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Profile: Patricia Smith Churchland (University of California, San Diego)
  1.  83
    Patricia S. Churchland (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press.
    This is a unique book. It is excellently written, crammed with information, wise and a pleasure to read.' ---Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University.
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  2.  13
    Willard Van Orman Quine, Patricia Smith Churchland & Dagfinn Føllesdal (2013). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
    Willard Van Orman Quine begins this influential work by declaring, "Language is asocial art.
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  3. Patricia S. Churchland, Terrence J. Sejnowksi & Brian P. McLaughlin (1996). The Computational Brain. Philosophy of Science 63 (1):137.
     
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  4. Patricia S. Churchland (1988). Reduction and the Neurobiological Basis of Consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press
  5. Patricia S. Churchland (2012). Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality. Princeton University Press.
    What is morality? Where does it come from? And why do most of us heed its call most of the time? In Braintrust, neurophilosophy pioneer Patricia Churchland argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. She describes the "neurobiological platform of bonding" that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behavior. The result is a provocative genealogy of morals that asks us to reevaluate the priority given to religion, absolute rules, and (...)
     
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  6. Patricia S. Churchland (2002). Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. MIT Press.
    A neurophilosopher?s take on the self, free will, human understanding, and the experience of God, from the perspective of the brain.
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  7.  98
    Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1981). Functionalism, Qualia and Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):121-32.
  8. Patricia S. Churchland, V. S. Ramachandran & Terrence J. Sejnowski (1993). A Critique of Pure Vision. In Christof Koch & Joel L. David (eds.), Large-scale neuronal theories of the brain. MIT Press 23.
    Anydomainofscientificresearchhasitssustainingorthodoxy. Thatis, research on a problem, whether in astronomy, physics, or biology, is con- ducted against a backdrop of broadly shared assumptions. It is these as- sumptionsthatguideinquiryandprovidethecanonofwhatisreasonable-- of what "makes sense." And it is these shared assumptions that constitute a framework for the interpretation of research results. Research on the problem of how we see is likewise sustained by broadly shared assump- tions, where the current orthodoxy embraces the very general idea that the business of the visual system is to (...)
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  9. Patricia S. Churchland (1983). Consciousness: The Transmutation of a Concept. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):80-95.
     
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  10. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1994). Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist's Field Guide. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell
  11.  86
    Patricia S. Churchland (1981). The Timing of Sensations: Reply to Libet. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):492-7.
  12.  44
    Patricia S. Churchland (1981). On the Alleged Backward Referral of Experience and its Relevance to the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy of Science 48 (June):165-81.
    A remarkable hypothesis has recently been advanced by Libet and promoted by Eccles which claims that there is standardly a backwards referral of conscious experiences in time, and that this constitutes empirical evidence for the failure of identity of brain states and mental states. Libet's neurophysiological data are critically examined and are found insufficient to support the hypothesis. Additionally, it is argued that even if there is a temporal displacement phenomenon to be explained, a neurophysiological explanation is most likely.
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  13.  58
    Patricia S. Churchland (1980). A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research. Journal of Philosophy 77 (April):185-207.
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  14.  49
    Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1998). On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997. Cambridge: MIT Press.
    This collection was prepared in the belief that the most useful and revealing of anyone's writings are often those shorter essays penned in conflict with...
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  15. Patricia S. Churchland (1980). Language, Thought, and Information Processing. Noûs 14 (May):147-70.
  16.  36
    Christopher L. Suhler & Patricia S. Churchland (2009). Control: Conscious and Otherwise. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (8):341-347.
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  17. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1990). Could a Machine Think? Scientific American 262 (1):32-37.
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  18. Patricia Churchland, The Big Questions: Do We Have Free Will?
    As neuroscience uncovers these and other mechanisms regulating choices and social behaviour, we cannot help but wonder whether anyone truly chooses anything (though see "Is the universe deterministic?"). As a result, profound questions about responsibility are inescapable, not just regarding criminal justice, but in the day-to-day business of life. Given that, I suggest that free will, as traditionally understood, needs modification. Because of its importance in society, any description of free will updated to fit what we know about the nervous (...)
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  19.  38
    Patricia Smith Churchland (2002). Brain Wise. The MIT Press.
    A neurophilosopher?s take on the self, free will, human understanding, and the experience of God, from the perspective of the brain.
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  20. William D. Casebeer & Patricia S. Churchland (2003). The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):169-194.
    We critically review themushrooming literature addressing the neuralmechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reachingthe following broad conclusions: (1) researchmainly focuses on three inter-relatedcategories: the moral emotions, moral socialcognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2)Research varies in terms of whether it deploysecologically valid or experimentallysimplified conceptions of moral cognition. Themore ecologically valid the experimentalregime, the broader the brain areas involved.(3) Much of the research depends on simplifyingassumptions about the domain of moral reasoningthat are motivated by the need to makeexperimental progress. This is a (...)
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  21. Patricia S. Churchland (1996). The Hornswoggle Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):402-8.
    Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have propsed setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind as ‘the most difficult problem’. When critically examined, the basis for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter-productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of ‘I-cannot-imagine’ arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known about a domain of phenomena, our inability to imagine (...)
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  22. Patricia S. Churchland (1987). Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience. Journal of Philosophy 84 (October):546-53.
  23.  50
    Patricia S. Churchland (1978). Fodor on Language Learning. Synthese 38 (May):149-59.
  24.  5
    Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1983). Content: Semantic and Information-Theoretic. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):67.
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  25. Patricia Smith Churchland, The Impact of Neuroscience on Philosophy.
    Philosophy, in its traditional guise, addresses questions where experimental science has not yet nailed down plausible explanatory theories. Thus, the ancient Greeks pondered the nature of life, the sun, and tides, but also how we learn and make decisions. The history of science can be seen as a gradual process whereby speculative philosophy cedes intellectual space to increasingly wellgrounded experimental disciplines—first astronomy, but followed by physics, chemistry, geology, biology, archaeology, and more recently, ethology, psychology, and neuroscience. Science now encompasses plausible (...)
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  26.  7
    Patricia Smith Churchland & Paul M. Churchland (1978). Internal States and Cognitive Theories. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):565.
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  27. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (2003). Recent Work on Consciousness: Philosophical, Theoretical, and Empirical. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. Amsterdam: J Benjamins 49--123.
  28.  21
    Patricia S. Churchland (2015). The Neurobiological Platform for Moral Values. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:97-110.
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  29.  65
    Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1983). Stalking the Wild Epistemic Engine. Noûs 17 (March):5-18.
  30.  30
    Patricia Smith Churchland (2007). The Necessary-and-Sufficient Boondoggle. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):54-55.
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  31.  97
    Patricia S. Churchland (1994). Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything About Consciousness? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4):23-40.
  32.  86
    Patricia Churchland, A Neurophilosophical Slant on Consciousness Research.
    Explaining the nature and mechanisms of conscious experience in neurobiological terms seems to be an attainable, if yet unattained, goal. Research at many levels is important, including research at the cellular level that explores the role of recurrent pathways between thalamic nuclei and the cortex, and research that explores consciousness from the perspective of action. Conceptually, a clearer understanding of the logic of expressions such as ‘‘causes’’ and ‘‘correlates’’, and about what to expect from a theory of consciousness are required. (...)
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  33. Rick Grush & Patricia S. Churchland (1998). Computation and the Brain. In Robert A. Wilson & Frank F. Keil (eds.), Mit Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (Mitecs). MIT Press
    Two very different insights motivate characterizing the brain as a computer. One depends on mathematical theory that defines computability in a highly abstract sense. Here the foundational idea is that of a Turing machine. Not an actual machine, the Turing machine is really a conceptual way of making the point that any well-defined function could be executed, step by step, according to simple 'if-you-are-in-state-P-and-have-input-Q-then-do-R' rules, given enough time (maybe infinite time) [see COMPUTATION]. Insofar as the brain is a device whose (...)
     
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  34. Patricia S. Churchland & Terrence J. Sejnowski (1989). Neural Representation and Neural Computation. In L. Nadel (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives. MIT Press 343-382.
  35.  90
    Patricia Churchland (2003). The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):169-194.
    We critically review themushrooming literature addressing the neuralmechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reachingthe following broad conclusions: (1) researchmainly focuses on three inter-relatedcategories: the moral emotions, moral socialcognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2)Research varies in terms of whether it deploysecologically valid or experimentallysimplified conceptions of moral cognition. Themore ecologically valid the experimentalregime, the broader the brain areas involved.(3) Much of the research depends on simplifyingassumptions about the domain of moral reasoningthat are motivated by the need to makeexperimental progress. This is a (...)
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  36.  36
    Paul M. Churchland & Patricia Smith Churchland (1981). Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):121-145.
  37.  58
    Patricia Smith Churchland & Terrence J. Sejnowski (1990). Neural Representation and Neural Computation. Philosophical Perspectives 4:343-382.
  38.  5
    Patricia Smith Churchland (1986). Replies to Comments. Inquiry 29 (1-4):241 – 272.
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  39. Patricia Smith Churchland, Rick Grush, Rob Wilson & Frank Keil, Computation and the Brain.
    Two very different insights motivate characterizing the brain as a computer. One depends on mathematical theory that defines computability in a highly abstract sense. Here the foundational idea is that of a Turing machine. Not an actual machine, the Turing machine is really a conceptual way of making the point that any well-defined function could be executed, step by step, according to simple 'if-you-are-in-state-P-and-have-input-Q-then-do-R' rules, given enough time (maybe infinite time) [see COMPUTATION]. Insofar as the brain is a device whose (...)
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  40. Patricia S. Churchland (1981). Is Determinism Self-Refuting? Mind 90 (January):99-101.
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  41.  76
    Patricia S. Churchland & Paul M. Churchland, Neural Worlds and Real Worlds.
    States of the brain represent states of the world. A puzzle arises when one learns that at least some of the mind/brain’s internal representations, such as a sensation of heat or a sensation of red, do not genuinely resemble the external realities they allegedly represent: the mean kinetic energy of the molecules of the substance felt (temperature) and the mean electromagnetic reflectance profile of the seen object (color). The historical response has been to declare a distinction between objectively real properties, (...)
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  42.  14
    Patricia Smith Churchland (1983). Dennett' Instrumentalism: A Frog at the Bottom of the Mug. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):358.
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  43. Patricia S. Churchland & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (1993). Filling In: Why Dennett is Wrong. In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell
     
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  44.  17
    Patricia S. Churchland (2008). Human Dignity From a Neurophilosophical Perspective. In Adam Schulman (ed.), Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. [President's Council on Bioethics
  45. Why Dennett is Wrong, Patricia Smith Churchland & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (1994). Filling In. In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum
     
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  46. Patricia S. Churchland (2005). Moral Decision-Making and the Brain. In Judy Illes (ed.), Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy. OUP Oxford
     
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  47.  75
    Patricia Churchland & JeeLoo Liu, The Nature of Consciousness Handout [11].
    *[Intertheoretic Reduction]: ___ When a new and very powerful theory turns out to entail a set of propositions and principles that mirror perfectly the propositions of some older theory or conceptual framework, we can conclude that the old terms and the new terms refer to the very same thing, or express the very same properties. (e.g. heat = high average molecular kinetic energy) The old theory is then said to be "reducible" to the new theory.
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  48.  39
    Patricia S. Churchland (1982). Mind-Brain Reduction: New Light From Philosophy of Science. Neuroscience 7:1041-7.
  49.  1
    Patricia Smith Churchland (1981). How Many Angels…? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1):103.
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  50.  12
    Patricia Churchland (1990). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Theory of the Mind/Brain. Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):93-102.
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