metaphysics is concerned into two classes, universals and particulars, or whetlher there is any method of overcoming this dualism. My own opinion is that the dualism is ultimate; on the other hand, many men with whom, in the main, I am in close agreement, hold that it is not ultimate. I do not feel the grounds in favour of its (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Matteo Morganti (2012). Sellarsian Particulars. Acta Analytica 27 (3):293-306.score: 18.0
    Abstract In this article, a critical assessment is carried out of the two available forms of nominalism with respect to the ontological constitution of material objects: resemblance nominalism and trope theory. It is argued that these two nominalistic ontologies naturally converge towards each other when the problems they have to face are identified and plausible solutions to these problems are sought. This suggests a synthesis between the two perspectives along lines first proposed by Sellars, whereby, at least at the level (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Noa Latham (2002). Spatiotemporal and Spatial Particulars. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):17-35.score: 18.0
    The aim of this paper is to offer a classification of particulars in terms of their relations to spatiotemporal and spatial regions. It begins with an examination of spatiotemporal particulars, and then explores the extent to which a parallel account can be offered of continuants, or spatial particulars that can endure and change over time, assuming such particulars exist. For every spatial particular there are spatiotemporal particulars that can be described as its life and parts (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). The Bundle Theory is Compatible with Distinct but Indiscernible Particulars. Analysis 64 (1):72–81.score: 18.0
    According to a widely held philosophical opinion the Bundle Theory entails the Identity of Indiscernibles. In this paper I show that the Bundle Theory neither entails nor is otherwise committed to the Identity of Indiscernibles and therefore the Bundle Theory is compatible with the falsity of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I also show that the Bundle Theory can give an account of particulars consistent with the falsity of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Not only that, when developed in this way (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Angelika Kratzer (2002). Facts: Particulars or Information Units? [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):655-670.score: 18.0
    What are facts, situations, or events? When Situation Semantics was born in the eighties, I objected because I could not swallow the idea that situations might be chunks of information. For me, they had to be particulars like sticks or bricks. I could not imagine otherwise. The first manuscript of “An Investigation of the Lumps of Thought” that I submitted to Linguistics and Philosophy had a footnote where I distanced myself from all those who took possible situations to be (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Fraser MacBride (1998). Where Are Particulars and Universals? Dialectica 52 (3):203–227.score: 18.0
    Is there a particular-universal distinction? Is there a difference of kind between all the particulars on the one hand and all the universals on the other? Can we demonstrate that there is such a difference without assuming what we set out to show? In 1925 Frank Ramsey made a famous attempt to answers these questions. He came to the sceptical conclusion that there was no particularuniversal distinction, the theory of universals being merely “a great muddle”. Following Russell, Ramsey identified (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Timothy Pickavance (2009). In Defence of 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):155 – 158.score: 18.0
    In a recent article in this journal, Richard Brian Davis argues that 'bare particulars [as defended by J. P. Moreland] face several serious shortcomings'[2003: 547]. I argue that Davis's two principal criticisms fall flat.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Peter Schulte (2007). How to Link Particulars to Universals: Four Versions of Bradley's Regress Refuted. Philosophia Naturalis 44 (2):219-237.score: 18.0
    It is often claimed that Realism about universals is problematic because it cannot account for the relation between particulars and universals without falling prey to ,,Bradley's regress". In this article, I consider four different versions of this regress argument (the semantic regress, the explanatory regress, the ,One over Many' regress, and the truthmaker regress), each based on a different ,regress-generating' assumption. I argue that none of these arguments succeeds in refuting Realism. Still, I contend that two interesting conclusions can (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Peter Simons (1991). Ramsey, Particulars, and Universals. Theoria 57 (3):150-161.score: 18.0
    My subject is the arguments brought by Ramsey in his paper “Universals” (1925)’ against the generally held distinction between particulars and universals. This paper is provocative, suggestive, and radical, and it is humbling to reflect that its author was just 22 years old when it was published in Mind. As so often with Ramsey, the paper is superficially very easy to follow and hardly requires any introduction other than the imperative, “Read it through”, but underneath the surface are many (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. D. W. Mertz (2003). Against Bare Particulars a Response to Moreland and Pickavance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):14 – 20.score: 18.0
    In a recent article [Mertz 2001] in this journal I argued for the virtues of a realist ontology of relation instances (unit attributes). A major strength of this ontology is an assay of ontic ('material') predication that yields an account of individuation without the necessity of positing and defending 'bare particulars'. The crucial insight is that it is the unifying agency or combinatorial aspect of a relation instance as predicable that is for ontology the principium individuationis [Mertz 2002; 1996]. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. J. P. T. MorelandPickavance (2003). Bare Particulars and Individuation Reply to Mertz. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):1 – 13.score: 18.0
    Not long ago, one of us has clarified and defended a bare particular theory of individuation. More recently, D. W. Mertz has raised a set of objections against this account and other accounts of bare particulars and proffered an alternative theory of individuation. He claims to have shown that 'the concept of bare particulars, and consequently substratum ontology that requires it, is untenable.' We disagree with this claim and believe there are adequate responses to the three arguments Mertz (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Richard Brian Davis (2003). 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):534 – 548.score: 18.0
    In a recent series of articles, J. P. Moreland has attempted to revive the idea that bare particulars are indispensable for individuating concrete particulars. The success of the project turns on Moreland's proposal that while bare particulars are indeed 'partially clad'--that is, exemplify at least some properties--they are nevertheless 'bare' in that they lack internal constituents. I argue that 'partially clad' bare particulars (PCBPs) are impervious not only to traditional objections, but also those recently urged in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Peter Adamson (2005). On Knowledge of Particulars. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):273–294.score: 18.0
    Avicenna's notorious claim that God knows particulars only 'in a universal way' is argued to have its roots in Aristotelian epistemology, and especially in the "Posterior Analytics". According to Avicenna and Aristotle as understood by Avicenna, there is in fact no such thing as 'knowledge' of particulars, at least not as such. Rather, a particular can only be known by subsuming it under a universal. Thus Avicenna turns out to be committed to a much more surprising epistemological thesis: (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Albert Casullo (1984). The Contingent Identity of Particulars and Universals. Mind 93 (372):527-541.score: 18.0
    The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that particulars in the actual world are nothing but complexes of universals. I begin by briefly presenting bertrand russell's version of this view and exposing its primary difficulty. I then examine the key assumption which leads russell to difficulty and show that it is mistaken. The rejection of this assumption forms the basis of an alternative version of the view which is articulated and defended.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Maria van der Schaar (2004). The Red of a Rose. On the Significance of Stout's Category of Abstract Particulars. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82 (1):197-216.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue for the thesis that Stout's category of abstract particulars (what Husserl calls "moments') has played a role in the transition from Bradleian idealism to British analytic philosophy. That category plays this role as part of a new theory of wholes, parts and relations that Stout develops in opposition to Bradley. In Stout's theory abstract particulars are dependent parts of wholes. The critical remarks that G. E. Moore and Kevin Mulligan have made concerning Stout's (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Larry Lee Blackman (1983). Russell on the Relations of Universals and Particulars. Philosophy Research Archives 9:265-278.score: 18.0
    In his 1911 paper, “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,” Bertrand Russell supposes the question whether universals are spatial or non spatial turns on the question of the existence of particulars. If particulars could be shown to exist, then since, according to Russell, they obviously are spatial, the non-spatiality of universals would be established. On the other hand, the denial of the existence of particulars would entail the spatiality of universals.In this paper, I argue that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Charles Altieri (2003). The Particulars of Rapture: An Aesthetics of the Affects. Cornell University Press.score: 18.0
    " "The Particulars of Rapture proposes treating affects in adverbial rather than in adjectival terms, emphasizing the way in which text and paintings shape ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Herbert Hochberg (1996). Particulars, Universals and Russell's Late Ontology. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:129-137.score: 18.0
    Russell’s late ontology sought to avoid “wholly colourless particulars” (substrata, points of space, bare instants of time) by appealing to complexes of compresent qualities in place of particulars that exemplify qualitieso Yet he insisted on (i) calling qualities like redness “discontinuous,” “repeatable” particulars, and (ii) claiming that such qualities were not universals, since they were not exemplified but were ultimate subjects that exemplified universal relations and universal qualities. It is argued that his choice of terminology is not (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Philipp Keller, How to Tell Universals From Particulars.score: 18.0
    I reassess the famous arguments of Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1925) against the tenability of the distinction between particulars and universals and discuss their recent elaboration by Fraser MacBride. I argue that Ramsey’s argument is ambiguous between kinds and properties and that his sceptical worries can be resolved once this distinction is taken into account. A crucial role in this dissolution is a notion of what is essential to a property. I close by some epistemological considerations.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Francesco Orilia (2006). Quantum-Mechanical Statistics and the Inclusivist Approach to the Nature of Particulars. Synthese 148 (1):57 - 77.score: 18.0
    There have been attempts to derive anti-haeccetistic conclusions from the fact that quantum mechanics (QM) appeals to non-standard statistics. Since in fact QM acknowledges two kinds of such statistics, Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac, I argue that we could in the same vein derive the sharper anti-haeccetistic conclusion that bosons are bundles of tropes and fermions are bundles of universals. Moreover, since standard statistics is still appropriate at the macrolevel, we could also venture to say that no anti-haecceitistic conclusion is warranted for (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Albert Casullo (1982). Particulars, Substrata, and the Identity of Indiscernibles. Philosophy of Science 49 (4):591-603.score: 18.0
    This paper examines the view that ordinary particulars are complexes of universals. Russell's attempt to develop such a theory is articulated and defended against some common misinterpretations and unfounded criticisms in Section I. The next two sections address an argument which is standardly cited as the primary problem confronting the theory: (1) it is committed to the necessary truth of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles; (2) the principle is not necessarily true. It is argued in Section II (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Kevjn Lim (2009). God's Knowledge of Particulars. Journal of Islamic Philosophy 5:75-98.score: 18.0
    This article offers a comparative study of three thinkers from almost as many intellectual and cultural traditions: Avicenna, Maimonides, and Gersonides, and discusses the extent of the knowledge of particulars which each one ascribed to God. Avicenna de-reified Aristotle’s abstract and isolated Prime Mover and argued that God can know particulars but limited these to universals. Maimonides disanalogized divine from human knowledge, arguing that the epistemic mode predicated of mankind cannot be equally predicated of God, and that God (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Laird Addis (1967). Particulars and Acquaintance. Philosophy of Science 34 (3):251-259.score: 18.0
    Philosophers who hold that the correct ontological analysis of things includes both properties and particulars have often been pressed to "show" the particular. If we are not acquainted with them, it is argued, then we should not suppose that they exist. I argue that, while we do have good and sufficient reasons for supposing there to be particulars, we are not acquainted with them. To suppose that we are acquainted with them is to treat particulars as if (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Martin A. Bertman (1972). Basic Particulars and the Identity Thesis. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 3 (1):1-8.score: 18.0
    This paper begins with a discussion of the logical apparatus of Frege, where his use of Sinn suggests a modification of Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Then, it turns to Strawson's basic particulars with its essentially Kantian orientation. This brings forward the logical ground upon which the Identity Thesis rests. Finally, following Frege with some modifications, the paper suggests that an ontological list where concepts can be treated as objective (materially dependent) subsistent entities would be necessary in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Herbert Hochberg (1995). Particulars As Universals. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:83-111.score: 18.0
    Russell’s elimination of basic particulars, in An lnquiry into Meaning and Truth and Human Knowledge: lts Scope and Limits, by purportedly construing them as “bundles” or “complexes” of universal qualities has been attacked over the years by A. J. Ayer, M. Black, D. M. Armstrong, M. Loux, and others. These criticisms of Russell’s ontological assay of “particularity” have been based on misconstruals of his analysis. The present paper interprets Russell’s analysis, rebuts arguments of his critics, and sets out a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Catherine Osborne (1995). Perceiving Particulars and Recollecting the Forms in the 'Phaedo'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:211 - 233.score: 18.0
    I ask whether the Recollection argument commits Socrates to the view that our only source of knowledge of the Forms is sense perception. I argue that Socrates does not confine our presently available sources of knowledge to empirically based recollection, but that he does think that we can't begin to move towards a philosophical understanding of the Forms except as a result of puzzles prompted by the shortfall of particulars in relation to the Forms, and hence that our awareness (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. E. D. Klemke (1960). Universals and Particulars in a Phenomenalist Ontology. Philosophy of Science 27 (3):254-261.score: 18.0
    A phenomenalist philosophy which employs the Principle of Acquaintance (PA) plus the Principle that what exists are the referents of certain meaningful terms, defined by PA, cannot include either universals or particulars in its ontology, but is limited to instances of universals as constituting the range of ontological existents. Universals must be omitted since they are repeatable and, hence, never wholly presented or contained, whereas the objects of direct acquaintance are wholly and exhaustively presented. Furthermore, no entities beyond characters (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Roderick M. Chisholm (1983). Boundaries as Dependent Particulars. Grazer Philosophische Studien 20:87-95.score: 18.0
    Körner has made an important distinction between dependent and independent particulars, noting that any adequate theory of categories will divide particulars into those that are independent and those that are not. In the present paper, the concept of a spatial boundary is used to illustrate the concept of a dependent particular. It is suggested that, if we follow Brentano and think of such boundaries as ontologically dependent upon the things of which they may be said to be boundaries, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Andrew Newman, The Bundle Theory for Simple Particulars July 2006 Andrewnewman@Mail.Unomaha.Edu.score: 18.0
    1 A particular may have other particulars as parts, but according to the bundle theory its ultimate constituents are confined to universals. Parts are different from constituents or components. A part is a type of constituent, but there are constituents that are not parts. Parts belong to the same general category as the whole: if a concrete particular has parts, those parts will themselves be concrete particulars. This is not always the case with constituents: the constituents of a (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. L. Nathan Oaklander (1977). Particulars, Positional Qualities, and Individuation. Philosophy of Science 44 (3):478-490.score: 18.0
    In this paper I attempt to show that an argument offered by Bergmann and Hausman against positional qualities and for bare particulars as individuators is unsound. I proceed by giving two ontological assays of an ordinary thing and showing that the entity that individuates on one assay--a bare particular--does not provide deeper ontological ground of individuation than the entity that individuates on the other assay--a positional quality. Since the argument for particulars is based on the premise that only (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Roger Bibace, James D. Laird & Kenneth L. Noiler (2005). Universals and Particulars in the Practices of Psychology and Medicine: Entering a Dialogue. In , Science and Medicine in Dialogue: Thinking Through Particulars and Universals. Praeger.score: 18.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Christopher Gill (2010). Particulars, Selves, and Individuals in Stoic Philosophy. In R. W. Sharples (ed.), Particulars in Greek Philosophy: The Seventh S.V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. Brill.score: 18.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Angela Hobbs (2010). On Christopher Gill on Particulars, Selves, and Individuals in Stoic Philosophy. In R. W. Sharples (ed.), Particulars in Greek Philosophy: The Seventh S.V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. Brill.score: 18.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000