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  1. Phil Dowe, Paul Noordhof & Clark Glymour, Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition.
    For most of the contributions to this volume, the project is this: Fill out “Event X is a cause of event Y if and only if……” where the dots on the right are to be filled in by a claims formulated in terms using any of (1) descriptions of possible worlds and their relations; (2) a special predicate, “is a law;” (3) “chances;” and (4) anything else one thinks one needs. The form of analysis is roughly the same as that (...)
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  2. Paul Noordhof, More in Pain … 153.
    In his response, Michael Tye writes as if I reject Representationalism about pain. But in my original paper (Noordhof 2001) I hoped to make clear that I did not. For instance, I remarked that I had sympathy with the position (95) and, on the subsequent page, outlined what I thought the Represen- tationalist should say. My proposal was that when we experience a pain in the finger, the experience is veridical only if the cause of this experience is a disordered (...)
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  3. Paul Noordhof (2013). And Patterns of Variation. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. 88.
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  4. Paul Noordhof (2013). Mental Causation : Ontology and Patterns of Variation. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  5. Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof (2013). A Defence of Owens' Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457.
    In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen’s response to Owens’ Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters into (...)
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  6. Paul Noordhof (2010). Emergent Causation and Property Causation. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  7. Paul Noordhof (2009). The Essential Instability of Self-Deception. Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):45-71.
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  8. Paul Noordhof (2008). Expressive Perception as Projective Imagining. Mind and Language 23 (3):329–358.
    I argue that our experience of expressive properties (such as the joyfulness or sadness of a piece of music) essentially involves the sensuous imagination (through simulation) of an emotion-guided process which would result in the production of the properties which constitute the realisation of the expressive properties experienced. I compare this proposal with arousal theories, Wollheim’s Freudian account, and other more closely related theories appealing to imagination such as Kendall Walton’s. I explain why the proposal is most naturally developed in (...)
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  9. Paul Noordhof (2008). The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value - by Robert Audi. Philosophical Books 49 (2):175-178.
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  10. Paul Noordhof (2007). A Coherentist Response to Stoneham's Reductio. Analysis 67 (295):267–268.
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  11. Paul Noordhof (2006). Environment-Dependent Content and the Virtues of Causal Explanation. Synthese 149 (3):551 - 575.
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  12. Paul Noordhof (2006). The Success of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):109-127.
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  13. Paul Noordhof (2005). In a State of Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
    Michael Tye and I are both Representationalists. Nevertheless, we have managed to disagree about the semantic character of ‘in’ in ‘There is a pain in my fingertip’ (see Noordhof (2001); Tye (2002); Noordhof (2002)). The first section of my commentary will focus on this disagreement. I will then turn to the location of pain. Here, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be much more agreement between Tye and me. I restrict myself to three points. First, I argue that Tye has (...)
     
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  14. Paul Noordhof (2005). Morgenbesser's Coin, Counterfactuals and Independence. Analysis 65 (287):261–263.
    In assessing counterfactuals, should we consider circumstances which match the actual circumstances in all probablistically independent fact or all causally independent fact? Jonathan Schaffer argues the latter and claims that the former approach, advanced by me, cannot deal with the case of Morgenbesser’s coin. More generally, he argues that, where there is a difference between the two, his account yields our intuitive verdicts about the truth of counterfactuals where mine does not (Schaffer 2004: 307, n. 16). In this brief note, (...)
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  15. Paul Noordhof (2005). The Transmogrification of a Posteriori Knowledge: Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 65 (285):88-89.
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  16. Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.) (2004). Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
    Cause and Chance is a collection of specially written papers by world-class metaphysicians. Its focus is the problems facing the "reductionist" approach to causation: the attempt to cover all types of causation, deterministic and indeterministic, with one basic theory.
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  17. Paul Noordhof (2004). Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown Argument? Analysis 64 (1):48-56.
    Externalists about mental content are supposed to face the following dilemma. Either they must give up the claim that we have privileged access to our own mental states or they must allow that we have privileged access to the world. The dilemma is posed in its most precise form through the McKinsey-Brown argument (McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995). Over the years since it was ?rst published in 1991, our understanding of the precise character of the premisses which constitute the argument has (...)
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  18. Paul Noordhof (2004). Prospects for a Counterfactual Theory of Causation. In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
     
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  19. Paul Noordhof (2003). Epiphenomenalism and Causal Asymmetry. In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
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  20. Paul Noordhof (2003). Not Old... But Not That New Either: Explicability, Emergence, and the Characterisation of Materialism. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
     
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  21. Paul Noordhof (2003). Not Old... But Not That New Either. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 85.
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  22. Paul Noordhof (2003). Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.
    I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of (...)
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  23. Paul Noordhof (2003). Something Like Ability. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
    One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I consider three arguments against the existence of phenomenal propositions and find them wanting. Nevertheless I deny that knowing phenomenal propositions is part of knowing what an experience is like. I provide a hybrid account of knowing what an experience is (...)
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  24. Paul Noordhof (2003). Tooley on Backward Causation. Analysis 63 (2):157–162.
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  25. Paul Noordhof & Emma Borg (2003). Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind and Language 18 (5):538–551.
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  26. Paul Noordhof (2002). Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences. Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue (...)
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  27. Paul Noordhof (2002). More in Pain. Analysis 62 (2):153-154.
    made with any ambitions for ontological reduction (e.g. denying that there are pains but only states of having pain). So I'm afraid that Tye's objections deriving from attributing to me such a view and pointing out that Representationalism is needed to capture, amongst other things, the fact that we experience pains in phantom limbs are all beside the point. Instead, the question is entirely a matter of whether the inferences mentioned in my original paper and Tye's reply fail because, although (...)
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  28. Paul Noordhof (2002). Personal Dualism and the Argument From Differential Vagueness. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):63-86.
    Abstract In Causing Actions, Pietroski defends a distinctive view of the relationship between mind and body which he calls Personal Dualism. Central to his defence is the Argument from Differential Vagueness. It moves from the claim that mental events have different vagueness of spatiotemporal boundaries from neural events to the claim that mental events are not identical to neural events. In response, I argue that this presupposes an ontological account of vagueness that there is no reason to believe in this (...)
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  29. Paul Noordhof (2002). Sungho Choi and the ‘Actual Events’ Clause. Analysis 62 (273):46–47.
    In order to keep matters brief, I shall assume knowledge of my Mind paper and Sungho Choi’s paper printed before this brief response (Noordhof 1999; Choi 2002). Sungho Choi claims that the example I gave to motivate my formulation of the ‘actual events’ clause fails to motivate it and that the formulation, in fact, contains a redundant element, namely my appeal to supersets. I think he is right that my example doesn’t work. However, I think he is wrong that the (...)
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  30. Paul Noordhof (2001). Believe What You Want. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265.
    The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth. I argue that these don't work. They either explain the aim in a way which makes it implausible that the Uncontrollability Thesis is true, or they fail to justify their claim that beliefs should be understood as aimed at the truth. I further (...)
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  31. Paul Noordhof, Getting Personal: Pietroski's Dualism.
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  32. Paul Noordhof (2001). In Defence of Influence? Analysis 61 (4):323–327.
    there is a substantial range of C1, C2, … of different not-too- distant alterations of C and a range E1, E2, of alterations of E, at least some of which differ, such that if C1 had occurred, E1 would have occurred, if C2 had occurred, E2 would have occurred and so on (Lewis 2000).
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  33. Paul Noordhof (2001). In Pain. Analysis 61 (2):95-97.
    When I feel a pain in my leg, how should we understand the.
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  34. Paul Noordhof (2000). Ramachandran's Four Counterexamples. Mind 109 (434):315-324.
    Murali Ramachandran has kindly provided me with four (alleged) counterexamples to the theory of causation which I recently put forward in Mind (Ramachandran 2000; Noordhof 1999). Space is limited for a response. Since this note will be published Ramachandran's paper, I will not set out the cases he gives. I refer the reader to the appropriate descriptions. I will also presume knowledge of the framework of my paper and just give page references in case this is helpful. I will try (...)
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  35. Paul Noordhof (1999). Barnes, Annette-Seeing Through Self Deception. Philosophical Books 40:180-183.
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  36. Paul Noordhof (1999). Causation by Content? Mind and Language 14 (3):291-320.
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  37. Paul Noordhof (1999). Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):115-18.
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  38. Paul Noordhof (1999). Moral Requirements Are Still Not Rational Requirements. Analysis 59 (3):127–136.
    Moral requirements apply to rational agents as such. But it is a conceptual truth that if agents are morally required to act in a certain way then we expect them to act in that way. Being rational, as such, must therefore suffice to ground our expectation that rational agents will do what they are morally required to do. But how could this be so? It could only be so if we think of the moral requirements that apply to agents as (...)
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  39. Paul Noordhof (1999). Probabilistic Causation, Preemption and Counterfactuals. Mind 108 (429):95-125.
    Counter factual theories of Causation have had problems with cases of probabilistic causation and preemption. I put forward a counterfactual theory that seems to deal with these problematic cases and also has the virtue of providing an account of the alleged asymmetry between hasteners and delayers: the former usually being counted as causes, the latter not. I go on to consider a new type of problem case that has not received so much attention in the literature, those I dub catalysts (...)
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  40. Paul Noordhof (1999). The Overdetermination Argument Versus the Cause-and-Essence Principle--No Contest. Mind 108 (430):367-375.
    Scott Sturgeon has claimed to undermine the principal argument for Physicalism, in his words, the view that 'actuality is exhausted by physical reality' (Sturgeon 1998, p. 410). In noting that actuality is exhausted by physical reality, the Physicalist is not claiming that all that there is in actuality are those things identified by physics. Rather the thought is that actuality is made up of all the things identified by physics and anything which is a compound of these things. So there (...)
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  41. Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof & Murali Ramachandran (1998). For a (Revised) PCA-Analysis. Analysis 58 (1):45–47.
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  42. Paul Noordhof (1998). Causation, Probability, and Chance. [REVIEW] Mind 107 (428):855-875.
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  43. Paul Noordhof (1998). Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation? Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):221-26.
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  44. Paul Noordhof (1998). Problems for the M-Set Analysis of Causation. Mind 107 (426):457-463.
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  45. Paul Noordhof (1998). Review: Causation, Probability, and Chance. [REVIEW] Mind 107 (428):855 - 875.
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  46. Paul Noordhof (1997). Making the Change: The Functionalist's Way. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):233-50.
    The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because it would make them properties of the ?implementing science?, e. g. neuroscience. I show (...)
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  47. Paul Noordhof (1997). The Mysterious Grand Properties of Forrest. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):99 – 101.
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  48. Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof & Murali Ramachandran (1996). Counterfactuals and Preemptive Causation. Analysis 56 (4):219–225.
    David Lewis modified his original theory of causation in response to the problem of ‘late preemption’ (see 1973b; 1986b: 193-212). However, as we will see, there is a crucial difference between genuine and preempted causes that Lewis must appeal to if his solution is to work. We argue that once this difference is recognized, an altogether better solution to the preemption problem presents itself.
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  49. Paul Noordhof (1996). Accidental Associations, Local Potency, and a Dilemma for Dretske. Mind and Language 11 (2):216-22.
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  50. Paul Noordhof (1994). PHILOSOPHY OF MIND Consciousness. Philosophical Books 35 (4):271-273.
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