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  1. Paul M. Churchland (1984). Matter and Consciousness. MIT Press.
    The Mind-Body Problem Questions: What is the mind? What is its connection to the body? Most basic division of answers: Dualist and Materialist (or Physicalist) responses.
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  2. Paul M. Churchland (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press.
    A Neurocomputationial Perspective illustrates the fertility of the concepts and data drawn from the study of the brain and of artificial networks that model the...
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  3. Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
  4. Paul M. Churchland (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
    This article describes a theory of the computations underlying the selection of coordinated motion patterns, especially in reaching tasks. The central idea is that when a spatial target is selected as an object to be reached, stored postures are evaluated for the contributions they can make to the task. Weights are assigned to the stored postures, and a single target posture is found by taking a weighted sum of the stored postures. Movement is achieved by reducing the distance between the (...)
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  5. Paul M. Churchland (1985). Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States. Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.
  6. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1994). Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist's Field Guide. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell
  7.  46
    Paul M. Churchland (1995). The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey Into the Brain. MIT Press.
    For the uninitiated, there are two major tendencies in the modeling of human cognition. The older, tradtional school believes, in essence, that full human cognition can be modeled by dividing the world up into distinct entities -- called __symbol s__-- such as “dog”, “cat”, “run”, “bite”, “happy”, “tumbleweed”, and so on, and then manipulating this vast set of symbols by a very complex and very subtle set of rules. The opposing school claims that this system, while it might be good (...)
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  8. Paul M. Churchland (1988). Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87.
    The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly (...)
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  9. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective. Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33-50.
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  10. Paul M. Churchland (1988). Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:209-21.
  11.  20
    Paul M. Churchland (2012). Plato's Camera: How the Physical Brain Captures a Landscape of Abstract Universals. The MIT Press.
    In _ Plato's Camera_, eminent philosopher Paul Churchland offers a novel account of how the brain constructs a representation -- or "takes a picture" -- of the universe's timeless categorical and dynamical structure. This construction process, which begins at birth, yields the enduring background conceptual framework with which we will interpret our sensory experience for the rest of our lives. But, as even Plato knew, to make singular perceptual judgments requires that we possess an antecedent framework of abstract categories to (...)
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  12. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1981). Functionalism, Qualia and Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):121-32.
  13. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1990). Could a Machine Think? Scientific American 262 (1):32-37.
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  14. Paul M. Churchland (1986). Some Reductive Strategies in Cognitive Neurobiology. Mind 95 (July):279-309.
  15. Paul M. Churchland (2007). Neurophilosophy at Work. Cambridge University Press.
    In this collection of essays, Paul Churchland explores the unfolding impact of the several empirical sciences of the mind, especially cognitive neurobiology and computational neuroscience on a variety of traditional issues central to the discipline of philosophy. Representing Churchland's most recent research, they continue his research program, launched over thirty years ago, and which has evolved into the field of neurophilosophy.
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  16. Paul M. Churchland (1996). The Rediscovery of Light. Journal of Philosophy 93 (5):211-28.
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  17. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions From Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.
    The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the (...)
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  18.  6
    Paul M. Churchland (1991). [Book Review] Matter and Consciousness, a Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW] Criminal Justice Ethics 10 (374):27-40.
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  19.  39
    Paul M. Churchland (1989). Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson. In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press 163--178.
  20.  58
    Paul Churchland (2007). On the Reality (and Diversity) of Objective Colors: How Color‐Qualia Space is a Map of Reflectance‐Profile Space. Philosophy of Science 74 (2):119-149.
    How, if at all, does the internal structure of human phenomenological color space map onto the internal structure of objective reflectance‐profile space, in such a fashion as to provide a useful and accurate representation of that objective feature space? A prominent argument (due to Hardin, among others) proposes to eliminate colors as real, objective properties of objects, on grounds that nothing in the external world (and especially not surface‐reflectance‐profiles) answers to the well‐known and quite determinate internal structure of human phenomenological (...)
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  21. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (2003). Recent Work on Consciousness: Philosophical, Theoretical, and Empirical. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. Amsterdam: J Benjamins 49--123.
  22.  50
    Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1998). On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997. Cambridge: MIT Press.
    This collection was prepared in the belief that the most useful and revealing of anyone's writings are often those shorter essays penned in conflict with...
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  23. Paul M. Churchland (1999). Densmore and Dennett on Virtual Machines and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):763-767.
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  24. Paul M. Churchland (2006). Into the Brain: Where Philosophy Should Go From Here. [REVIEW] Topoi 25 (1-2):29-32.
    The maturation of the cognitive neurosciences will throw light on many central philosophical issues. Among them: semantic theory, perception, learning, social and moral knowledge, and practical reasoning and decision making. As contemporary medicine cannot do without the achievements of modern biology, philosophy would be pitiful if it disregarded the achievements of brain research.
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  25.  68
    Paul M. Churchland (1970). The Logical Character of Action-Explanations. Philosophical Review 79 (2):214-236.
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  26. Paul M. Churchland (2006). Eliminative Materialism [Selection From Matter and Consciousness]. In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman and Littlefield 115.
    The identity theory was called into doubt not because the prospects for a materialist account of our mental capacities were thought to be poor, but because it seemed unlikely that the arrival of an adequate materialist theory would bring with it the nice one-to-one match-ups, between the concepts of folk psychology and the concepts of theoretical neuroscience, that intertheoretic reduction requires. The reason for that doubt was the great variety of quite different physical systems that could instantiate the required functional (...)
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  27.  57
    Paul M. Churchland (1993). State-Space Semantics and Meaning Holism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):667 - 672.
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  28. Paul M. Churchland (1998). Conceptual Similarity Across Sensory and Neural Diversity: The Fodor/Lepore Challenge Answered. Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):5-32.
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  29.  75
    Paul M. Churchland (2005). Cleansing Science. Inquiry 48 (5):464 – 477.
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  30. Paul M. Churchland (2002). Outer Space and Inner Space: The New Epistemology. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 76 (2):25-48.
  31. Paul Churchland (2009). Is Evolutionary Naturalism Epistemologically Self-Defeating. Philo 12 (2):135-141.
    Alvin Plantinga argues that our cognitive mechanisms have been selected for their ability to sustain reproductively successful behaviors, not for their ability to track truth. This aspect of our cognitive mechanisms is said to pose a problem for the biological theory of evolution by natural selection in the following way. If our cognitive mechanisms do not provide any assurances that the theories generated by them are true, then the fact that evolutionary theory has been generated by them, and even accepted (...)
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  32.  6
    Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1983). Content: Semantic and Information-Theoretic. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):67.
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  33. Paul M. Churchland (2012). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    A study in the philosophy of science, proposing a strong form of the doctrine of scientific realism' and developing its implications for issues in the philosophy of mind.
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  34.  34
    Paul M. Churchland (1989). On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14:59--101.
  35.  68
    Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1983). Stalking the Wild Epistemic Engine. Noûs 17 (March):5-18.
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  36.  8
    Patricia Smith Churchland & Paul M. Churchland (1978). Internal States and Cognitive Theories. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):565.
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  37. Paul M. Churchland (1989). Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior. Philosophical Perspectives 3:225-241.
  38.  40
    Paul Churchland (2000). Rules, Know-How, and the Future of Moral Cognition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):291-306.
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  39.  97
    Paul M. Churchland (1993). Evaluating Our Self-Conception. Mind and Language 8 (2):211-22.
  40.  47
    Paul M. Churchland (1982). Is 'Thinker' a Natural Kind? Dialogue 21 (June):223-38.
    Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is here criticized from the perspective of a more naturalistic and less compromising form of materialism. Parallels are explored between the problem of cognitive activity and the somewhat more settled problem of vital activity. The lessons drawn suggest that functionalism in the philosophy of mind may be both counterproductive as a research strategy, and false as a substantive position.
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  41.  38
    Paul M. Churchland & Patricia Smith Churchland (1981). Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):121-145.
  42.  75
    Paul M. Churchland (1987). How Parapsychology Could Become a Science. Inquiry 30 (3):227 – 239.
    An important methodological argument is outlined in support of general theoretical challenges to the dominant materialist paradigm. The idea is that the empirical inadequacies of a dominant theory can be hidden from view by various factors, and will emerge from the shadows only when viewed from the perspective of a systematic conceptual alternative. The question then posed is whether parapsychology provides a conceptual alternative adequate to this task. The provisional conclusion drawn is that it does not. Some further consequences are (...)
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  43. Paul M. Churchland (2007). The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
  44.  77
    Patricia S. Churchland & Paul M. Churchland, Neural Worlds and Real Worlds.
    States of the brain represent states of the world. A puzzle arises when one learns that at least some of the mind/brain’s internal representations, such as a sensation of heat or a sensation of red, do not genuinely resemble the external realities they allegedly represent: the mean kinetic energy of the molecules of the substance felt (temperature) and the mean electromagnetic reflectance profile of the seen object (color). The historical response has been to declare a distinction between objectively real properties, (...)
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  45.  46
    Paul M. Churchland (1986). Cognitive Neurobiology: A Computational Hypothesis for Laminar Cortex. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 1 (1):25-51.
    This paper outlines the functional capacities of a novel scheme for cognitive representation and computation, and it explores the possible implementation of this scheme in the massively parallel organization of the empirical brain. The suggestion is that the brain represents reality by means of positions in suitably constitutes phase spaces; and the brain performs computations on these representations by means of coordinate transformations from one phase space to another. This scheme may be implemented in the brain in two distinct forms: (...)
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  46.  28
    Paul Churchland (1990). Cognitive Activity in Artificial Neural Networks. In Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science. MIT Press 3--372.
  47.  13
    Paul M. Churchland (1986). Semantic Content: In Defense of a Network Approach. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):139-140.
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  48.  82
    Paul M. Churchland (2004). Philosophy of Mind Meets Logical Theory: Perry on Neo-Dualism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):199-206.
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  49.  73
    Paul M. Churchland (1992). Activation Vectors Versus Propositional Attitudes: How the Brain Represents Reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):419-424.
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  50.  63
    Paul M. Churchland (1989). On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach. In A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press
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