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Profile: Paul Skokowski (Stanford University)
  1. Paul G. Skokowski, Belief in Networks.
  2. Paul G. Skokowski (2004). Structural Content: A Naturalistic Approach to Implicit Belief. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):362-369.
    Various systems that learn are examined to show how content is carried in connections installed by a learning history. Agents do not explicitly use the content of such states in practical reasoning, yet the content plays an important role in explaining behavior, and the physical state carrying that content plays a role in causing behavior, given other occurrent beliefs and desires. This leads to an understanding of the environmental reasons which are the determinate content of these states, and leads to (...)
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  3. Paul G. Skokowski (2002). I, Zombie. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):1-9.
    Certain recent philosophical theories offer the prospect that zombies are possible. These theories argue that experiential contents, or qualia, are nonphysical properties. The arguments are based on the conceivability of alternate worlds in which physical laws and properties remain the same, but in which qualia either differ or are absent altogether. This article maintains that qualia are, on the contrary, physical properties in the world. It is shown how, under the burden of the a posteriori identification of qualia with physical (...)
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  4. Paul G. Skokowski (1999). Information, Belief, and Causal Role. In L. S. Moss, J. Ginzburg & M. de Rijke (eds.), Logic, Language, and Computation Vol 2. CSLI Press.
  5. Paul G. Skokowski (1994). Can Computers Carry Content "Inexplicitly&Quot;? Minds and Machines 4 (3):333-44.
    I examine whether it is possible for content relevant to a computer''s behavior to be carried without an explicit internal representation. I consider three approaches. First, an example of a chess playing computer carrying emergent content is offered from Dennett. Next I examine Cummins response to this example. Cummins says Dennett''s computer executes a rule which is inexplicitly represented. Cummins describes a process wherein a computer interprets explicit rules in its program, implements them to form a chess-playing device, then this (...)
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  6. Paul G. Skokowski (1994). How Do We Satisfy Our Goals? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):224.
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