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Pascal Engel [192]Pascale Engel [1]
  1.  70
    Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
    Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.
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  2. Pascal Engel (2009). Epistemic Responsibility Without Epistemic Agency. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.
    This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents.
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  3.  69
    Pascal Engel (2007). Belief and Normativity. Disputatio 2 (23):179-203.
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  4.  7
    Pascal Engel (2002). Truth. Routledge.
    In this critical introduction to contemporary philosophical issues in the theory of truth Pascal Engel provides clear and authoritative exposition of recent and current ideas while providing original perspectives that advances discussion of the key issues. This book begins with a presentation of the classical conceptions of truth - the correspondence theory, the coherence theory and verificationist and pragmatist accounts - before examining so-called minimalist and deflationist conceptions that deny truth can be anything more than a thin concept holding no (...)
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  5. Pascal Engel & Richard Rorty (2007). What's the Use of Truth? Columbia University Press.
     
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  6.  92
    Pascal Engel (1998). Believing, Holding True, and Accepting. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151.
    Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and (...)
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  7. Pascal Engel (2008). In What Sense is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion? Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.
    The knowledge account of assertion (KAA) is the view that assertion is governed by the norm that the speaker should know what s/he asserts. It is not the purpose of this article to examine all the criticisms nor to try to give a full defence of KAA, but only to defend it against the charge of being normatively incorrect. It has been objected that assertion is governed by other norms than knowledge, or by no norm at all. It seems to (...)
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  8.  56
    Pascal Engel (2013). Sosa on the Normativity of Belief. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.
    Sosa takes epistemic normativity to be kind of performance normativity: a belief is correct because a believer sets a positive value to truth as an aim and performs aptly and adroitly. I object to this teleological picture that beliefs are not performances, and that epistemic reasons or beliefs cannot be balanced against practical reasons. Although the picture fits the nature of inquiry, it does not fit the normative nature of believing, which has to be conceived along distinct lines.
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  9.  16
    Pascal Engel (1991). The Norm of Truth: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. University of Toronto Press.
  10.  31
    Pascal Engel (2013). Is Epistemic Agency Possible? Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.
    There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic agents, which is that the structure of reasons for epistemic attitudes differs fundamentally from the structure of reasons for actions. The main differences are that we cannot act for the wrong reasons although we can believe for the wrong reasons, and that reasons for beliefs are exclusive in (...)
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  11.  7
    Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel, Ramsey's Principle Re-Situated.
    This paper is about Ramsey's Principle, according to which a belief's truth-conditions are those that guarantee the success of an action based on that belief whatever the underlying motivating desires. Some philosophers have argued that the Principle should be rejected because it leads to the apparently implausible consequence that any failure of action is the result of some false belief on the agent's part. There is a gap between action and success that cannot be bridged by the agent's cognitive state. (...)
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  12.  21
    Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel (2002). Frank Ramsey: Truth and Success. Routledge.
    This book provides a much-needed critical introduction to the main doctrines of Frank Ramsey's work and assesses their contemporary significance.
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  13.  57
    Pascal Engel (2001). The False Modesty of the Identity Theory of Truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):441 – 458.
    The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name.
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  14. Pascal Engel (2009). Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. OUP Oxford
     
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  15.  64
    Pascal Engel (2005). Logical Reasons. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):21 – 38.
    Simon Blackburn has shown that there is an analogy between the problem of moral motivation in ethics (how can moral reasons move us?) and the problem of what we might call the power of logical reasons (how can logical reasons move us, what is the force of the 'logical must?'). In this paper, I explore further the parallel between the internalism problem in ethics and the problem of the power of logical reasons, and defend a version of psychologism about reasons, (...)
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  16. Pascal Engel (2002). The Norms of Thought: Are They Social? Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148.
    A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that (...)
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  17.  99
    Pascal Engel (2012). Bad Analytic Philosophy. Dialectica 66 (1):1-4.
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  18. Pascal Engel (2007). Va Savoir: De la Connaissance En Général. Hermann.
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  19.  49
    Pascal Engel (1999). Dispositional Belief, Assent, and Acceptance. Dialectica 53 (3-4):211–226.
    I discuss Ruth Marcus' conception of beliefs as dispositional states related to possible states of affaires. While I agree with Marcus that this conception accounts for the necessary distinction between belief and linguistic assent, I argue that the relationship between dispositional beliefs and our assent attitudes is more complex, and should include other mental states, such as acceptances, which, although they contain voluntary elements, are further layers of dispositional doxastic attitudes.
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  20. Pascal Engel (2000). Wherein Lies the Normative Dimension in Meaning and Mental Content? Philosophical Studies 100 (3):305-321.
    This paper argues that the normative dimension in mental and semantic content is not a categorical feature of content, but an hypothetical one, relative to the features of the interpretation of thoughts and meaning. The views of Robert Brandom are discussed. The thesis defended in this paper is not interpretationist about thought. It implies that the normative dimension of content arises from the real capacity of thinkers and speakers to self ascribe thoughts to themselves and to reach self knowledge of (...)
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  21.  12
    Pascal Engel (2015). Is There Really Something Wrong With Contemporary Epistemology? Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (9999):287-296.
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  22. Pascal Engel (2000). I. Categorical Vs Relational Normativity. Philosophical Studies 100:305-321.
     
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  23.  77
    Pascal Engel (2006). Logic, Reasoning and the Logical Constants. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):219-235.
    What is the relationship between logic and reasoning? How do logical norms guide inferential performance? This paper agrees with Gilbert Harman and most of the psychologists that logic is not directly relevant to reasoning. It argues, however, that the mental model theory of logical reasoning allows us to harmonise the basic principles of deductive reasoning and inferential perfomances, and that there is a strong connexion between our inferential norms and actual reasoning, along the lines of Peacocke’s conception of inferential role.
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  24.  32
    Pascal Engel (2005). The Unimportance of Being Modest: A Footnote to McDowell's Note. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (1):89 – 93.
    (2005). The unimportance of being modest: a footnote to McDowell’s note. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 89-93. doi: 10.1080/0967255042000324362.
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  25.  82
    Pascal Engel (2010). Self-Ascriptions of Belief and Transparency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
    Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P.
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  26.  56
    Pascal Engel (1998). Believing, Accepting, and Holding True. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2).
  27.  1
    Pascal Engel (2002). Truth. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking, as is claimed by some radical deflationists. In particular, he shows that some deflationist views have a definitively relativist and "postmodernist" ring and should be rejected. Even if a metaphysically substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, he argues, truth plays a central role as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries (...)
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  28.  88
    Pascal Engel (2002). Intentionality, Normativity, and Community. Facta Philosophica 4 (1):25-49.
    Against the view that the normativity of mental content is social content, I argue that it is not, examining the views of Wittgenstein, Davidson, Brandom and Pettit.
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  29.  15
    Pascal Engel, Belief As a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme.
    In this paper I want to show that, although it is a common thread of many pragmatist or pragmatist-inspired doctrines, the belief-as-disposition-to-act theme is played on very different tunes by the various philosophical performers. A whole book could be devoted to the topic. I shall limit myself here to the views of Peirce, James, Ramsey, contemporary functionalists, and Isaac Levi. Depending on how they interpret this theme, the pragmatist philosophers can emphasise more or less the role of theory and practice (...)
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  30.  51
    Pascal Engel (2012). Trust and the Doxastic Family. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.
    This article examines Keith Lehrer's distinction between belief and acceptance and how it differs from other accounts of belief and of the family of doxastic attitudes. I sketch a different taxonomy of doxastic attitudes. Lehrer's notion of acceptance is mostly epistemic and at the service of his account of the "loop of reason", whereas for other writers acceptance is mostly a pragmatic attitude. I argue, however, that his account of acceptance underdetermines the role that the attitude of trust plays in (...)
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  31. Pascal Engel (2001). Philosophie Et Psychologie. Mind 110 (437):199-203.
     
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  32.  22
    Pascal Engel (1987). Continental Insularity: Contemporary French Analytical Philosophy. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 21:1-19.
    The author recalls some of the reasons why analytical philosophy has been foreign to contemporary fre philosophical tradition. Presenting some recent work by contemporary fre philosophers influenced by analytic philosophy, He shows that most of them share the view that philosophy is a kind of transcendental inquiry on the nature and limits of language, And that recent trends in analytical philosophy, Such as scientific realism and "naturalised epistemology" are not well represented in france.
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  33.  10
    Pascal Engel, The Trouble with W*Ttg*Nst**N.
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  34.  27
    Pascal Engel (2002). Volitionism and Voluntarism About Belief. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):265-281.
    This paper attempts to clarify some issues about what is usually called “doxastic voluntarism”. This phrase often hides a confusion between two separate (although connected) issues: whether beliefis or can be, as a matter of psychological fact, under the control of the will, on the one hand, and whether we can have practical reasons to believe something, or whether our beliefs are subject to any sort of “ought”, on the other hand. The first issue -- which I prefer to call (...)
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  35.  49
    Bengt Hansson, Hans van Ditmarsch, Pascal Engel, Sven Ove Hansson, Vincent Hendricks, Søren Holm, Pauline Jacobson, Anthonie Meijers, Henry S. Richardson & Hans Rott (2011). A Theoria Round Table on Philosophy Publishing. Theoria 77 (2):104-116.
    As part of the conference commemorating Theoria's 75th anniversary, a round table discussion on philosophy publishing was held in Bergendal, Sollentuna, Sweden, on 1 October 2010. Bengt Hansson was the chair, and the other participants were eight editors-in-chief of philosophy journals: Hans van Ditmarsch (Journal of Philosophical Logic), Pascal Engel (Dialectica), Sven Ove Hansson (Theoria), Vincent Hendricks (Synthese), Søren Holm (Journal of Medical Ethics), Pauline Jacobson (Linguistics and Philosophy), Anthonie Meijers (Philosophical Explorations), Henry S. Richardson (Ethics) and Hans Rott (Erkenntnis).
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  36. Pascal Engel (1994). Davidson Et la Philosophie du Langage. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  37.  2
    Pascal Engel, Croyances Collectives Et Intentions Partagées.
    Draft as of 2001 of a book chapter a^ppeared in 2005. This paper gives an account of the belief/ acceptance distrinction applied to the issue of collective beliefs and intentionality in terms of the "doctrinal dilemma" proposed by some legal theorists.
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  38.  59
    Pascal Engel (1991). Interpretation Without Hermeneutics: A Plea Against Ecumenism. Topoi 10 (2):137-146.
    Many contemporary writers (and Richard Rorty in particular) have attempted to define an "ecumenistic" position, according to which "continental" and "analytic" philosophy should join forces and work together. This has been claimed on behalf of supposed similarities between hermeneutics and interpretation theory. The author tries to show, comparing Gadamer and Davidson on interpretation, that there are, on the contrary, huge differences between these respective approaches.
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  39.  1
    Pascal Engel (1993). Mental-Model Theory and Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345.
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  40.  4
    Pascal Engel (2005). Croyances collectives et intentions partagées (2001). In Alain Leroux & Pierre Livet (eds.), Leçons de Philosophie Économique. Economica 129--143.
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  41.  14
    Pascal Engel (1999). Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Norms. The Monist 82 (2):218-234.
    What is the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? That the former has not withdrawn norms of justification and truth, whereas the latter has bred suspicion about them.
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  42.  16
    Pascal Engel (2013). Trois conceptions de la connaissance littéraire : cognitive, affective, pratique. Philosophiques 40 (1):121.
    Pascal Engel | : À partir d’une typologie des formes de connaissance, je soutiens qu’il y a trois formes principales de connaissance littéraire : cognitive propositionnelle, affective et pratique. La conception propositionnelle est erronée : la littérature ne fournit pas directement une forme de savoir que. La conception affective ou expressiviste peut au mieux dire qu’il y a des effets cognitifs des oeuvres littéraires. La conception pratique a le plus de chances d’être correcte, mais seulement si l’on accepte l’idée que (...)
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  43.  21
    Pascal Engel (1988). Radical Interpretation and the Structure of Thought. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:161-177.
    It is often argued that a radical interpretation procedure for the analysis of thought (especially davidson's) is committed to the thesis that thoughts are essentially structured entities, And is therefore false because many structures of thought do not match linguistic or semantic structures. The author attempts to defend davidson's theory of radical interpretation against such criticisms and to show that the interdependence of thought and language presupposed by this theory does not mean a primacy of either one over the other.
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  44. Pascal Engel (2013). Belief and the Right Kind of Reason. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):19-34.
     
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  45.  3
    Pascal Engel (2002). Descartes y la responsabilidad epistémica. Laguna 10:9-26.
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  46.  8
    Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel (2005). Ramsey's Principle Re-Situated. In Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. OUP Oxford
    This paper is about Ramsey's Principle, according to which a belief's truth-conditions are those that guarantee the success of an action based on that belief whatever the underlying motivating desires. Some philosophers have argued that the Principle should be rejected because it leads to the apparently implausible consequence that any failure of action is the result of some false belief on the agent's part. There is a gap between action and success that cannot be bridged by the agent's cognitive state. (...)
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  47. Pascal Engel (1998). 1. Suppose You Leaf Through the Pages of a Book on Taoism 1, Written by a Renowned Expert, and That You Do Not Know Nothing About the Tao, or Chinese Philosophy, or Even the Chinese Language, and You Read This. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140-151.
     
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  48.  8
    Pascal Engel (2002). La Rationalité Est-Elle Incodifiable? Philosophia Scientiae 6 (2):91-107.
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  49. Pascal Engel (ed.) (2000). Believing and Accepting. Kluwer.
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  50.  6
    Pascal Engel (1995). Le « patternalisme » de Dennett. Philosophiques 22 (2):197-212.
    On expose et discute dans cet article la théorie instrumentante de l'intentionnalité de Dennett. Ce dernier a tenté récemment de montrer que cette théorie n'avait pas les conséquences antiréalistes qu'on lui prête habituellement, en recourant à la notion de « trames » sous tendant les attributions en « posture intentionnelle ». On montre cependant que cette notion ne permet pas d'accomplir le travail que Dennett entend lui faire accomplir. Elle est trop indéterminée pour satisfaire les intuitions réalistes, parce que Dennett (...)
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