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Profile: Paul Raymont (Ryerson University)
  1. Paul Raymont, Conscious Unity.
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  2. Paul Raymont, From HOTs to Self-Representing States.
    After briefly summarizing Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, I consider difficulties that arise for his account from the possibility of an ‘empty HOT’, a HOT that occurs in the absence of the mental state that it purports to represent. I criticize Rosenthal’s responses to this objection, and conclude that the difficulties that derive from the possibility of such misrepresentation are fatal to his HOT-theory.
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  3. Paul Raymont, Some Experienced Qualities Belong to the Experience.
    In this paper, a criticism of representationalist views of consciousness is developed. These views are often supported by an appeal to a transparency thesis about conscious states, according to which an experience does not itself possess the qualities of which it makes one conscious. The experience makes one conscious of these qualities by representing them, not by instantiating them. Against this, it is argued that some of the properties of which one is conscious are had by the conscious state itself. (...)
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  4. Andrew Brook & Paul Raymont (forthcoming). A Unified Theory of Consciousness. MIT Press.
  5. Andrew Brook & Paul Raymont (2006). The Representational Base of Consciousness. Psyche 12 (2).
    Current views of consciousness can be divided by whether the theorist accepts or rejects cognitivism about consciousness. Cognitivism as we understand it is the view that consciousness is just a form of representation or an information-processing property of a system that has representations or perhaps both.<b> </b>Anti-cognitivists deny this, appealing to thought experiments about inverted spectra, zombies and the like to argue that consciousness could change while nothing cognitive or representational changes. Nearly everyone agrees, however, that consciousness has a _representational (...)
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  6. Paul Raymont (2004). On Causal Relevance. Dialogue 43 (2):367-376.
  7. Paul Raymont (2003). Kim on Closure, Exclusion, and Nonreductive Physicalism. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
  8. Paul Raymont (2003). Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion, and Nonreductive Physicalism. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
    An analysis and rebuttal of Jaegwon Kim's reasons for taking nonreductive physicalism to entail the causal irrelevance of mental features to physical phenomena, particularly the behaviour of human bodies.
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  9. Paul Raymont (2003). O'Connor, Timothy. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Review of Metaphysics 57 (1):170-172.
  10. Paul Raymont (2001). Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant? Dialogue 40 (3):509-528.
    Non-reductive physicalists are increasingly regarded as unwitting epiphenomenalists, since their refusal to reduce mental features to physical properties allegedly implies that while there are mental causes, none of these causes produces its effects in virtue of being the type of mental state that it is. I examine, and reject, the “trope” response to this charge. I take the failure of the trope model of causal relevance to be instructive, since it illustrates a confusion that lies at the heart of the (...)
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  11. Paul Raymont (1999). An Idle Threat: Epiphenomenalism Exposed. Dissertation, University of Toronto
    In this doctoral dissertation I consider, and reject, the claim that recent varieties of non-reductive physicalism, particularly Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, are committed to a new kind of epiphenomenalism. Non-reductive physicalists identify each mental event with a physical event, and are thus entitled to the belief that mental events are causes, since the physical events with which they are held to be identical are causes. However, Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and others have argued that if we follow the non-reductive physicalist (...)
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  12. Paul Raymont (1999). The Know-How Response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):113-26.
    I defend Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind from a criticism that has been advanced by Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis. According to their criticism, what Mary lacked when she was in her black and white room was a set of abilities; she did not know how to recognize or imagine certain types of experience from a first-person perspective. Her subsequent discovery of what it is like to experience redness amounts to no more than her (...)
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  13. Paul Raymont (1997). Peter Godfrey-Smith, Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 17 (1):35-38.
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  14. Paul Raymont (1995). Tye's Criticism of the Knowledge Argument. Dialogue 34 (4):713-26.
    A defense of Frank Jackson's knowledge argument from an objection raised by Michael Tye (1986, 1989), according to which Mary acquires no new factual knowledge when she first sees red but, instead, merely comes to know old facts (that she already knew) in a new way.
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  15. Sanford G. Thatcher, James S. Stramel, Heather Blair, David Christensen, Ronald De Sousa, Timothy F. Murphy, Paul Raymont, Harold J. Dumain, Joseph A. Grispino, Todd Volker, Anto Knežević & Karen M. Kuss (1995). Letters to the Editor. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5):107 - 122.
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