I argue that some perceptual experiences are vague. To do so, I identify a characteristic feature of vagueness and show that some perceptual experiences have this feature. These include blurry experiences, experiences of color under low lighting, and experiences of number, as in the case of the speckled hen. The conclusion that these experiences are vague has two noteworthy consequences. First, it presses us to see whether and how existing theories of vagueness can be extended to perceptual experience. Second, it (...) sheds light on several puzzles in the philosophy of perception. (shrink)

This paper discusses Socrates’ conversation with Cephalus in Book I of Plato’s “Republic”, arguing that the passage expresses Plato’s view that the activity of reminisce in old age can be a source of moral insight. To motivate this thesis, the author devotes a class session to explaining the theory of “life review”, which consists of an aging person’s final, retrospective articulation of the important components of their life. Finally, the paper points to three pedagogical implications for teaching the meaning of (...) Socrates’ conversation with Cephalus and several suggestions on how to help students develop their ideas about the Cephalus passage. (shrink)

As the percentage of U.S. citizenry over 65 years of age rises, people of old age will become increasingly present both in and out of the classroom. This paper recommends several methods for incorporating philosophical reflection about old age into several philosophy courses and various leading questions to help thematize how old age figures into philosophical texts. For an epistemology course, the author explores the question of epistemological authority (whether living a full human lifespan really imbues one with greater perspective (...) or insight into matters of importance) and epistemological conflict (by what common criteria can one evaluate one’s earlier and later judgments on something when they conflict?). For an ethics course, the author explores one factual question (viz., Do healthy, aging people gradually lose interest in the goals they held when younger and do they acquire different, contemplative priorities?) and one normative question (viz., Ought the elderly to turn towards contemplation?) and relates both questions to the broader philosophical themes of human nature, the nature of activity or action, and what it means to live well. The author relates these questions to a number of philosophical texts and figures, including Hindu classics, Plato, Cicero, and Montaigne. (shrink)

Plato imputes an important form of understanding to Cephalus in Book I of the Republic and revisits it at the end of Book X. Plato's astute observations of mental life in old age tie Cephalus’ conversation to the concept of “life review” in contemporary geriatric psychology. This provides the basis for an argument that Cephalus exemplifies the indispensable teacher described in Book X, and this raises interesting new epistemological and ethical issues. Finally, I ask why commentaries on the Republic have (...) overlooked this theme, and argue that an ageist bias against Cephalus has distorted commentators’ reading of the text. (shrink)

Plato imputes an important form of understanding to Cephalus in Book I of the Republic and revisits it at the end of Book X. Plato's astute observations of mental life in old age tie Cephalus’ conversation to the concept of “life review” in contemporary geriatric psychology. This provides the basis for an argument that Cephalus exemplifies the indispensable teacher described in Book X, and this raises interesting new epistemological and ethical issues. Finally, I ask why commentaries on the Republic have (...) overlooked this theme, and argue that an ageist bias against Cephalus has distorted commentators’ reading of the text. (shrink)

The term “wise” applied to judgments is honorific, suggesting special epistemic achievement. That achievement consists in making ajudgment on the basis of an aspect of inner experience I call seeing through illusion. I analyze the inner experience of seeing through illusion, then use it to develop a moderate internalist theory of wise judgment. The theory illuminates examples of wise judgment, explains ordinary intuitions we have about it, and can be defended against objections. This suggests that an epistemology of wise judgment (...) can be developed in terms of existing epistemological concepts. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Unexpected but vivid and compelling memories are a wide‐spread experience in late life. The experience has often been described in literature, and in recent years has been the object of extensive gerontological research under the label ‘life review’. Such memories often include a reversal of judgment about a past act, relationship, event, etc. What earlier was judged to be so is, in the retrospect of late life, judged not to have been so after all. This presents a question: which (...) judgment—the earlier or the later—has better epistemological credentials in such cases? Some obvious possible answers are considered and rejected. It would seem that the issue is not resolvable on epistemological grounds. A parallel dilemma seems to appear in other dimensions of experience. An example from aesthetic experience is briefly considered. (shrink)

There are calls to expand the schema “ S knows that p ” to accommodate ways of knowing that are socially important but neglected in recent epistemology. A wider, more adequate conception of human knowing is needed that will include interested or motivated inquirers as “S,” and personal traits of persons as “ p .” Historically important treatments of knowing that accommodate these features deserve examination as part of the effort to create a broader epistemology. We find such a treatment (...) of knowing in Plato's Apology , 20 d-24 b, in which Socrates claims a bit of wisdom. We attend more carefully than others have to the concrete aspects of Socrates' encounters with interlocutors. (shrink)