39 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Patricia Greenspan [22]Patricia S. Greenspan [17]
See also:
Profile: Patricia Greenspan (University of Maryland, College Park)
  1. Patricia Greenspan, Darwinian Psychiatry and Women's Depression.
    The language of evolutionary biology and psychology is built on concepts applicable in the first instance to individual strategic rationality but extended to the level of genetic explanation. Current discussions of mental disorders as evolutionary adaptations would apply that extended language back to the individual level, with potentially problematic moral/political implications as well as possibilities of confusion. This paper focuses on one particularly problematic area: the explanation of women's greater tendency to depression. The suggestion that there are "good evolutionary reasons" (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Patricia Greenspan, Holding Psychopaths Responsible Holding Psychopaths Responsible.
    • But this rests on the debatable view that understanding a moral reason implies being motivated to conform to it. Psychopaths do seem to have at least a “rote” or emotionally shallow understanding that their acts are wrong.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Patricia Greenspan, Asymmetrical Practical Reasons.
    Current treatments of practical rationality understand reasons as considerations counting in favor of or against some practical option, treating the positive and the negative case as symmetrical. Typically the focus is on examples of positive reasons. However, I want to shift the spotlight to negative reasons, as making a tighter or more direct link to rationality — and ultimately to morality, which is what much of the current interest in reasons is meant to clarify. Recognizing a positive/negative asymmetry in normative (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Patricia Greenspan, Emotions, Innateness, and Ethics.
    My discussion below is an highly abbreviated version of a paper in preparation for a conference on innateness . I allow for both types of influence but suggest that more attention should be paid to mechanisms of social transfer of emotions, as a possible innate source of plasticity in moral learning via emotions - and hence of cultural variation in moral codes.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Patricia Greenspan, Reconceiving Practical Reasons.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Patricia S. Greenspan, Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem(S).
    I was led to this clarificatory job initially by some puzzlement from a philosopher's standpoint about just why free will questions should come up particularly in connection with the genome project, as opposed to the many other scientific research programs that presuppose determinism. The philosophic concept of determinism involves explanation of all events, including human action, by prior causal factors--so that whether or not human behavior has a genetic basis, it ultimately gets traced back to _something_ true of the world (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Patricia S. Greenspan, David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit (eds.) (forthcoming). Genetics and Criminal Behavior: Methods, Meanings, and Morals. Cambridge University Press.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Patricia Greenspan (2012). Free Will and Rational Coherency. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):185-200.
  9. Patricia Greenspan (2011). Craving the Right: Emotions and Moral Reasons. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press. 39.
    I first began working on emotions as a project in philosophy of action, without particular reference to moral philosophy. My thought was that emotions have a distinctive role to play in rationality that tends to be underappreciated by philosophers. Bringing this out was meant to counter a widespread tendency to treat emotions as “blind” causes of action (for the general picture, see Greenspan 2009.) Instead, I thought that emotions could be seen as providing reasons. I took their significance as moral (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Patricia Greenspan (2010). Learning Emotions and Ethics. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
    Innate emotional bases of ethics have been proposed by authors in evolutionary psychology, following Darwin and his sources in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Philosophers often tend to view such theories as irrelevant to, or even as tending to undermine, the project of moral philosophy. But the importance of emotions to early moral learning gives them a role to play in determining the content of morality. I argue, first, that research on neural circuits indicates that the basic elements or components of emotions (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Patricia Greenspan (2010). Making Room for Options: Moral Reasons, Imperfect Duties, and Choice. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):181-205.
    The notion of an imperfect obligation or duty, which contemporary moral philosophy takes from Kantian ethics, affords a way of mitigating morality’s demands while recognizing moral obligation as “binding” or inescapable, in Kant’s terms: something an agent cannot get out of just by appealing to ends or priorities of her own. A perfect duty, as Kant puts it, allows no exception in the interest of inclination.1 It tells us precisely what we must do, with no option of putting it off (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Patricia Greenspan (2009). Resting Content: Sensible Satisficing? American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):305 - 317.
    Suppose I am now making plans for next summer’s vacation. I can spend a week in Rome or on the Riviera, but not both. Either choice would be excellent, but after weighing various pros and cons, I decide that for my purposes Rome would be better. If I am rational, then, I must choose Rome. It is an assumption of standard decision theory that rationality requires maximizing: trying to get the maximum amount of whatever form of value we are after (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Sensible Satisficing & Patricia Greenspan (2009). Philosophical Abstracts. Review of Metaphysics 63:503-523.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Patricia Greenspan (2007). Practical Reasons and Moral 'Ought'. In Russell Schafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. II. Clarendon Press. 172-194.
    Morality is a source of reasons for action, what philosophers call practical reasons. Kantians say that it ‘gives’ reasons to everyone. We can even think of moral requirements as amounting to particularly strong or stringent reasons, in an effort to demystify deontological views like Kant’s, with its insistence on inescapable or ‘binding’ moral requirements or ‘oughts.’¹ When we say that someone morally ought not to harm others, perhaps all we are saying is that he has a certain kind of reason (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Patricia S. Greenspan (2004). Emotions, Rationality, and Mind-Body. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press. 113-125.
    This paper attempts to connect recent cross-disciplinary treatments of the cognitive or rational significance of emotions with work in contemporary philosophy identifying an evaluative propositional content of emotions. An emphasis on the perspectival nature of emotional evaluations allows for a notion of emotional rationality that does not seem to be available on alternative accounts.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Patricia S. Greenspan (2004). Practical Reasoning and Emotion. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The category of emotions covers a disputed territory, but clear examples include fear, anger, joy, pride, sadness, disgust, shame, contempt and the like. Such states are commonly thought of as antithetical to reason, disorienting and distorting practical thought. However, there is also a sense in which emotions are factors in practical reasoning, understood broadly as reasoning that issues in action. At the very least emotions can function as "enabling" causes of rational decision-making (despite the many cases in which they are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Patricia S. Greenspan (2004). The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Patricia Greenspan (2003). The Problem with Manipulation. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2):155-64.
    There is a well-known scene from The Adventures of Tom Sawyer that illustrates what might be considered benign manipulation: Tom has the job of whitewashing a fence but would rather spend the time with friends. By feigning enthusiasm for the job he manages to get his friends to hang around and do it for him. They even pay to do it - with various little items that he later trades for..
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Patricia Greenspan (2003). VII. Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/Body. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:113-125.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Patricia S. Greenspan (2003). Responsible Psychopaths. Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):417 – 429.
    Psychopaths are agents who lack the normal capacity to feel moral emotions (e.g. guilt based on empathy with the victims of their actions). Evidence for attributing psychopathy at least in some cases to genetic or early childhood causes suggests that psychopaths lack free will. However, the paper defends a sense in which psychopaths still may be construed as responsible for their actions, even if their degree of responsibility is less than that of normal agents. Responsibility is understood in Strawsonian terms, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Patricia Greenspan (2001). Good Evolutionary Reasons: Darwinian Psychiatry and Women's Depression. Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):327 – 338.
    The language of evolutionary biology and psychology is built on concepts applicable in the first instance to individual strategic rationality but extended to the level of genetic explanation. Current discussions of mental disorders as evolutionary adaptations would apply that extended language back to the individual level, with potentially problematic moral/political implications as well as possibilities of confusion. This paper focuses on one particularly problematic area: the explanation of women's greater tendency to depression. The suggestion that there are "good evolutionary reasons" (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Patricia S. Greenspan (2001). Genes, Electrotransmitters, and Free Will. In Patricia S. Greenspan, David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit (eds.), Genetics and Criminal Behavior: Methods, Meanings, and Morals. Cambridge University Press.
    There seems to be evidence of a genetic component in criminal behavior. It is widely agreed not to be "deterministic"--by which discussions outside philosophy seem to mean that by itself it is not sufficient to determine behavior. Environmental factors make a decisive difference--for that matter, there are nongenetic biological factors--in whether and how genetic.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Patricia Greenspan (2000). Emotional Strategies and Rationality. Ethics 110 (3):469-487.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Patricia Greenspan (2000). Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. In J. H. Aguilar & A. A. Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of action: 5 questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
    Like many people, I was initially attracted to free will issues – at first embracing hard determinism, as part of a general rejection of doctrines associated with religion, though exposure to Kant’s views in my first philosophy course made me begin to consider nonreligious grounds for an indeterminist conception of free action. Of course, Kant also takes belief in God and immortality as presupposed by moral agency, but I was never much moved by those arguments. On free will, though, I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Patricia Greenspan (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.
    In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Patricia S. Greenspan (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.
    P.S. Greenspan uses the treatment of moral dilemmas as the basis for an alternative view of the structure of ethics and its relation to human psychology. In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a socially based version of moral realism.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Patricia S. Greenspan (1993). Free Will and the Genome Project. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1):31-43.
    Popular and scientific accounts of the U.S. Human Genome Project often express concern about the implications of the project for the philosophic question of free will and responsibility. However, on its standard construal within philosophy, the question of free will versus determinism poses no special problems in relation to genetic research. The paper identifies a variant version of the free will question, free will versus internal constraint, that might well pose a threat to notions of individual autonomy and virtue in (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Patricia S. Greenspan (1993). Guilt as an Identificatory Mechanism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):46-59.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Patricia Greenspan (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry Into Emotional Justification. Routledge, Chapman and Hall.
    Philosophers have traditionally tried to understand the emotions and their bearing on rationality and moral motivation by assimilating emotion to other categories such as sensation, judgment, and desire. In recent years, moving away from the Cartesian identification of emotions with particular sensations, many philosophers have embraced "judgmentalism," the view that emotions are essentially evaluative judgments or beliefs, with only an accidental connection to the feelings and impulses we intuitively take as "emotional." Anger, for instance, either is or entails the belief (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Patricia S. Greenspan (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Enquiry Into Emotional Justification. Routledge.
    In Emotions and Reasons, Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Patricia Greenspan (1987). Unfreedom and Responsibility. In F. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Patricia S. Greenspan (1986). Identificatory Love. Philosophical Studies 50 (3):321 - 341.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Patricia S. Greenspan (1983). Moral Dilemmas and Guilt. Philosophical Studies 43 (1):117 - 125.
    I use a version of the case in "sophie's choice" as an example of the strongest sort of dilemma, With all options seriously wrong, And no permissible way of choosing one of them. This is worse, I argue, Than a choice between conflicting obligations, Where the agent has an overriding obligation "to choose", And does nothing wrong, Once the choice is made, By ignoring one of his prior obligations. Here, "contra" marcus, Guilt seems inappropriate.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Patricia S. Greenspan (1981). Emotions as Evaluations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (April):158-169.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Patricia Greenspan (1980). A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion. In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. University of California Press. 223--250.
  36. Patricia S. Greenspan (1980). Emotions, Reasons, and 'Self-Involvement'. Philosophical Studies 38 (2):161 - 168.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Patricia S. Greenspan (1978). Behavior Control and Freedom of Action. Philosophical Review 87 (April):225-40.
  38. Patricia S. Greenspan (1976). Wiggins on Historical Inevitability and Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 29 (April):235-247.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation