Search results for 'Patricia Bowen-Moore' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Patricia Bowen Moore (1987). Natality, Amor Mundi, and Nuclearism in the Thought of Hannah Arendt. In James William Bernauer (ed.), Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada Kluwer Academic Publishers.score: 870.0
     
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  2. H. Eugene Hern, Barbara A. Koenig, Lisa Jean Moore & Patricia A. Marshall (1998). The Difference That Culture Can Make in End-of-Life Decisionmaking. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 7 (01):27-40.score: 240.0
    Cultural difference has been largely ignored within bioethics, particularly within the end-of-life discourses and practices that have developed over the past two decades in the U.S. healthcare system. Yet how should culturebe taken into account?
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  3. Jill Moore, Marice Ashe, Patricia Gray & Doug Blanke (2003). Should Your State Have: A Public Health Law Center? Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 31 (s4):58-59.score: 240.0
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  4. Patricia Le Baccon & Andrew Moore (2012). Biology and Microscopy: The Friendship Strengthens…. Bioessays 34 (5):329-329.score: 240.0
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  5. Julia Moore, Jennifer A. Scarduzio, Brielle Plump & Patricia Geist-Martin (2013). The Light and Shadow of Feminist Research Mentorship: A Collaborative Autoethnography of Faculty-Student Research. Journal of Research Practice 9 (2):Article M8 (proof).score: 240.0
    “Research assistant” is a term used to describe student researchers across a variety of contexts and encompasses a wide array of duties, rewards, and costs. As critical/qualitative scholars situated in a discipline that rarely offers funded research assistantships to graduate students, we explore how we have engaged in faculty-student research in one particularly understudied context: the independent study. Using narrative writing and reflection within a framework of collaborative autoethnography, the first three authors reflect as three “generations” of protégés who were (...)
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  6. Michael S. Moore (2012). Moore's Truths About Causation and Responsibility: A Reply to Alexander and Ferzan. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):445-462.score: 210.0
    In this response to the review of Moore, Causation and Responsibility, by Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan, previously published in this journal, two issues are discussed. The first is whether causation, counterfactual dependence, moral blame, and culpability, are all scalar properties or relations, that is, matters of more-or-less rather than either-or. The second issue discussed is whether deontological moral obligation is best described as a prohibition against using another as a means, or rather, as a prohibition on an agent strongly (...)
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  7. G. E. Moore (1993). G.E. Moore: Selected Writings. Routledge.score: 210.0
    G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World (...)
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  8. G. E. Moore, Moore's Margin Notes on Reid.score: 180.0
  9. G. E. Moore (1959). G. E. Moore. Mind 68 (269):1-1.score: 180.0
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  10. S. Moore (2001). In What Follows, We Shall Bring Out as Clearly as Possible These Points of Similarities That Moore's Thinking on Goodness Have with Phenomenological Thinking on Values. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 28:N0 - 2.score: 180.0
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  11. Barbara M. Kinach & Carol A. Moore (1991). Kinach/Moore Bibliography (From Page 7). Inquiry 8 (2):13-13.score: 180.0
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  12. G. E. Moore (1986). G.E. Moore: The Early Essays. Temple University Press.score: 180.0
     
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  13. Patricia Bowen-Moore (1989). Hannah Arendt's Philosophy of Natality. St. Martin's Press.score: 87.0
  14. Patricia Bowen-Moore (2004). Richard Feist and William Sweet, Eds., Husserl and Stein Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 24 (4):251-253.score: 87.0
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  15. Charles Pigden (2007). Desiring to Desire: Russell, Lewis and G.E.Moore. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes from G.E.Moore. Oxford University Press. 244-260.score: 27.0
    I have two aims in this paper. In §§2-4 I contend that Moore has two arguments (not one) for the view that that ‘good’ denotes a non-natural property not to be identified with the naturalistic properties of science and common sense (or, for that matter, the more exotic properties posited by metaphysicians and theologians). The first argument, the Barren Tautology Argument (or the BTA), is derived, via Sidgwick, from a long tradition of anti-naturalist polemic. But the second argument, the Open (...)
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  16. Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.score: 24.0
    We shall evaluate two strategies for motivating the view that knowledge is the norm of belief. The first draws on observations concerning belief's aim and the parallels between belief and assertion. The second appeals to observations concerning Moore's Paradox. Neither of these strategies gives us good reason to accept the knowledge account. The considerations offered in support of this account motivate only the weaker account on which truth is the fundamental norm of belief.
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  17. Guy Fletcher (2008). 'Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value'. Social Theory and Practice 34 (4):517-32.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining the charge of inconsistency that Moore (...)
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  18. Anthony Brueckner (2009). Moore-Paradoxicality and the Principle of Charity. Theoria 75 (3):245-247.score: 24.0
    In a recent article in Theoria , Hamid Vahid offered an explanation of the phenomenon of Moore-paradoxicality which employed Davidson's Principle of Charity regarding radical interpretation. I argue here that Vahid's explanation fails.
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  19. Timothy Chan (2010). Moore's Paradox is Not Just Another Pragmatic Paradox. Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.score: 24.0
    One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according (...)
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  20. Luca Moretti (2014). The Dogmatist, Moore's Proof and Transmission Failure. Analysis 74 (3):382-389.score: 24.0
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore’s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore’s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn’t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.
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  21. Jack Woods (2014). Expressivism and Moore's Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (5):1-12.score: 24.0
    Expressivists explain the expression relation which obtains between sincere moral assertion and the conative or affective attitude thereby expressed by appeal to the relation which obtains between sincere assertion and belief. In fact, they often explicitly take the relation between moral assertion and their favored conative or affective attitude to be exactly the same as the relation between assertion and the belief thereby expressed. If this is correct, then we can use the identity of the expression relation in the two (...)
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  22. Amy Kind (2003). Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.score: 24.0
    I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. (...)
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  23. Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.score: 24.0
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions (...)
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  24. Nikolay Milkov (2004). G. E. Moore and the Greifswald Objectivists on the Given and the Beginning of Analytic Philosophy. Axiomathes 14 (4):361-379.score: 24.0
    Shortly before G. E. Moore wrote down the formative for the early analytic philosophy lectures on Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1910–1911), he had become acquainted with two books which influenced his thought: (1) a book by Husserl's pupil August Messer and (2) a book by the Greifswald objectivist Dimitri Michaltschew. Central to Michaltschew's book was the concept of the given. In Part I, I argue that Moore elaborated his concept of sense-data in the wake of the Greifswald concept. Carnap (...)
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  25. John N. Williams (2006). Moore's Paradox and Conscious Belief. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.score: 24.0
    For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don.
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  26. Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (2011). Moore's Paradox, Truth and Accuracy. Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.score: 24.0
    G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a better (...)
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  27. Susana Nuccetelli (2009). Sosa's Moore and the New Dogmatists. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):180-186.score: 24.0
    Abstract: Some seventy years ago, G. E. Moore invoked his own sensory experience (as of a hand before him in the right circumstances), added some philosophical analysis about externality, and took himself to have offered his "Proof" of the existence of an external world. Current neo-Mooreans either reject completely the standard negative assessment of the Proof or qualify it substantially. For Sosa, the Proof can be persuasive, but only when read literally as offering reasons for the conclusion that there is (...)
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  28. Ian Proops (2006). Soames on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Moore and Russell. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 129 (3):627–635.score: 24.0
    A critical discussion of selected chapters of the first volume of Scott Soames’s Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. It is argued that this volume falls short of the minimal standards of scholarship appropriate to a work that advertises itself as a history, and, further, that Soames’s frequent heuristic simplifications and distortions, since they are only sporadically identified as such, are more likely confuse than to enlighten the student. These points are illustrated by reference to Soames’s discussions of Russell’s logical (...)
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  29. Michael Cholbi (2009). Moore's Paradox and Moral Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.score: 24.0
    Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can be traced (...)
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  30. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief. Erkenntnis 61 (1):99-121.score: 24.0
    Propositions such as <It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining> are paradoxical, in that even though they can be true, they cannot be truly asserted or believed. This is Moore’s paradox. Sydney Shoemaker has recently ar- gued that the paradox arises from a constitutive relation that holds between first- and second-order beliefs. This paper explores this approach to the paradox. Although Shoemaker’s own account of the paradox is rejected, a different account along similar lines is (...)
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  31. Hamid Vahid (2008). Radical Interpretation and Moore's Paradox. Theoria 74 (2):146-163.score: 24.0
    Abstract: Moore's sentences of the form "P & ∼I believe that P" and "P & I believe that ∼P" are thought to be paradoxical because they cannot be properly asserted despite being possibly true. Solutions to the paradox usually explain the oddity of such sentences in terms of phenomena as diverse as the pragmatics of speech acts, nature of belief or justification. In this paper I shall argue that despite their seemingly different approaches to the problem, there is a single (...)
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  32. John N. Williams (2004). Moore's Paradoxes, Evans's Principle and Self-Knowledge. Analysis 64 (284):348-353.score: 24.0
    I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes.
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  33. Andrew Chignell (2006). Review: Moore, Noble in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Varitation in Kant's Moral and Religious Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 115 (1):118-121.score: 24.0
  34. John N. Williams (2012). Moore-Paradoxical Belief, Conscious Belief and the Epistemic Ramsey Test. Synthese 188 (2):231-246.score: 24.0
    Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to (...)
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  35. John N. Williams (2010). Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief. Theoria 76 (3):221-248.score: 24.0
    In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief. The (...)
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  36. William S. Larkin (1999). Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-52.score: 24.0
    Shoemaker argues that a satisfactory resolution of Moore's paradox requires a _self-intimation thesis that posits a "constitutive relation between belief and believing that one believes." He claims that such a thesis is needed to explain the crucial fact that the assent conditions for '_P' entail those for '_I believe that P'. This paper argues for an alternative resolution of Moore's paradox that provides for an adequate explanation of the crucial fact without relying on the kind of necessary connection between first (...)
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  37. John Williams (2012). Moore-Paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief. Acta Analytica 27 (1):9-12.score: 24.0
    I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.
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  38. David G. Stern, Gabriel Citron & Brian Rogers (forthcoming). Moore's Notes on Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933: Text, Context, and Content. Nordic Wittgenstein Review.score: 24.0
    Wittgenstein’s writings and lectures during the first half of the 1930s play a crucial role in any interpretation of the relationship between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations . G. E. Moore’s notes of Wittgenstein’s Cambridge lectures, 1930-1933, offer us a remarkably careful and conscientious record of what Wittgenstein said at the time, and are much more detailed and reliable than previously published notes from those lectures. The co-authors are currently editing these notes of Wittgenstein’s lectures for a book to (...)
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  39. William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji (2013). Confirmation, Transitivity, and Moore: The Screening-Off Approach. Philosophical Studies (3):1-21.score: 24.0
    It is well known that the probabilistic relation of confirmation is not transitive in that even if E confirms H1 and H1 confirms H2, E may not confirm H2. In this paper we distinguish four senses of confirmation and examine additional conditions under which confirmation in different senses becomes transitive. We conduct this examination both in the general case where H1 confirms H2 and in the special case where H1 also logically entails H2. Based on these analyses, we argue that (...)
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  40. John N. Williams (2014). Moore's Paradox in Belief and Desire. Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.score: 24.0
    Is there a Moore’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative examples (...)
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  41. John N. Williams (2013). Moore's Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.score: 24.0
    Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such asBangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailandare ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this will translate (...)
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  42. John N. Williams (2013). The Completeness of the Pragmatic Solution to Moore's Paradox in Belief: A Reply to Chan. Synthese 190 (12):2457-2476.score: 24.0
    Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘ p and I do not believe that p ’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. Chan, who also takes the absurdity to be a (...)
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  43. Charles Pigden (2004). Review of G.E.Moore’s Ethical Theory by Brian Hutchinson. [REVIEW] International Philosophical Quarterly:543-547.score: 24.0
    The history of philosophy can be seen either as a contribution to history or a contribution to philosophy or perhaps as a bit of both. Hutchinson fail on both counts. The book is bad: bad in itself (since it quite definitely ought not to be) and bad as a companion to Principia (since it sets students a bad example of slapdash, lazy and pretentious philosophizing and would tend to put them off reading Moore). As a conscientious reviewer I ploughed through (...)
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  44. Philip Stratton-Lake & Brad Hooker (2006). Scanlon Versus Moore on Goodness. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 149.score: 24.0
  45. Attila Tanyi (2009). Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and Tolerable Revisionism: Lessons From Moore and Parfit. Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico 212:49-57.score: 24.0
    My aim in this paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Desire-based Reasons Model or the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then consider attempts to argue against the Model through its naturalism. I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is the indirect version of G. E. Moore’s Open (...)
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  46. Avrum Stroll (2001). Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (1).score: 24.0
    Analytic philosophy is difficult to define since it is not so much a specific doctrine as a loose concatenation of approaches to problems. As well as having strong ties to scientism -the notion that only the methods of the natural sciences give rise to knowledge -it also has humanistic ties to the great thinkers and philosophical problems of the past. Moreover, no single feature characterizes the activities of analytic philosophers. Undaunted by these difficulties, Avrum Stroll investigates the "family resemblances" between (...)
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  47. Cláudio de Almeida (2009). Racionalidade epistêmica e o Paradoxo de Moore. Veritas 54 (2).score: 24.0
    G. E. Moore identified a peculiar form of epistemic irrationality. Wittgenstein called it “Moore’s Paradox”. Neither of them knew exactly what he was talking about. And yet, the vast literature on the problem leaves no room for doubt: the paradox is deep; its resolution, elusive. But, up until now, we haven’t been in a position to appreciate its importance for contemporary epistemology. This paper puts forward an epistemological solution to the paradox. It also seeks to show that the paradox yields (...)
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  48. John N. Williams (2013). Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox. Theoria 80 (3).score: 24.0
    John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of (...)
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  49. Qudsia Mirza (1999). Patricia Williams: Inflecting Critical Race Theory. [REVIEW] Feminist Legal Studies 7 (2):111-132.score: 24.0
    Critical Race Theory (C.R.T.) has developed out of a deep dissatisfaction that many black legal scholars in the U.S. felt with liberal civil rights discourse, a discourse premised upon the ideals of assimilation, ‘colour-blindness’ and integration. In addition, the emergence of the Critical Legal Studies movement provided Critical Race theorists with an innovative lexicon and practice which allowed them to develop a critique of traditional race analysis and U.S. law. Patricia Williams has played a key role in the formation (...)
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  50. Emmanuel Picavet (2005). Sidgwick, Moore et l'approche économique de l'utilité des règles ordinaires. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 3 (3):333-347.score: 24.0
    Cet article est consacré aux arguments naturalistes mobilisés par Henry Sidgwick et par George Edward Moore dans l'analyse de l'utilité des règles morales ordinaires. Les hypothèses évolutionnistes d'arrière-plan et l'observation des conditions naturelles des interactions humaines typiques jouent un rôle décisif dans ce contexte, de même que l'attention spécifique aux limitations cognitives dans l'espèce humaine. Sur certains points, des analyses décisionnelles et économiques plus récentes viennent préciser des intuitions remarquables de ces auteurs et donnent un aperçu des rapports qui se (...)
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