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Paul K. Moser [138]Paul Kenneth Moser [1]
  1.  101 DLs
    Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser (1994). Intentional Action. Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
    We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily (...)
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  2.  93 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (2005). Jesus and Philosophy: On the Questions We Ask. Faith and Philosophy 22 (3):261-283.
    What, if anything, has Jesus to do with philosophy? Although widely neglected, this question calls for attention from anyone interested in philosophy,whether Christian or non-Christian. This paper clarifies how philosophy fares under the teaching of Jesus. In particular, it contends that Jesus’slove (agape) commands have important implications for how philosophy is to be done, specifically, for what questions may be pursued. The paper,accordingly, distinguishes two relevant modes of being human: a discussion mode and an obedience mode. Philosophy done under the (...)
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  3.  78 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1984). Natural Evil and the Free Will Defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 15 (1/2):49 - 56.
  4.  69 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (2008). The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
    Three questions motivate this book's account of evidence for the existence of God. First, if God's existence is hidden, why suppose He exists at all? Second, if God exists, why is He hidden, particularly if God seeks to communicate with people? Third, what are the implications of divine hiddenness for philosophy, theology, and religion's supposed knowledge of God? This book answers these questions on the basis of a new account of evidence and knowledge of divine reality that challenges skepticism about (...)
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  5.  63 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (forthcoming). God, Flux, and the Epistemology of Agape Struggle. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
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  6.  62 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1986). Perception and Belief: A Regress Problem. Philosophy of Science 53 (March):120-126.
    Some philosophers, Such as n r hanson, Have suggested that one's perceiving an object entails one's having a particular perceptual belief, And not just some belief or other, About that object. This article constructs an argument showing that such a view generates an infinite regress of required perceptual beliefs.
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  7.  62 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1996). Physicalism and Mental Causes: Contra Papineau. Analysis 56 (4):263-67.
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  8.  60 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (ed.) (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology contains 19 previously unpublished chapters by today's leading figures in the field. These chapters function not only as a survey of key areas, but as original scholarship on a range of vital topics. Written accessibly for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and professional philosophers, the Handbook explains the main ideas and problems of contemporary epistemology while avoiding overly technical detail.
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  9.  55 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1988). Observation and Objectivity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4):551-561.
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  10.  54 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1992). Beyond the Private Language Argument. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):77-89.
  11.  53 DLs
    Paul K. Moser & Mark L. McCreary (2010). Kierkegaard's Conception of God. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):127-135.
    Philosophers have often misunderstood Kierkegaard's views on the nature and purposes of God due to a fascination with his earlier, pseudonymous works. We examine many of Kierkegaard's later works with the aim of setting forth an accurate view on this matter. The portrait of God that emerges is a personal and fiercely loving God with whom humans can and should enter into relationship. Far from advocating a fideistic faith or a cognitively unrestrained leap in the dark, we argue that Kierkegaard (...)
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  12.  52 DLs
    Daniel Howard-Snyder & Paul K. Moser (eds.) (2002). Divine Hiddenness: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    For many people the existence of God is by no means a sufficiently clear feature of reality. This problem, the fact of divine hiddenness, has been a source of existential concern and has sometimes been taken as a rationale for support of atheism or agnosticism. In this new collection of essays, a distinguished group of philosophers of religion explore the question of divine hiddenness in considerable detail. The issue is approached from several perspectives including Jewish, Christian, atheist and agnostic. There (...)
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  13.  42 DLs
    Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.) (1995). Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. Routledge.
    Contemporary Materialism presents an important collection of recent work on materialism in connection with metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and theories of value. This anthology charts the contemporary problems, positions and themes on the topic of materialism. It illuminates materialism's complex intersection with related subjects such as cognition and psychology. By gathering a wide-range of philosophical interventions around the subject of materialism, this anthology provides a valuable discussion of how materialism can effectively serve the purposes of philosophical assessment. (...)
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  14.  37 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1989). Knowledge and Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
    Paul Moser's book defends what has been an unfashionable view in recent epistemology: the foundationalist account of knowledge and justification. Since the time of Plato philosophers have wondered what exactly knowledge is. This book develops a new account of perceptual knowledge which specifies the exact sense in which knowledge has foundations. The author argues that experiential foundations are indeed essential to perceptual knowledge, and he explains what knowledge requires beyond justified true beliefs. In challenging prominent sceptical claims that we have (...)
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  15.  35 DLs
    Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (1995). Physicalism, Supervenience, and Dependence. In Elias E. Savellos (ed.), Supervenience: New Essays. Needham Heights: Cambridge 187--217.
  16.  32 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1991). Consequentialism and Self-Defeat. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):82-85.
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  17.  31 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1991). Justification in the Natural Sciences. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):557-575.
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  18.  30 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1984). Types, Tokens, and Propositions: Quine's Alternative to Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):361-375.
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  19.  29 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1988). The Foundations of Epistemological Probability. Erkenntnis 28 (2):231 - 251.
    Epistemological probability is the kind of probability relative to a body of evidence. Many philosophers, including Henry Kyburg and Roderick Chisholm, hold that all epistemological probabilities reflect a relation between an evidential body of propositions and other propositions. But this article argues that some epistemological probabilities for empirical propositions must be relative to non-propositional evidence, specifically the contents of non-propositional perceptual states. In doing so, the article distinguishes between internalism and externalism regarding epistemological probability, and argues for a version of (...)
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  20.  29 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1985). Knowledge Without Evidence. Philosophia 15 (1-2):109-116.
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  21.  27 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (2012). Undermining the Case for Evidential Atheism. Religious Studies 48 (1):83 - 93.
    Evidential atheism, as espoused by various philosophical atheists, recommends belief that God does not exist on the basis of not just the evidence of which we are aware, but also our overall available evidence. This article identifies a widely neglected problem from potential surprise evidence that undermines an attempt to give a cogent justification of such evidential atheism. In addition, it contends that evidential agnosticism fares better than evidential atheism relative to this neglected problem, and that traditional monotheism has evidential (...)
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  22.  26 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1987). Propositional Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52 (1):91 - 114.
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  23.  23 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1993). Philosophy After Objectivity: Making Sense in Perspective. Oxford University Press.
    Since the beginning of philosophy, philosophers have sought objective knowledge: knowledge of things whose existence does not depend on one's conceiving of them. This book uses lessons from debates over objective knowledge to characterize the kinds of reasons pertinent to philosophical and other theoretical views. It argues that we cannot meet skeptics' typical demands for nonquestion-begging support for claims to objective truth, and that therefore we should not regard our supporting reasons as resistant to skeptical challenges. One key lesson is (...)
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  24.  23 DLs
    Paul K. Moser & Paul Copan (eds.) (2003). The Rationality of Theism. Routledge.
    The Rationality of Theism is a controversial collection of brand new papers by thirteen outstanding philosophers and scholars. Its aim is to offer comprehensive theistic replies to the traditional arguments against the existence of God, offering a positive case for theism as well as rebuttals of recent influential criticisms of theism.
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  25.  22 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1994). Beyond Realism and Idealism. Philosophia 23 (1-4):271-288.
    Debates between realists and idealists have raged since the beginning of philosophy. Richard Rorty has recently claimed that his pragmatism enables philosophers to move beyond realism and idealism. This paper shows that Rorty's pragmatism fails to move us beyond debates involving realism and idealism. It also sketches a more promising strategy for handling the perennial dispute over realism and idealism.
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  26.  20 DLs
    Paul K. Moser & Kevin Flannery (1985). Kripke and Wittgenstein: Intention Without Paradox. Heythrop Journal 26 (3):310–318.
  27.  20 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1991). Malcolm on Wittgenstein on Rules. Philosophy 66 (January):101-105.
  28.  20 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1986). Epistemic Coherentism and the Isolation Objection. Grazer Philosophische Studien 27:83-99.
    It is argued that a pure coherence theory of epistemic empirical justification fails to avoid an isolation objection according to which empirical justification has been divorced from one's total empirical evidence. Also, it is shown that several recent efforts to meet this objection either are outright failures or are irrelevant inasmuch as they diverge from epistemic coherentism. The overall moral is that we should look beyond coherentism for an adequate theory of epistemic empirical justification.
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  29.  19 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1985). Whither Infinite Regresses of Justification? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):65-74.
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  30.  18 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1990). Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
    This paper outIines an account of rational action. It distinguishes three species of reasons: motivating reasons, evidential reasons, and normative reasons. It also contends that there is a univocal notion of reason common to the notions of motivating reasons, evidential reasons, and normative reasons. Given this thesis, the paper explains how we can have a unified theory of reasons for action. It also explains the role of values in rational action. It sketches an affective approach to value that contrasts with (...)
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  31.  17 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1994). Naturalism and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):63-84.
    This article explores the possibility of naturalized theory of action. It distinguishes ontological naturalism from conceptual naturalism, and asks whether a defensible theory of action can be either ontologically or conceptually naturalistic. The distinction between conditions for an ontology and conditions for a concept receives support from Donald Davidson's identification of two modes of explanation for action: rational and physical causal explanation. Davidson's action theory provides a naturalized ontology for action theory, but not a naturalized concept of intentional action. This (...)
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  32.  17 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1983). William James' Theory of Truth. Topoi 2 (2):217-222.
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  33.  16 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (2012). Gethsemane Epistemology. Philosophia Christi 14 (2):263-274.
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  34.  16 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1987). Does Foundationalism Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Studies 31 (48):183-196.
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  35.  16 DLs
    Joseph Agassi, Dorit Bar-on, D. S. Clarke, Paul Sheldon Davies, Anthony J. Graybosch, Lila Luce, Paul K. Moser, Saul Smilansky, Roger Smook, William Sweet, John J. Tilley & Ruth Weintraub (1994). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (1-4):359-362.
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  36.  15 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1984). A Defense of Epistemic Intuitionism. Metaphilosophy 15 (3-4):196-209.
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  37.  14 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1990). A Dilemma for Internal Realism. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):101 - 106.
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  38.  14 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1986). On Scientific Justification by Consensus. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 17 (1):154-161.
    Nach vielen gegenwärtigen Wissenschaftstheoretikern ist die Wissenschaftstheorie des Logischen Empirismus, wie sie in den Schriften von Carnap, Russell, Reichenbach und Hempel vertreten wird, durch die neue Wissenschaftstheorie wesentlich verbessert worden, wie sie von Hanson, Polanyi, Toulmin und Kuhn entwickelt worden ist. Aber keiner der letzteren Gegner des Logischen Empirismus hat im Detail die Erkenntnistheorie herausgearbeitet, welche der neuen Wissenschaftstheorie zugrundeliegt. Kürzlich jedoch hat Harold I. Brown, in Perception, Theory and Commitment · The New Philosophy of Science , eine klare Formulierung (...)
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  39.  14 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1989). Reliabilism and Relevant Worlds. Philosophia 19 (2-3):155-164.
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  40.  13 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1990). A Dilemma for Sentential Dualism. Linguistics and Philosophy 13 (6):687 - 698.
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  41.  13 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1989). A Defense of Empirical Justification. Philosophical Studies 56 (2):209 - 215.
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  42.  12 DLs
    Paul K. Moser & Jeffrey Tlumak (1985). Two Paradoxes of Rational Acceptance. Erkenntnis 23 (2):127 - 141.
    This article provides a straightforward diagnosis and resolution of the lottery paradox and the epistemic version of the paradox of the preface. In doing so, The article takes some steps in relating the notion of probability to the notion of epistemic justification.
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  43.  12 DLs
    Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (1996). Relativism and Normative Nonrealism: Basing Morality on Rationality. Metaphilosophy 27 (3):277-295.
    Normative nonrealism denies, first, that some things are good or bad independently of facts about the attitudes of moral agents and, second, that attitude-independent moral facts determine what is rational. This implies that facts about what is rational are logically prior to what is moral. Nonrealism commonly assumes that moral realism is false or unjustifiable, that there is a conceptual connection between morality and rationality and that the particular theory of rationality is the correct account of rationality. Facing the threat (...)
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  44.  12 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1992). Physicalism and Global Supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):71-82.
    This paper examines a nonreductive supervenience relation central to a philosophically popular version of nonreductive physicalism inspired by Donald Davidson. The paper argues that this global supervenience relation faces a serious epistemological problem that blocks its being superior to weaker, less general supervenience relations.
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  45.  11 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1984). Justification and Indefinite Propositions: Disarming Gettier's Counterexamples. Critica 16 (46):3 - 14.
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  46.  11 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1988). A Dilemma for Normative Moral Relativism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):207-216.
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  47.  11 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (2012). Reconceiving Philosophy of Religion. Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (20):115 - 136.
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  48.  10 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1987). Epistemology and Cognition. International Philosophical Quarterly 27 (2):217-221.
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  49.  10 DLs
    Paul K. Moser & D. Hudson Mulder (1994). Probability in Rational Decision-Making. Philosophical Papers 23 (2):109-128.
  50.  10 DLs
    Paul K. Moser (1996). Précis of Philosophy After Objectivity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):379-385.
    This paper is part of a symposium on Paul Moser, _Philosophy After Objectivity (Oxford University Press, 1993). The paper identifies and clarifies the main themes of _Philosophy After Objectivity.
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