36 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Paul Pietroski (University of Maryland, College Park)
  1. Paul M. Pietroski & Georges Rey (1995). When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws From Vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.
    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   54 citations  
  2. Paul M. Pietroski (1993). Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory. Ethics 103 (3):489-515.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   46 citations  
  3.  38
    Paul M. Pietroski (2004). Events and Semantic Architecture. Oxford University Press.
    A study of how syntax relates to meaning by a leader of the new generation of philosopher-linguists.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  4. Stephen Crain & Paul M. Pietroski (2001). Nature, Nurture, and Universal Grammar. Linguistics and Philosophy 24 (2):139-186.
    In just a few years, children achieve a stable state of linguistic competence, making them effectively adults with respect to: understanding novel sentences, discerning relations of paraphrase and entailment, acceptability judgments, etc. One familiar account of the language acquisition process treats it as an induction problem of the sort that arises in any domain where the knowledge achieved is logically underdetermined by experience. This view highlights the cues that are available in the input to children, as well as childrens skills (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  5.  97
    Paul M. Pietroski (2010). Concepts, Meanings and Truth: First Nature, Second Nature and Hard Work. Mind and Language 25 (3):247-278.
    I argue that linguistic meanings are instructions to build monadic concepts that lie between lexicalizable concepts and truth-evaluable judgments. In acquiring words, humans use concepts of various adicities to introduce concepts that can be fetched and systematically combined via certain conjunctive operations, which require monadic inputs. These concepts do not have Tarskian satisfaction conditions. But they provide bases for refinements and elaborations that can yield truth-evaluable judgments. Constructing mental sentences that are true or false requires cognitive work, not just an (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  6.  52
    Paul M. Pietroski & Peter Menzies (2003). Causing Actions. Mind and Language 18 (4):440-446.
    Paul Pietroski presents an original philosophical theory of actions and their mental causes. We often act for reasons, deliberating and choosing among options, based on our beliefs and desires. But because bodily motions always have biochemical causes, it can seem that thinking and acting are biochemical processes. Pietroski argues that thoughts and deeds are in fact distinct from, though dependent on, underlying biochemical processes within persons.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  7.  39
    Paul M. Pietroski (2008). Think of the Children. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):657 – 669.
    Often, the deepest disagreements are about starting points, and which considerations are relevant.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  8.  16
    Paul M. Pietroski (2015). Framing Event Variables. Erkenntnis 80 (1):31-60.
    Davidsonian analyses of action reports like ‘Alvin chased Theodore around a tree’ are often viewed as supporting the hypothesis that sentences of a human language H have truth conditions that can be specified by a Tarski-style theory of truth for H. But in my view, simple cases of adverbial modification add to the reasons for rejecting this hypothesis, even though Davidson rightly diagnosed many implications involving adverbs as cases of conjunct-reduction in the scope of an existential quantifier. I think the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9.  47
    Paul M. Pietroski (1998). Actions, Adjuncts, and Agency. Mind 107 (425):73-111.
    The event analysis of action sentences seems to be at odds with plausible (Davidsonian) views about how to count actions. If Booth pulled a certain trigger, and thereby shot Lincoln, there is good reason for identifying Booths' action of pulling the trigger with his action of shooting Lincoln; but given truth conditions of certain sentences involving adjuncts, the event analysis requires that the pulling and the shooting be distinct events. So I propose that event sortals like 'shooting' and 'pulling' are (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  10.  65
    Paul M. Pietroski (2003). Small Verbs, Complex Events: Analyticity Without Synonymy. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing 179--214.
  11.  41
    Susan Dwyer & Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Believing in Language. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):338-373.
    We propose that the generalizations of linguistic theory serve to ascribe beliefs to humans. Ordinary speakers would explicitly (and sincerely) deny having these rather esoteric beliefs about language--e.g., the belief that an anaphor must be bound in its governing category. Such ascriptions can also seem problematic in light of certain theoretical considerations having to do with concept possession, revisability, and so on. Nonetheless, we argue that ordinary speakers believe the propositions expressed by certain sentences of linguistic theory, and that linguistics (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  12. Paul M. Pietroski (2005). Meaning Before Truth. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  13. Stephen Crain & Paul M. Pietroski (2002). Why Language Acquisition is a Snap. Linguistic Review.
    Nativists inspired by Chomsky are apt to provide arguments with the following general form: languages exhibit interesting generalizations that are not suggested by casual (or even intensive) examination of what people actually say; correspondingly, adults (i.e., just about anyone above the age of four) know much more about language than they could plausibly have learned on the basis of their experience; so absent an alternative account of the relevant generalizations and speakers' (tacit) knowledge of them, one should conclude that there (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14. Paul M. Pietroski & Stephen Crain (2005). Innate Ideas. In James A. McGilvray (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky. Cambridge 164--181.
    Here's one way this chapter could go. After defining the terms 'innate' and 'idea', we say whether Chomsky thinks any ideas are innate -- and if so, which ones. Unfortunately, we don't have any theoretically interesting definitions to offer; and, so far as we know, Chomsky has never said that any ideas are innate. Since saying that would make for a very short chapter, we propose to do something else. Our aim is to locate Chomsky, as he locates himself, in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Paul M. Pietroski (2006). Character Before Content. In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford: Clarendon Press 34--60.
  16.  6
    Paul M. Pietroski (1993). First-Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  17.  42
    Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Fregean Innocence. Mind and Language 11 (4):338-370.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  18.  24
    Paul M. Pietroski (2000). Euthyphro and the Semantic. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):341-349.
  19.  67
    Stephen Crain, Andrea Gualmini & Paul M. Pietroski (2005). Brass Tacks in Linguistic Theory: Innate Grammatical Principles. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York 1--175.
    In the normal course of events, children manifest linguistic competence equivalent to that of adults in just a few years. Children can produce and understand novel sentences, they can judge that certain strings of words are true or false, and so on. Yet experience appears to dramatically underdetermine the com- petence children so rapidly achieve, even given optimistic assumptions about children’s nonlinguistic capacities to extract information and form generalizations on the basis of statistical regularities in the input. These considerations underlie (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20. Paul M. Pietroski (2002). Review: Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (442):488-491.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  69
    Paul M. Pietroski (1994). Executing the Second Best Option. Analysis 54 (4):201-207.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  7
    Paul M. Pietroski (2000). The Undeflated Domain of Semantics. SATS 1 (2):161.
  23.  88
    Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Experiencing the Facts (Critical Notice of McDowell). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26:613-36.
    The general topic of "Mind and World", the written version of John McDowell's 1991 John Locke Lectures, is how `concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world'. And one of the main aims is `to suggest that Kant should still have a central place in our discussion of the way thought bears on reality' (1).1 In particular, McDowell urges us to adopt a thesis that he finds in Kant, or perhaps in Strawson's Kant: the content of experience is conceptualized; (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  25
    Paul M. Pietroski (2006). Interpreting Concatenation and Concatenates. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):221–245.
    This paper presents a slightly modified version of the compositional semantics proposed in Events and Semantic Architecture (OUP 2005). Some readers may find this shorter version, which ignores issues about vagueness and causal constructions, easier to digest. The emphasis is on the treatments of plurality and quantification, and I assume at least some familiarity with more standard approaches.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  43
    Paul M. Pietroski (2000). On Explaining That. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):655-662.
    How can a speaker can explain that P without explaining the fact that P, or explain the fact that P without explaining that P, even when it is true (and so a fact) that P? Or in formal mode: what is the semantic contribution of 'explain' such that 'She explained that P' can be true, while 'She explained the fact that P' is false (or vice versa), even when 'P' is true? The proposed answer is that 'explained' is a semantically (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26.  24
    Paul M. Pietroski (2003). Quantification and Second Order Monadicity. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):259–298.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  35
    Paul M. Pietroski (1993). Possible Worlds, Syntax, and Opacity. Analysis 53 (4):270 - 280.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  1
    Paul M. Pietroski (2011). Minimal Semantic Instructions. In Boeckx Cedric (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Minimalism. Oxford University Press 472-498.
    Chomsky’s (1995, 2000a) Minimalist Program (MP) invites a perspective on semantics that is distinctive and attractive. In section one, I discuss a general idea that many theorists should find congenial: the spoken or signed languages that human children naturally acquire and use— henceforth, human languages—are biologically implemented procedures that generate expressions, whose meanings are recursively combinable instructions to build concepts that reflect a minimal interface between the Human Faculty of Language (HFL) and other cognitive systems. In sections two and three, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  7
    Paul M. Pietroski (1994). A “Should” Too Many. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):26.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  7
    Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):613-636.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  12
    Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Mind and World. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):613-636.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  1
    Paul M. Pietroski (2000). On Explaining That. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):655.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  14
    Paul M. Pietroski & Susan J. Dwyer (1999). Knowledge by Ignoring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):781-781.
    Some cases of implicit knowledge involve representations of (implicitly) known propositions, but this is not the only important type of implicit knowledge. Chomskian linguistics suggests another model of how humans can know more than is accessible to consciousness. Innate capacities to focus on a small range of possibilities, thereby ignoring many others, need not be grounded by inner representations of any possibilities ignored. This model may apply to many domains where human cognition “fills a gap” between stimuli and judgment.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. M. Pietroski Paul (2002). Causing Actions. OUP Oxford.
    Paul Pietroski presents an original philosophical theory of actions and their mental causes. We often act for reasons: we deliberate and choose among options, based on our beliefs and desires. However, bodily motions always have biochemical causes, so it can seem that thinking and acting are biochemical processes. Pietroski argues that thoughts and deeds are in fact distinct from, though dependent on, underlying biochemical processes within persons.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Paul M. Pietroski (2004). Events and Semantic Architecture. OUP Oxford.
    This book presents a unified theory of how grammar relates to meaning. Intended for linguists and philosophers it provides fresh ways of thinking about semantic generalizations that may reflect innately determined aspects of human languages.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Paul M. Pietroski (1997). Specifying Senses Innocently1. In Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics. Maribor 318.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography