The author uses social epistemology to develop the cognitive authority theory. The fundamental concept of cognitive authority is that people construct knowledge in two different ways: based on their first-hand experience or on what they have learned second-hand from others. What people learn first-hand depends on the stock of ideas they bring to the interpretation and understanding of their encounters with the world. People primarily depend on others for ideas as well as for information outside the range of direct experience. (...) Much of what they think of the world is what they have gained second-hand. All that people know of the world beyond the narrow range of their own lives is what others have told them. However, people do not count all hearsay as equally reliable; only those who are deemed to “know what they are talking about” become cognitive authorities. --. (shrink)

The fundamental constants and initial conditions of the universe seem "finely tuned" for human habitation. The anthropic principle attempts to explain this fine tuning in terms of the eventual development of intelligent life. A closer look at the principle’s explanandum, however, reveals that it is teleologically and anthropocentrically biased. Our ignorance of the physical requirements of nonhuman forms of life forces the principle to be more unjustifiably anthropocentric and more speculative than is commonly admitted. Leslie’s, Barrow’s and Tipler’s attempts to (...) avoid an overly anthropocentric anthropic principle fail to solve these problems. (shrink)

A significant criticism of the anthropic principle as a scientific claim is that testable predictions cannot be derived from it. Brandon Carter has argued, however, that the principle can be used to predict on the one hand that the period of time biological evolution is intrinsically likely to require is very large, and on the other that the number of ‘critical steps’ that have occurred in the evolution of life on earth is related to the length of time life can (...) continue to evolve. I attempt to show that neither of Carter's arguments provides a convincing defence of the testability of the anthropic principle. (shrink)

Examines the perennial issues that keep science and religion at arm's length, clarifies those issues, and fits them into an historical framework—from Plato, to Aquinas, to today's thinkers.

Patrick Wilson; Intentionalist Values and Literary Education: a reply to Jim Gribble, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages.

Patrick Wilson; Intentionalist Values and Literary Education: a reply to Jim Gribble, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages.

Against Quine's thesis of the ?indeterminacy of translation?, in Word and Object, it is argued that the extension of terms, where determinable at all except by arbitrary decision, is determinable by empirical means other than comparison of ?stimulus meaning?, that translation of terms does not presuppose prior translation of syncategoremata, that parallelisms of function of syncategoremata in different languages can in part be discovered on the basis of stimulus meanings, that it is incorrect to speak of bilinguals? necessarily using ?analytical (...) hypotheses?, that in one form the thesis is correct and uncontroversial, that in another it is controversial but both unacceptable and at variance with Quine's own views on language. (shrink)

The structure of the universe and of most objects in it is determined by a small number of physical constants. It can be shown that only a limited range of values for each of these constants is compatible with the existence of human life. The fact that we are able to exist--but just barely--calls for an explanation. In the last fifteen years, an "anthropic principle" has been proposed as a possible scientific explanation of the fortuitous features of our world. This (...) type of explanation focuses on ways in which the presence of human beings guarantees that conditions in the early universe be suitable for the eventual development of intelligent life. In its strongest form, the anthropic principle is teleological: the universe is habitable precisely so that humans can evolve in it. ;Many issues surrounding the principle and its role in contemporary cosmology have been widely misunderstood by physicists and philosophers alike. My project is to clarify the nature of the principle and to criticize its value as a scientific claim. In chapters 1 and 2, I discuss the principle's historical background, and differentiate between several distinct ideas often misleadingly categorized as "anthropic." In chapter 3, after considering the principle's scientific justification, I conclude that it is neither essentially anthropic nor capable of predictive success. In chapter 4, I argue that the principle has little, if any, explanatory power, even in its teleological form. Having put fourth a number of criticisms of the principle as a scientific principle, in the final chapter I look at the possibility of construing it in a theistic context. Although the principle is not usually considered a religious principle, its resemblance to premises used in traditional theistic arguments from design suggests that it may be more defensible if thought of in a theistic context. (shrink)

There appears to be no limit to the number and kind of things which someone, somewhere, might feel to be in need of justification: the existence of snakes and spiders, one’s own existence, some or all of the things one does, some or all of the things one thinks and feels. The need for justification is a need to feel, or to be able to show, that a thing is somehow as it should be, right, proper, appropriate, or at least (...) that it is all right, not blameworthy, unsuitable, or discreditable. The forms taken by the attempt to justify vary greatly, as the preceding list of adjectives begins to show; and the need to justify appears variously, at times as a dull sense of unease or discomfort, at times as a conscious sense of obligation to produce good reasons for what one does, thinks, or feels. Perhaps the need for justification, like a need for yachts or applause, is something one would be better off without; might not one be a stoic or cynic philosopher on the topic of justification, and advocate a life free from the burdens of the need to justify, as more becoming to a free man? (shrink)

The author's chief task is to develop complementary accounts of interpretation and explanation in the human sciences while defending methodological naturalism. Interpretation and explanation are seen to complement one another insofar as correct interpretations must lead to explanatory success and insofar as explanations in the human sciences typically involve intentions that require interpretation. Furthermore, interpretation and explanation in the human sciences are methodologically similar to their counterparts in the natural sciences, on Henderson's view, for interpretive understanding turns out to be (...) a case of theory-laden observation, while intentional explanations comprise both cause-describing answers to why-questions and closely related answers to how-questions. Both natural and human sciences, in short, share essentially the same logic of inquiry. (shrink)