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Patrick Dieveney [4]Patrick S. Dieveney [1]
  1. Patrick Dieveney (2014). Quantification and Metaphysical Discourse. Theoria 80 (4):292-318.
    It is common in metaphysical discourse to make claims like “Everything is self-identical” in which “everything” is intended to range over everything. This sort of “unrestricted” generality appears central to metaphysical discourse. But there is debate whether such generality, which appears to involve quantification over an all-inclusive domain, is even meaningful. To address this concern, Shaughan Lavine and Vann McGee supply competing accounts of the generality expressed by this use of “everything.” I argue that, from the perspective of the metaphysician, (...)
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  2. Patrick Dieveney (2013). Anything and Everything. Erkenntnis 78 (1):119 - 140.
    Some novel solutions to problems in mathematics and philosophy involve employing schemas rather than quantified expressions to formulate certain propositions. Crucial to these solutions is an insistence that schematic generality is distinct from quantificational generality. Although many concede that schemas and quantified expressions function differently, the dominant view appears to be that the generality expressed by the former is ultimately reducible to the latter. In this paper, I argue against this view, which I call the 'Reductionist view'. But instead of (...)
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  3. Patrick Dieveney (2012). In Defense of Quinean Ontological Naturalism. Erkenntnis 76 (2):225-242.
    Quinean Ontological Naturalism addresses the question “What is there?” Advocates of the view maintain that we can answer this question by applying Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment to our best scientific theories. In this paper, I discuss two major objections that are commonly offered to this view, what I call the “Paraphrase Objection” and “First Philosophy Objection”. I argue that these objections arise from a common uncharitable characterization of the Quinean Ontological Naturalist’s project that fails to distinguish two distinct roles (...)
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  4. Patrick Dieveney (2008). Ontological Infidelity. Synthese 165 (1):1 - 12.
    In ethical discourse, it is common practice to distinguish between normative commitments and descriptive commitments. Normative commitments reflect what a person ought to be committed to, whereas descriptive commitments reflect what a person actually is committed to. While the normative/descriptive distinction is widely accepted as a way of talking about ethical commitments, philosophers have missed this distinction in discussing ontological commitments. In this paper, I distinguish between descriptive ontological commitments and normative ontological commitments and discuss several significant benefits of recognizing (...)
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  5. Patrick S. Dieveney (2007). Dispensability in the Indispensability Argument. Synthese 157 (1):105 - 128.
    One of the most influential arguments for realism about mathematical objects is the indispensability argument. Simply put, this is the argument that insofar as we are committed to the existence of the physical objects existentially quantified over in our best scientific theories, we are also committed to the mathematical objects existentially quantified over in these theories. Following the Quine–Putnam formulation of the indispensability argument, some proponents of the indispensability argument have made the mistake of taking confirmational holism to be an (...)
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