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  1. Pat A. Manfredi (2012). The Compatibility of a Priori Knowledge and Empirical Defeasibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (Supplement):159-177.
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  2. Pat A. Manfredi (1998). Deconstructing the Mind. Teaching Philosophy 21 (1):99-103.
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  3. Donna M. Summerfield & Pat A. Manfredi (1998). Indeterminacy in Recent Theories of Content. Minds and Machines 8 (2):181-202.
    Jerry Fodor has charged that Fred Dretske's account of content suffers from indeterminacy to the extent that we should reject it in favor of Fodor‘s own account. In this paper, we ask what the problem of indeterminacy really is; we distinguish a relatively minor problem we call ‘looseness of fit’ from a major problem of failing to show how to point to what is not there. We sketch Dretske's account of content and how it is supposed to solve the major (...)
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  4. Pat A. Manfredi (1993). Tacit Beliefs and Other Doxastic Attitudes. Philosophia 22 (1-2):95-117.
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  5. Pat A. Manfredi (1993). Two Routes to Narrow Content: Both Dead Ends. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.
    If psychology requires a taxonomy that categorizes mental states according to their causal powers, the common sense method of individuating mental states (a taxonomy by intentional content) is unacceptable because mental states can have different intentional content, but identical causal powers. This difference threatens both the vindication of belief/desire psychology and the viability of scientific theories whose posits include intentional states. To resolve this conflict, Fodor has proposed that for scientific purposes mental states should be classified by their narrow content. (...)
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  6. Pat A. Manfredi & Donna M. Summerfield (1992). Robustness Without Asymmetry: A Flaw in Fodor's Theory of Content. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 66 (3):261-83.
  7. Pat A. Manfredi (1986). Processing or Pickup: Conflicting Approaches to Perception. Mind and Language 1 (3):181-200.
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