31 found
Sort by:
  1. Patrick Rysiew & Trent Dougherty, Pragmatics Without Pragmatism: Reply to Fantl & McGrath.
    To accept ‘pragmatic encroachment’ is to take the view that whether you are in a position to know is in part a function of practical stakes. This position strikes many as not just unorthodox but extremely implausible. According to Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (F&M), however, the best account of the prima facie oddity of certain utterances incorporates just such a pragmatist maneuver. In reaching this conclusion, F&M begin with Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew’s (D&R’s) theory as the best on (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Patrick Rysiew (forthcoming). Hume and Reid on Common Sense. Eidos.
    The first half of this paper is concerned with drawing out the commonalities--and, more importantly, the differences--between the views of Hume and Reid regarding both the nature of common sense and the epistemological status of the basic deliverances thereof. (Thus,the author seeks to expose the falsity of the claim that Hume and Reid "differed more in words than in opinion.) It is then argued that Reid's conception of common sense is to be preferred over Hume's.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2013). Experience First. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 2.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2013). Still Nowhere Else to Start. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 25.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2013). What Is Knowledge-First Epistemology? In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 10.
  6. Patrick Rysiew (2013). 13. Is Knowledge a Non-Composite Mental State? Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:333.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Patrick Rysiew (2012). Elusive 'Knowledge'. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):130-138.
    No categories
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Patrick Rysiew (2012). Epistemic Scorekeeping. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2011). Clarity About Concessive Knowledge Attributions: Reply to Dodd. Synthese 181 (3):395-403.
    Recently, Dylan Dodd (this Journal ) has tried to clear up what he takes to be some of the many confusions surrounding concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs)—i.e., utterances of the form “S knows that p , but it’s possible that q ” (where q entails not- p ) (Rysiew, Noûs 35(4): 477–514, 2001). Here, we respond to the criticisms Dodd offers of the account of the semantics and the sometime-infelicity of CKAs we have given (Dougherty and Rysiew, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Patrick Rysiew (2011). Evidentness, Justification, and Belief. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 207.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Patrick Rysiew (2011). Making It Evident: Evidence and Evidentness, Justification, and Belief. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Patrick Rysiew (2011). Surveys, Intuitions, Knowledge Attributions. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):111-120.
  13. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2009). Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.
    If knowing requires believing on the basis of evidence that entails what’s believed, we have hardly any knowledge at all. Hence the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology: if it's true that "we are all fallibilists now" (Siegel 1997: 164), that's because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence1is, it seems, not an option if we're to preserve the very strong appearance that we do know many things (Cohen 1988: 91). Hence the significance of concessive knowledge (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Patrick Rysiew (2009). Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Patrick Rysiew (2008). Rationality Disputes – Psychology and Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1153-1176.
    This paper reviews the largely psychological literature surrounding apparent failures of human rationality (sometimes referred to as 'the Rationality Wars') and locates it with respect to concepts and issues within more traditional epistemological inquiry. The goal is to bridge the gap between these two large and typically disconnected literatures – concerning rationality and the psychology of human reasoning, on the one hand, and epistemological theories of justified or rational belief, on the other – and to do so in such as (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Patrick Rysiew (2008). Thomas Reid's Theory of Perception. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):pp. 647-648.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Patrick Rysiew (2007). Beyond Words: Communication, Truthfulness, and Understanding. Episteme 4 (3):285-304.
    Testimony is an indispensable source of information. Yet, contrary to ‘literalism’, speakers rarely mean just what they say; and even when they do, that itself is something the hearer needs to realize. So, understanding instances of testimony requires more than merely reading others' messages off of the words they utter. Further, a very familiar and theoretically well-entrenched approach to how we arrive at such understanding serves to emphasize, not merely how deeply committed we are to testimony as a reliable source (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Patrick Rysiew, Epistemic Contextualism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epistemic contextualism (EC) is a recent and hotly debated position. In its dominant form, EC is the view that the proposition expressed by a given knowledge sentence (‘S knows that p’, ‘S doesn't know that p’) depends upon the context in which it is uttered. What makes this view interesting and controversial is that ‘context’ here refers, not to certain features of the putative subject of knowledge (his/her evidence, history, other beliefs, etc.) or his/her objective situation (what is true/false, which (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Patrick Rysiew (2007). Speaking of Knowing. Noûs 41 (4):627–662.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Patrick Rysiew (2006). Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):259-279.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Patrick Rysiew (2005). Contesting Contextualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):51-70.
    According to Keith DeRose, the invariantist's attempt to account for the data which inspire contextualism fares no better, in the end, than the "desperate and lame" maneuvers of "the crazed theory of 'bachelor'", whereby S's being unmarried is not among the truth conditions of 'S is a bachelor', but merely an implicature generated by an assertion thereof. Here, I outline the invariantist account I have previously proposed. I then argue that the prospects for sophisticated invariantism — either as a general (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Patrick Rysiew (2005). Reidian Evidence. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (2):107-121.
  23. Patrick Rysiew (2004). Introduction. Episteme 1 (3):163-168.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Patrick Rysiew (2003). Richard Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 23 (3):178-180.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Patrick Rysiew (2002). Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (2):260-261.
  26. Patrick Rysiew (2002). Encouragement in Darwin? Acta Philosophica 4:271-286.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Patrick Rysiew (2002). Reid and Epistemic Naturalism. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):437–456.
    Central to the contemporary dispute over 'naturalizing epistemology' is the question of the continuity of epistemology with science, i.e., how far purely descriptive, psychological matters can or should inform the traditional evaluative epistemological enterprise. Thus all parties tend to agree that the distinction between psychology and epistemology corresponds to a firm fact/value distinction. This is something Reid denies with respect to the first principles of common sense: while insisting on the continuity of epistemology with the rest of science, he does (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Patrick Rysiew (2001). The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. Noûs 35 (4):477–514.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Patrick Rysiew (2000). Conventional Wisdom. Analysis 60 (1):74–83.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Patrick Rysiew (2000). Testimony, Simulation, and the Limits of Inductivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):269 – 274.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Patrick Rysiew (1999). Reid's (Mis) Characterization of Judgment. Reid Studies 3:63-8.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation