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Profile: Paul Faulkner (University of Sheffield)
  1. Paul Faulkner (2014). A Virtue Theory of Testimony. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):189-211.
    This paper aims to outline, evaluate, and ultimately reject a virtue epistemic theory of testimony before proposing a virtue ethical theory. Trust and trustworthiness, it is proposed, are ethical virtues; and from these ethical virtues, epistemic consequences follow.
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  2. Paul Faulkner (2014). Really Trying or Merely Trying. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 41 (3):363-380.
    We enjoy first person authority with respect to a certain class of actions: for these actions, we know what we are doing just because we are doing it. This paper first formulates an epistemological principle that captures this authority in terms of trying to act in a way that one has the capacity to act. It then considers a case of effortful action that threatens this principle. And proposes the solution of changing the metaphysics of action: one can keep hold (...)
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  3. Paul Faulkner (2014). The Moral Obligations of Trust. :1-14.
    The moral obligations of trust. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2014.942228.
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  4. Paul Faulkner (2013). Lying and Deceit. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  5. Paul Faulkner (2013). Two-Stage Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, Dualism and the Problem of Sufficiency. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8):121-138.
    Social epistemology should be truth-centred, argues Goldman. Social epistemology should capture the ‘logic of everyday practices’ and describe socially ‘situated’ reasoning, says Fuller. Starting from Goldman’s vision of epistemology, this paper aims to argue for Fuller’s contention. Social epistemology cannot focus solely on the truth because the truth can be got in lucky ways. The same too could be said for reliability. Adding a second layer of epistemic evaluation helps only insofar as the reasons thus specified are appropriately connected to (...)
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  6. Paul Faulkner (2012). Précis of" Knowledge on Trust". Abstracta 6 (3):4-5.
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  7. Paul Faulkner (2012). Replies. Abstracta 6 (3):117-137.
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  8. Paul Faulkner (2012). The Practical Rationality of Trust. Synthese (9):1-15.
    Most action can be explained in Humean or teleological terms; that is, in most cases, one can explain why someone acted by reference to that person’s beliefs and desires. However, trusting and being trustworthy are actions that do not permit such explanation. The action of trusting someone to do something is a matter of expecting someone to act for certain reasons, and acting trustworthily is one of acting for these reasons. It is better to say that people act out of (...)
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  9. Paul Faulkner (2011). Carson , Thomas L. Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice .Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 288. $65.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 121 (4):799-803.
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  10. Paul Faulkner (2011). Epistemology of Testimony. In Östman & Verschueren (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics. John Benjamins.
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  11. Paul Faulkner (2011). Knowledge on Trust. OUP Oxford.
    We know a lot about the world and our place in it. We have come to this knowledge in a variety of ways. And one central way that we, both as individuals and as a society, have come to know what we do is through communication with others. Much of what we know, we know on the basis of testimony. In Knowledge on Trust, Paul Faulkner presents an epistemological theory of testimony, or a theory that explains how it is that (...)
     
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  12. Paul Faulkner (2010). Norms of Trust. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oup Oxford.
    Should we tell other people the truth? Should we believe what other people tell us? This paper argues that something like these norms of truth-telling and belief govern our production and receipt of testimony in conversational contexts. It then attempts to articulate these norms and determine their justification. More fully specified these norms prescribe that speakers tell the truth informatively, or be trustworthy, and that audiences presume that speakers do this, or trust. These norms of trust, as norms of conversational (...)
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  13. Paul Faulkner (2008). Cooperation and Trust in Conversational Exchanges. Theoria 23 (1):23-34.
    A conversation is more than a series of disconnected remarks because it is conducted against a background presumption of cooperation. But what makes it reasonable to presume that one is engaged in a conversation? What makes it reasonable to presume cooperation? This paper considers Grice’s two ways ofanswering this question and argues for the one he discarded. It does so by means of considering a certain problem and analysis of trust.
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  14. Paul Faulkner (2008). Can We Agree to Disagree? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):282-285.
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  15. Paul Faulkner (2007). A Genealogy of Trust. Episteme 4 (3):305-321.
    In trusting a speaker we adopt a credulous attitude, and this attitude is basic: it cannot be reduced to the belief that the speaker is trustworthy or reliable. However, like this belief, the attitude of trust provides a reason for accepting what a speaker says. Similarly, this reason can be good or bad; it is likewise epistemically evaluable. This paper aims to present these claims and offer a genealogical justification of them.
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  16. Paul Faulkner (2007). On Telling and Trusting. Mind 116 (464):875-902.
    A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to (...)
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  17. Paul Faulkner (2007). What is Wrong with Lying? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535–557.
    One thing wrong with lying is that it can be manipulative. Understanding why lying can be a form of manipulation involves understanding how our telling someone something can give them a reason to believe it, and understanding this requires seeing both how our telling things can invite trust and how trust can be a reason to believe someone. This paper aims to outline the mechanism by means of which lies can be manipulative and through doing so identify a unique reason (...)
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  18. Paul Faulkner (2006). Understanding Knowledge Transmission. Ratio 19 (2):156–175.
    We must allow that knowledge can be transmitted. But to allow this is to allow that an individual can know a proposition despite lacking any evidence for it and reaching belief by an unreliable means. So some explanation is required as to how knowledge rather than belief is transmitted. This paper considers two non-individualistic explanations: one in terms of knowledge existing autonomously, the other in terms of it existing as a property of communities. And it attempts to decide what is (...)
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  19. Paul Faulkner (2005). On Dreaming and Being Lied To. Episteme 2 (3):149-159.
    As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfi ed in the way the Moorean would suggest. This (...)
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  20. Paul Faulkner (2004). Relativism and Our Warrant for Scientific Theories. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):259 – 269.
    We depend upon the community for justified belief in scientific theory. This dependence can suggest that our individual belief in scientific theory is justified because the community believes it to be justified. This idea is at the heart of an anti-realist epistemology according to which there are no facts about justification that transcend a community's judgement thereof. Ultimately, knowledge and justified belief are simply social statuses. When conjoined with the lemma that communities can differ in what they accept as justified, (...)
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  21. Paul Faulkner (2004). Review: Thinking About Knowing. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (450):390-394.
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  22. Paul Faulkner (2004). Thinking About Knowing. Mind 113 (450):390-394.
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  23. Paul Faulkner (2003). Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge. Mind 112 (446):346-349.
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  24. Paul Faulkner (2003). Review: Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (446):346-349.
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  25. Paul Faulkner (2000). The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):581-601.
    Through communication, we form beliefs about the world, its history, others and ourselves. A vast proportion of these beliefs we count as knowledge. We seem to possess this knowledge only because it has been communicated. If those justifications that depended on communication were outlawed, all that would remain would be body of illsupported prejudice. The recognition of our ineradicable dependence on testimony for much of what we take ourselves to know has suggested to many that an epistemological account of testimony (...)
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  26. Paul Faulkner (1998). Conspiracies And Lyes: Scepticism And The Epistemology of Testimony. Dissertation, University College London
    In Conspiracies and Lyes I aim to provide an epistemological account of testimony as one of our faculties of knowledge. I compare testimony to perception and memory. Its similarity to both these faculties is recognised. A fundamental difference is stressed: it can be rational to not accept testimony even if testimony is fulfilling its proper epistemic function because it can be rational for a speaker to not express a belief; or, as I say, it can be rational for a speaker (...)
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  27. Paul Faulkner (1998). David Hume's Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):302–313.
    David Hume advances a reductionist epistemology of testimony: testimonial beliefs are justified on the basis of beliefs formed from other sources. This reduction, however, has been misunderstood. Testimonial beliefs are not justified in a manner identical to ordinary empirical beliefs; it is true, they are justified by observation of the conjunction between testimony and its truth, it is the nature of the conjunctions that has been misunderstood. The observation of these conjunctions provides us with our knowledge of human nature and (...)
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