19 found
Sort by:
  1. Paul R. Thagard (2006). Desires Are Not Propositional Attitudes. Dialogue 45 (1):151-156.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Paul R. Thagard (ed.) (2006). Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Baljinder Sahdra & Paul R. Thagard (2003). Self-Deception and Emotional Coherence. Minds and Machines 13 (2):213-231.
    This paper proposes that self-deception results from the emotional coherence of beliefs with subjective goals. We apply the HOTCO computational model of emotional coherence to simulate a rich case of self-deception from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.We argue that this model is more psychologically realistic than other available accounts of self-deception, and discuss related issues such as wishful thinking, intention, and the division of the self.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Paul R. Thagard (2002). How Molecules Matter to Mental Computation. Philosophy of Science 69 (3):497-518.
    Almost all computational models of the mind and brain ignore details about neurotransmitters, hormones, and other molecules. The neglect of neurochemistry in cognitive science would be appropriate if the computational properties of brains relevant to explaining mental functioning were in fact electrical rather than chemical. But there is considerable evidence that chemical complexity really does matter to brain computation, including the role of proteins in intracellular computation, the operations of synapses and neurotransmitters, and the effects of neuromodulators such as hormones. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Paul R. Thagard (2002). The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Paul R. Thagard (2002). The Passionate Scientist: Emotion in Scientific Cognition. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 235.
    Since Plato, most philosophers have drawn a sharp line between reason and emotion, assuming that emotions interfere with rationality and have nothing to contribute to good reasoning. In his dialogue the Phaedrus, Plato compared the rational part of the soul to a charioteer who must control his steeds, which correspond to the emotional parts of the soul (Plato 1961, p. 499). Today, scientists are often taken as the paragons of rationality, and scientific thought is generally assumed to be independent of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Allison Barnes & Paul R. Thagard (1997). Empathy and Analogy. Dialogue 36 (4):705-720.
    We contend that empathy is best viewed as a kind of analogical thinking of the sort described in the multiconstraint theory of analogy proposed by Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard (1995). Our account of empathy reveals the Theory-theory/Simulation theory debate to be based on a false assumption and formulated in terms too simple to capture the nature of mental state ascription. Empathy is always simulation, but may simultaneously include theory-application. By properly specifying the analogical processes of empathy and their constraints, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Paul R. Thagard (1997). Coherent and Creative Conceptual Combinations. In T.B. Ward, S.M Smith & J. Viad (eds.), Creative Thought: An Investigation of Conceptual Structures and Processes. American Psychological Association.
    Conceptual combinations range from the utterly mundane to the sublimely creative. Mundane combinations include a myriad of adjective-noun and noun-noun juxtapositions that crop up in everyday speaking and writing, such as blue car, cooked carrots, and radio phone. Creative combinations include some of the most important theoretical constructions in science, such as sound wave, bacterial infection, and natural selection. Both mundane and creative conceptual combinations are essential to our attempts to make sense of the world and people's utterances about it. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. John H. Holland, Keith J. Holyoak, Richard E. Nisbett & Paul R. Thagard (1993). Deductive Reasoning. In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Mit Press.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Paul R. Thagard (1991). Philosophical and Computational Models of Explanation. Philosophical Studies 64 (October):87-104.
  11. Paul R. Thagard (1990). Concepts and Conceptual Change. Synthese 82 (2):255-74.
    This paper argues that questions concerning the nature of concepts that are central in cognitive psychology are also important to epistemology and that there is more to conceptual change than mere belief revision. Understanding of epistemic change requires appreciation of the complex ways in which concepts are structured and organized and of how this organization can affect belief revision. Following a brief summary of the psychological functions of concepts and a discussion of some recent accounts of what concepts are, I (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Paul R. Thagard (1990). Philosophy and Machine Learning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):261-76.
    This article discusses the philosophical relevance of recent computational work on inductive inference being conducted in the rapidly growing branch of artificial intelligence called machine learning.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Paul R. Thagard (1989). Connectionism and Epistemology: Goldman on Winner-Take-All Networks. Philosophia 19 (2-3):189-196.
    This paper examines Alvin Goldman's discussion of acceptance and uncertainty in chapter 15 of his book, Epistemology and Cognition. Goldman discusses how acceptance and rejection of beliefs might be understood in terms of "winner-take-all" connectionist networks. The paper answers some of the questions he raises in his epistemic evaluation of connectionist programs. The major tool for doing this is a connectionist model of explanatory coherence judgments (Thagard, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1989). Finally, there is a discussion of problems for Goldman's (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Paul R. Thagard (1986). Parallel Computation and the Mind-Body Problem. Cognitive Science 10 (3):301-18.
    states are to be understood in terms of their functional relationships to other mental states, not in terms of their material instantiation in any particular kind of hardware. But the argument that material instantiation is irrelevant to functional..
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Paul R. Thagard (1986). The Emergence of Meaning: An Escape From Searle's Chinese Room. Behaviorism 14 (3):139-46.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Paul R. Thagard (1978). The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice. Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):76-92.
    accounts will be sensitive to thes objections — that successive theories tend to fail to have the logical relations of contradiction and explanation as a special case or an approximation. Although Carnap does not pursue this all the way to the observational level as Kuhn and Feyerabend do, these problems do arise for him on the theoretical level. But science typically has some cumulative development on this level as well as on the observational one. If these problems are to be (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Paul R. Thagard (1978). Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:223 - 234.
    Using astrology as a case study, this paper attempts to establish a criterion for demarcating science from pseudoscience. Numerous reasons for considering astrology to be a pseudoscience are evaluated and rejected; verifiability and falsifiability are briefly discussed. A theory is said to be pseudoscientific if and only if (1) it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems, but (2) the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Paul R. Thagard (1977). Darwin and Whewell. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 8 (4):353-356.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Paul R. Thagard (1977). The Unity of Peirce's Theory of Hypothesis. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 13 (2):112 - 121.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation