32 found
Order:
  1. Paul F. Snowdon (2014). Persons, Animals, Ourselves. OUP Oxford.
    What kind of thing are we? Paul Snowdon's answer is that we are animals, of a sort. This view--'animalism'--may seem obvious but on the whole philosophers have rejected it. Snowdon argues that animalism is a defensible way of thinking about ourselves. Its rejection rests on the tendency when doing philosophy to mistake fantasy for reality.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2. Paul F. Snowdon (2005). The Formulation of Disjunctivism: A Response to Fish. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):129-141.
    Fish proposes that we need to elucidate what 'disjunctivism' stands for, and he also proposes that it stands for the rejection of a principle about the nature of experience that he calls the decisiveness principle. The present paper argues that his first proposal is reasonable, but then argues, in Section II, that his positive suggestion does not draw the line between disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism in the right place. In Section III, it is argued that disjunctivism is a thesis about the (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  3. Paul F. Snowdon (1980). Perception, Vision, and Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:175-92.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  4. Paul F. Snowdon (1990). The Objects of Perceptual Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64:121-50.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  5.  29
    Paul F. Snowdon (2014). Animalism and the Lives of Human Animals. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):171-184.
    It is suggested that the best way to interpret animalism is as an identity thesis saying that each of us is identical to an animal. Since there are disagreements about the nature of animal persistence, this means that animalism itself not does not explicitly propose criteria of identity for persons. It implies the negative claim that features that have nothing to do with animal persistence have nothing to do with our persistence. Thinking of it as an identity thesis also makes (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Paul F. Snowdon (1992). The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  7.  20
    Paul F. Snowdon (1995). Persons, Animals and Bodies. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  8. Paul F. Snowdon (1990). Persons, Animals, and Ourselves. In Christopher Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  9. Paul F. Snowdon (2009). McDowell on Skepticism, Disjunctivism, and Transcendental Arguments. Philosophical Topics 37 (1):133-152.
  10. Paul F. Snowdon (1991). Human Beings. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  11.  22
    Paul F. Snowdon (2015). Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Philosophical Review 124 (3):425-430.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  37
    Paul F. Snowdon (2010). Animalism. The Philosophers' Magazine 50:104-105.
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  52
    Paul F. Snowdon (1991). Personal Identity and Brain Transplants. In David Cockburn (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press 109-126.
    My topic is personal identity, or rather, our identity. There is general, but not, of course, unanimous, agreement that it is wrong to give an account of what is involved in, and essential to, our persistence over time which requires the existence of immaterial entities, but, it seems to me, there is no consensus about how, within, what might be called this naturalistic framework, we should best procede. This lack of consensus, no doubt, reflects the difficulty, which must strike anyone (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  14. Paul F. Snowdon (2005). Some Reflections on an Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):285-305.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Paul F. Snowdon (1998). The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson. Chicago: Open Court.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  16.  34
    Paul F. Snowdon (2000). I, Animal. The Philosophers' Magazine 12:48-49.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17.  17
    Paul F. Snowdon (2009). The Self and Personal Identity. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
  18.  16
    Paul F. Snowdon (2015). Philosophy and the Mind/Body Problem. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:21-37.
    The thesis of the paper is that it is an illusion to think that the mind/body problem is one that philosophy can expect to solve. The basic reason is that the problem is one of determining the real nature of conscious states, and philosophy lacks the tools to work this out. It is argued that anti-materialist arguments in philosophy tend to rely on modal intuitions which lack any support. It is then argued that pro-materialist arguments, such as those of Smart (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Paul F. Snowdon (2011). Rylean Arguments: Ancient and Modern. In J. Bengson M. A. Moffett (ed.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action. 59-79.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20. Paul F. Snowdon (1998). Strawson on the Concept of Perception. In The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson. Chicago: Open Court
  21. Paul F. Snowdon (1992). How to Interpret Direct Perception. In The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  22.  68
    Paul F. Snowdon (1998). Strawson's Agnostic Materialism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):455-460.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  68
    Paul F. Snowdon (2006). Radical Externalisms. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):187-198.
    Professor Honderich presents his account of consciousness boldly and informally, and his presentation merits a response in similar terms. I conceive of this response as simply the first move in a conversation, in the course of which misunderstandings might be removed and, just possibly, criticisms sharpened, and positions modified. I want to concentrate on two questions that his very interesting paper prompts me to ask. The first question is; what exactly is the thesis about consciousness that Professor Honderich is proposing? (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  61
    Paul F. Snowdon (2009). Peacocke on Musical Experience and Hearing Metaphorically-As. British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (3):277-281.
    Christopher Peacocke's paper presents a characteristically rich and original theory of the so-called expressive qualities of music. It is, surely, impossible to come to a verdict on such an interesting theory quickly, and it will, no doubt, attract continuing and merited attention. The purpose of my preliminary reflections is to raise some questions about the proposal and to express some reservations, but I see these remarks as simply opening and inconclusive ones in a longer dialogue. I am going to divide (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  19
    Paul F. Snowdon (2009). 'Persons' and Persons. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (4):449-476.
    In chapter 3 of Individuals, entitled ‘Persons’, Strawson argues against dualism and the no-ownership theory, and proposes instead that our concept of a person is a primitive concept. In this paper, it is argued that the basic questions that frame Strawson’s discussion, and some of his main arguments and claims, are dubious. A general diagnosis of the source of these problems is proposed. It is argued that despite these problems Strawson gives an accurate and very insightful description of the way (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Paul F. Snowdon (1989). Persons, Animals, and Ourselves in the Person and the Human Mind: Issues. In Ancient and Modern Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Paul F. Snowdon (1989). On Formulating Materialism and Dualism. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  8
    Paul F. Snowdon (1998). Review: Strawson's Agnostic Materialism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):455 - 460.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  2
    Paul F. Snowdon (1993). Logical Forms. An Introduction to Philosophical Logic. Philosophical Books 34 (3):157-158.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.) (2016). Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press Uk.
    What are we? What is the nature of the human person? Animalism has a straightforward answer to these long-standing philosophical questions: we are animals. After being ignored for a long time in philosophical discussions of our nature, this idea has recently gained considerable support in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Containing mainly new papers as well as two highly important articles that were recently published elsewhere, this volume's contributors include both emerging voices in the debate and many of those who (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.) (forthcoming). Essays on Animalism: Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
    Arguably the most significant development in the recent history of the personal identity debate has been the emergence of the view known as "animalism." This volume brings together original contributions on this topic written by both well-known and emerging philosophers. Contributors: Lynne Rudder Baker, Stephan Blatti, David Hershenov, Jens Johansson, Mark Johnston, Rory Madden, Jeff McMahan & Tim Campbell, Eric Olson, Derek Parfit, Mark Reid, Denis Robinson, David Shoemaker, Sydney Shoemaker, Paul Snowdon.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Paul F. Snowdon (1989). Ancient and Modern Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography