50 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Paul M. Pietroski [34]Paul Pietroski [16]
See also:
Profile: Paul Pietroski (University of Maryland, College Park)
  1. Paul Pietroski, Monadic Determiners: Quantification and Thematic Separation.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Paul M. Pietroski (forthcoming). Framing Event Variables. Erkenntnis:1-30.
    Davidsonian analyses of action reports like ‘Alvin chased Theodore around a tree’ are often viewed as supporting the hypothesis that sentences of a human language H have truth conditions that can be specified by a Tarski-style theory of truth for H. But in my view, simple cases of adverbial modification add to the reasons for rejecting this hypothesis, even though Davidson rightly diagnosed many implications involving adverbs as cases of conjunct-reduction in the scope of an existential quantifier. I think the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Robert C. Berwick, Paul Pietroski, Beracah Yankama & Noam Chomsky (2011). Poverty of the Stimulus Revisited. Cognitive Science 35 (7):1207-1242.
    A central goal of modern generative grammar has been to discover invariant properties of human languages that reflect “the innate schematism of mind that is applied to the data of experience” and that “might reasonably be attributed to the organism itself as its contribution to the task of the acquisition of knowledge” (Chomsky, 1971). Candidates for such invariances include the structure dependence of grammatical rules, and in particular, certain constraints on question formation. Various “poverty of stimulus” (POS) arguments suggest that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jeffrey Lidz, Paul Pietroski, Tim Hunter & Justin Halberda (2011). Interface Transparency and the Psychosemantics of Most. Natural Language Semantics 19 (3):227-256.
    This paper proposes an Interface Transparency Thesis concerning how linguistic meanings are related to the cognitive systems that are used to evaluate sentences for truth/falsity: a declarative sentence S is semantically associated with a canonical procedure for determining whether S is true; while this procedure need not be used as a verification strategy, competent speakers are biased towards strategies that directly reflect canonical specifications of truth conditions. Evidence in favor of this hypothesis comes from a psycholinguistic experiment examining adult judgments (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Paul Pietroski (2010). Jerry A. Fodor: Lot 2: Language of Thought Revisited. Journal of Philosophy 107 (12).
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Paul Pietroski (2010). Lot 2. Journal of Philosophy 107 (12):653-658.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Paul M. Pietroski (2010). Concepts, Meanings and Truth: First Nature, Second Nature and Hard Work. Mind and Language 25 (3):247-278.
    I argue that linguistic meanings are instructions to build monadic concepts that lie between lexicalizable concepts and truth-evaluable judgments. In acquiring words, humans use concepts of various adicities to introduce concepts that can be fetched and systematically combined via certain conjunctive operations, which require monadic inputs. These concepts do not have Tarskian satisfaction conditions. But they provide bases for refinements and elaborations that can yield truth-evaluable judgments. Constructing mental sentences that are true or false requires cognitive work, not just an (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Paul Pietroski, Jeffrey Lidz, Tim Hunter & Justin Halberda (2009). The Meaning of 'Most': Semantics, Numerosity and Psychology. Mind and Language 24 (5):554-585.
    The meaning of 'most' can be described in many ways. We offer a framework for distinguishing semantic descriptions, interpreted as psychological hypotheses that go beyond claims about sentential truth conditions, and an experiment that tells against an attractive idea: 'most' is understood in terms of one-to-one correspondence. Adults evaluated 'Most of the dots are yellow', as true or false, on many trials in which yellow dots and blue dots were displayed for 200 ms. Displays manipulated the ease of using a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Paul Pietroski, Logical Form. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Paul M. Pietroski (2008). Think of the Children. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):657 – 669.
    Often, the deepest disagreements are about starting points, and which considerations are relevant.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Paul Pietroski & Jeffrey Lidz (2008). Natural Number Concepts: No Derivation Without Formalization. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):666-667.
    The conceptual building blocks suggested by developmental psychologists may yet play a role in how the human learner arrives at an understanding of natural number. The proposal of Rips et al. faces a challenge, yet to be met, faced by all developmental proposals: to describe the logical space in which learners ever acquire new concepts.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Paul Pietroski (2006). Logical Form and LF. In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 822--841.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Paul Pietroski (2006). 32.1 Patterns of Reason and Traditional Grammar. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 822.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Paul M. Pietroski (2006). Character Before Content. In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 34--60.
  15. Paul M. Pietroski (2006). Interpreting Concatenation and Concatenates. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):221–245.
    This paper presents a slightly modified version of the compositional semantics proposed in Events and Semantic Architecture (OUP 2005). Some readers may find this shorter version, which ignores issues about vagueness and causal constructions, easier to digest. The emphasis is on the treatments of plurality and quantification, and I assume at least some familiarity with more standard approaches.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Stephen Crain, Andrea Gualmini & Paul M. Pietroski (2005). Brass Tacks in Linguistic Theory: Innate Grammatical Principles. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 1--175.
    In the normal course of events, children manifest linguistic competence equivalent to that of adults in just a few years. Children can produce and understand novel sentences, they can judge that certain strings of words are true or false, and so on. Yet experience appears to dramatically underdetermine the com- petence children so rapidly achieve, even given optimistic assumptions about children’s nonlinguistic capacities to extract information and form generalizations on the basis of statistical regularities in the input. These considerations underlie (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Stephen Grain, Andrea Gualmini & Paul Pietroski (2005). Brass Tacks in Linguistic Theory. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind. Oxford University Press. 1--175.
  18. Paul M. Pietroski (2005). Events and Semantic Architecture. Oxford University Press.
    A study of how syntax relates to meaning by a leader of the new generation of philosopher-linguists.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Paul M. Pietroski (2005). Meaning Before Truth. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Paul M. Pietroski & Stephen Crain (2005). Innate Ideas. In James A. McGilvray (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky. Cambridge. 164--181.
    Here's one way this chapter could go. After defining the terms 'innate' and 'idea', we say whether Chomsky thinks any ideas are innate -- and if so, which ones. Unfortunately, we don't have any theoretically interesting definitions to offer; and, so far as we know, Chomsky has never said that any ideas are innate. Since saying that would make for a very short chapter, we propose to do something else. Our aim is to locate Chomsky, as he locates himself, in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Paul Pietroski & Stephen Crain (2005). 8 Innate Ideas. In James A. McGilvray (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky. Cambridge University Press. 164.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Stephen Crain & Paul Pietroski (2003). Innateness and Universal Grammar. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Paul Pietroski (2003). Quantification and Second-Order Quantification. Philosophical Perspectives 17:259--298.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Paul M. Pietroski (2003). Quantification and Second Order Monadicity. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):259–298.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Paul M. Pietroski (2003). Small Verbs, Complex Events: Analyticity Without Synonymy. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 179--214.
  26. Paul M. Pietroski & Peter Menzies (2003). Causing Actions. Mind and Language 18 (4):440-446.
    Paul Pietroski presents an original philosophical theory of actions and their mental causes. We often act for reasons, deliberating and choosing among options, based on our beliefs and desires. But because bodily motions always have biochemical causes, it can seem that thinking and acting are biochemical processes. Pietroski argues that thoughts and deeds are in fact distinct from, though dependent on, underlying biochemical processes within persons.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Stephen Crain & Paul M. Pietroski (2002). Why Language Acquisition is a Snap. Linguistic Review.
    Nativists inspired by Chomsky are apt to provide arguments with the following general form: languages exhibit interesting generalizations that are not suggested by casual (or even intensive) examination of what people actually say; correspondingly, adults (i.e., just about anyone above the age of four) know much more about language than they could plausibly have learned on the basis of their experience; so absent an alternative account of the relevant generalizations and speakers' (tacit) knowledge of them, one should conclude that there (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Norbert Hornstein & Paul Pietroski (2002). Does Every Sentence Like This Exhibit a Scope Ambiguity. In Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and Meaning: Essays at the Interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften. 43--72.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Paul M. Pietroski (2002). Review: Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (442):488-491.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Stephen Crain & Paul M. Pietroski (2001). Nature, Nurture, and Universal Grammar. Linguistics and Philosophy 24 (2):139-186.
    In just a few years, children achieve a stable state of linguistic competence, making them effectively adults with respect to: understanding novel sentences, discerning relations of paraphrase and entailment, acceptability judgments, etc. One familiar account of the language acquisition process treats it as an induction problem of the sort that arises in any domain where the knowledge achieved is logically underdetermined by experience. This view highlights the cues that are available in the input to children, as well as childrens skills (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Paul Pietroski (2000). Mental Causation for Dualists. Mind and Language 9 (3):336-366.
    The philosophical problem of mental causation concerns a clash between commonsense and scientific views about the causation of human behaviour. On the one hand, commonsense suggests that our actions are caused by our mental states—our thoughts, intentions, beliefs and so on. On the other hand, neuroscience assumes that all bodily movements are caused by neurochemical events. It is implausible to suppose that our actions are causally overdetermined in the same way that the ringing of a bell may be overdetermined by (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Paul M. Pietroski (2000). Euthyphro and the Semantic. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):341-349.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Paul M. Pietroski (2000). On Explaining That. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):655-662.
    How can a speaker can explain that P without explaining the fact that P, or explain the fact that P without explaining that P, even when it is true (and so a fact) that P? Or in formal mode: what is the semantic contribution of 'explain' such that 'She explained that P' can be true, while 'She explained the fact that P' is false (or vice versa), even when 'P' is true? The proposed answer is that 'explained' is a semantically (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Paul M. Pietroski (2000). The Undeflated Domain of Semantics. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):161.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Paul M. Pietroski & Susan J. Dwyer (1999). Knowledge by Ignoring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):781-781.
    Some cases of implicit knowledge involve representations of (implicitly) known propositions, but this is not the only important type of implicit knowledge. Chomskian linguistics suggests another model of how humans can know more than is accessible to consciousness. Innate capacities to focus on a small range of possibilities, thereby ignoring many others, need not be grounded by inner representations of any possibilities ignored. This model may apply to many domains where human cognition “fills a gap” between stimuli and judgment.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Paul M. Pietroski (1998). Actions, Adjuncts, and Agency. Mind 107 (425):73-111.
    The event analysis of action sentences seems to be at odds with plausible (Davidsonian) views about how to count actions. If Booth pulled a certain trigger, and thereby shot Lincoln, there is good reason for identifying Booths' action of pulling the trigger with his action of shooting Lincoln; but given truth conditions of certain sentences involving adjuncts, the event analysis requires that the pulling and the shooting be distinct events. So I propose that event sortals like 'shooting' and 'pulling' are (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Paul M. Pietroski (1997). Specifying Senses Innocently1. In Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics. Maribor. 318.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Susan Dwyer & Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Believing in Language. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):338-373.
    We propose that the generalizations of linguistic theory serve to ascribe beliefs to humans. Ordinary speakers would explicitly (and sincerely) deny having these rather esoteric beliefs about language--e.g., the belief that an anaphor must be bound in its governing category. Such ascriptions can also seem problematic in light of certain theoretical considerations having to do with concept possession, revisability, and so on. Nonetheless, we argue that ordinary speakers believe the propositions expressed by certain sentences of linguistic theory, and that linguistics (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Fregean Innocence. Mind and Language 11 (4):338-370.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):613-636.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Experiencing the Facts (Critical Notice of McDowell). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26:613-36.
    The general topic of "Mind and World", the written version of John McDowell's 1991 John Locke Lectures, is how `concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world'. And one of the main aims is `to suggest that Kant should still have a central place in our discussion of the way thought bears on reality' (1).1 In particular, McDowell urges us to adopt a thesis that he finds in Kant, or perhaps in Strawson's Kant: the content of experience is conceptualized; (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Mind and World. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):613-636.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Paul M. Pietroski & Georges Rey (1995). When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws From Vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.
    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Paul M. Pietroski (1994). A “Should” Too Many. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):26.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Paul M. Pietroski (1994). Executing the Second Best Option. Analysis 54 (4):201-207.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Paul M. Pietroski (1994). Mental Causation for Dualists. Mind and Language 9 (3):336-66.
    The philosophical problem of mental causation concerns a clash between commonsense and scientific views about the causation of human behaviour. On the one hand, commonsense suggests that our actions are caused by our mental states---our thoughts, intentions, beliefs and so on. On the other hand, neuroscience assumes that all bodily movements are caused by neurochemical events. It is implausible to suppose that our actions are causally overdetermined in the same way that the ringing of a bell may be overdetermined by (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Paul M. Pietroski (1993). First-Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Paul M. Pietroski (1993). Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory. Ethics 103 (3):489-515.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Paul M. Pietroski (1993). Possible Worlds, Syntax, and Opacity. Analysis 53 (4):270 - 280.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation