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Paul A. Roth [70]Paul Roth [17]Paul Andrew Roth [1]
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Profile: Paul A. Roth (University of California, Santa Cruz)
  1. Paul Roth (2004). Hearts of Darkness: 'Perpetrator History' and Why There is No Why. History of the Human Sciences 17 (2-3):211-251.
    Three theories contend as explanations of perpetrator behavior in the Holocaust as well as other cases of genocide: structural, intentional, and situational. Structural explanations emphasize the sense in which no single individual or choice accounts for the course of events. In opposition, intentional/cutltural accounts insist upon the genocides as intended outcomes, for how can one explain situations in which people ‘step up’ and repeatedly kill defenseless others in large numbers over sustained periods of time as anything other than a choice? (...)
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  2. Paul A. Roth (1992). Hayden White and the Aesthetics of Historiography. History of the Human Sciences 5 (1):17-35.
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  3.  87
    Paul A. Roth (2002). Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Time. Common Knowledge 8 (2):418-419.
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  4.  97
    Paul A. Roth (2012). The Pasts. History and Theory 51 (3):313-339.
    ABSTRACTThis essay offers a reconfiguration of the possibility‐space of positions regarding the metaphysics and epistemology associated with historical knowledge. A tradition within analytic philosophy from Danto to Dummett attempts to answer questions about the reality of the past on the basis of two shared assumptions. The first takes individual statements as the relevant unit of semantic and philosophical analysis. The second presumes that variants of realism and antirealism about the past exhaust the metaphysical options . This essay argues that both (...)
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  5.  98
    Paul A. Roth (1994). What Does the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge Explain?: Or, When Epistemological Chickens Come Home to Roost. History of the Human Sciences 7 (1):95-108.
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  6. Mark S. Peacock & Paul A. Roth (2004). Holocaust Studies: What is to Be Learned? History of the Human Sciences 17 (2-3):1-13.
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  7.  49
    Paul A. Roth (2003). Mistakes. Synthese 136 (3):389 - 408.
    A suggestion famously made by Peter Winch and carried through to present discussions holds that what constitutes the social as a kind consists of something shared -- rules or practices commonly learned, internalized, or otherwise acquired by all members belonging to a society. This essays argues against the explanatory efficacy of appeals to this shared something as constitutive of a social kind by examining a violation of social norms or rules, viz., mistakes. I argue that an asymmetric relation exists between (...)
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  8.  1
    Paul A. Roth (1992). Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences: A Case for Methodological Pluralism. Philosophical Review 101 (3):679-681.
  9.  69
    Paul A. Roth (2013). The Silence of the Norms: The Missing Historiography of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (4):545-52.
    History has been disparaged since the late 19th century for not conforming to norms of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact a work of history upends the regnant philosophical conception of science in the second part of the 20th century. Yet despite its impact, Kuhn’s Structure has failed to motivate philosophers to ponder why works of history should be capable of exerting rational influence on an understanding of philosophy of science. But all this constitutes a great irony and (...)
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  10. Paul A. Roth (2002). Ways of Pastmaking. History of the Human Sciences 15 (4):125-143.
    Riddles of induction – old or new, Hume’s or Goodman’s – pose unanswered challenges to assumptions that experiences logically legitimate expectations or classifications. The challenges apply both to folk beliefs and to scientific ones. In particular, Goodman’s ‘new riddle’ famously confounds efforts to specify how additional experiences confirm the rightness of currently preferred ways of organizing objects, i.e. our favored theories of what kinds there are.1 His riddle serves to emphasize that neither logic nor experience certifies accepted groupings of objects (...)
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  11.  25
    Stephen P. Turner & Paul Andrew Roth (eds.) (2003). The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Blackwell Pub..
    _The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences _collects newly commissioned essays that examine fundamental issues in the social sciences.
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  12.  91
    Paul A. Roth (1999). The Full Hempel. History and Theory 38 (2):249–263.
    Book reviewed in this article: The Logic of Historical Explanation by Clayton Roberts.
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  13. Paul A. Roth (1989). Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences. Journal of Philosophy 86 (8):442-446.
  14.  31
    Paul Roth & Thomas Ryckman (1995). Chaos, Clio, and Scientistic Illusions of Understanding. History and Theory 34 (1):30-44.
    A number of authors have recently argued that the mathematical insights of "chaos theory" offer a promising formal model or significant analogy for understanding at least some historical events. We examine a representative claim of each kind regarding the application of chaos theory to problems of historical explanation. We identify two lines of argument. One we term the Causal Thesis, which states that chaos theory may be used to plausibly model, and so explain, historical events. The other we term the (...)
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  15. Paul A. Roth (2000). The Object of Understanding. In K. R. Stueber & H. H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press 243--269.
     
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  16.  90
    Frank Ankersmit, Mark Bevir, Paul Roth, Aviezer Tucker & Alison Wylie (2007). The Philosophy of History: An Agenda. Journal of the Philosophy of History 1 (1):1-9.
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  17.  86
    Paul A. Roth (1983). Personhood, Property Rights, and the Permissibility of Abortion. Law and Philosophy 2 (2):163 - 191.
    The purpose of this paper is to argue that the tactic of granting a fetus the legal status of a person will not, contrary to the expectations of opponents of abortion, provide grounds for a general prohibition on abortions. I begin by examining two arguments, one moral (J. J. Thomson's A Defense of Abortion) and the other legal (D. Regan's Rewriting Roe v. Wade), which grant the assumption that a fetus is a person and yet argue to the conclusion that (...)
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  18.  3
    Paul A. Roth (1996). Will the Real Scientists Please Stand Up? Dead Ends and Live Issues in the Explanation of Scientific Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (1):43-68.
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  19.  30
    Paul A. Roth (2007). The Disappearance of the Empirical: Some Reflections on Contemporary Culture Theory and Historiography. Journal of the Philosophy of History 1 (3):271-292.
    This paper surveys the parallel fates of the notion of the empirical in philosophy of science in the 20th century and the notion of experience as evidence in one important line of debate in historiography/philosophy of history. The focus concerns the presumably crucial role some notion of the empirical plays in the assessment of knowledge claims. The significance of 'the empirical' disappears on the assumption that theories either determine what counts as experience or explain away any apparently discordant evidence. One (...)
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  20.  11
    Paul Roth (1988). Narrative Explanations: The Case of History. History and Theory 27 (1):1-13.
    The very idea of narrative explanation invites two objections: a methodological objection, stating that narrative structure is too far from the form of a scientific explanation to count as an explanation, and a metaphysical objection, stating that narrative structure situates historical practice too close to the writing of fiction. Both of these objections, however, are illfounded. The methodological objection and the dispute regarding the status of historical explanation can be disposed of by revealing their motivating presupposition: the plausibility of an (...)
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  21.  43
    Paul Roth (1999). The Epistemology of "Epistemology Naturalized". Dialectica 53 (2):87–110.
    Quine's “Epistemology Naturalized” has become part of the canon in epistemology and excited a widespread revival of interest in naturalism. Yet the status accorded the essay is ironic, since both friends and foes of philosophical naturalism deny that Quine makes a plausible case that the methods of naturalism can accommodate the problems of epistemology.
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  22.  52
    Paul A. Roth (1978). Paradox and Indeterminacy. Journal of Philosophy 75 (7):347-367.
  23.  63
    Paul A. Roth (2008). Varieties and Vagaries of Historical Explanation. Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2):214-226.
    For the better part of the 20th century, expositions of issues regarding historical explanation followed a predictable format, one that took as given the nonequivalence of explanations in history and philosophical models of scientific explanation. Ironically, at the present time, the philosophical point of note concerns how the notion of science has itself changed. Debates about explanation in turn need to adapt to this. This prompts the question of whether anything now still makes plausible the thought that history must make (...)
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  24.  36
    Robert Ackermann, Brian Baigrie, Harold I. Brown, Michael Cavanaugh, Paul Fox-Strangways, Gonzalo Munevar, Stephen David Ross, Philip Pettit, Paul Roth, Frederick Schmitt, Stephen Turner & Charles Wallis (1988). Responses to 'in Defense of Relativism'. Social Epistemology 2 (3):227 – 261.
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  25.  16
    Paul A. Roth (2003). ``Mistakes''. Synthese 136 (3):389-408.
    A suggestion famously made by Peter Winch and carried through to present discussions holds that what constitutes the social as a kind consists of something shared – rules or practices commonly learned, internalized, or otherwise acquired by all members belonging to a society. This essays argues against the explanatory efficacy of appeals to this shared something as constitutive of a social kind by examining a violation of social norms or rules, viz., mistakes. I argue that an asymmetric relation exists between (...)
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  26.  5
    Paul Roth (2003). ``Mistakes''. Synthese 136 (3):389-408.
    A suggestion famously made by Peter Winch and carried through to present discussions holds that what constitutes the social as a kind consists of something shared – rules or practices commonly learned, internalized, or otherwise acquired by all members belonging to a society. This essays argues against the explanatory efficacy of appeals to this shared something as constitutive of a social kind by examining a violation of social norms or rules, viz., mistakes. I argue that an asymmetric relation exists between (...)
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  27.  15
    Paul A. Roth (forthcoming). Beyond Understanding: The Career of the Concept of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
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  28.  48
    Ronald Munson & Paul A. Roth (1994). Testing Normative Naturalism: The Problem of Scientific Medicine. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):571-584.
    Laudan's normative naturalism' claims to account for the success of science by construing theories and other claims as methodological rules interpreted as defeasible hypothetical imperatives for securing cognitive ends. We ask two questions regarding the adequacy for medicine of Laudan's meta- methodology. First, although Laudan denies that general aims can be assigned to a science, we show that this is not the case for medicine. Second, we argue that Laudan's account yields mixed results as a tool for evaluating methodological rules (...)
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  29.  8
    Paul A. Roth (1983). Siegel on Naturalized Epistemology and Natural Science. Philosophy of Science 50 (3):482-493.
  30.  11
    Paul A. Roth (2003). Kitcher's Two Cultures. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):386-405.
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  31.  8
    Paul A. Roth (1989). Politics and Epistemology: Rorty, MacIntyre, and the Ends of Philosophy. History of the Human Sciences 2 (2):171-191.
    In this paper, I examine how a manifest disagreement between Richard Rorty and Alasdair MacIntyre concerning the history of philosophy is but one of a series of deep and interrelated disagreements concerning, in addition, the history of science, the good life for human beings, and, ultimately, the character of and prospects for humankind as well. I shall argue that at the heart of this series of disagreements rests a dispute with regard to the nature of rationality. And this disagreement concerning (...)
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  32.  43
    Paul A. Roth (2009). Quo Vadis? Quine's Web, Kuhn's Revolutions, and Baert's “Way Forward”. [REVIEW] Human Studies 32 (3):357 - 363.
  33.  26
    Paul A. Roth (1984). On Missing Neurath's Boat: Some Reflections on Recent Quine Literature. Synthese 61 (2):205-231.
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  34. Frank Ankersmit, Mark Bevir, Paul Roth, Aviezer Tucker, Alison Wylie & Giuseppina D'Oro (2010). Brill Online Books and Journals. Journal of the Philosophy of History 4 (3-4).
     
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  35.  11
    Paul A. Roth (1995). Microfoundations Without Foundations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):57-64.
  36.  14
    Paul A. Roth (2001). Review Symposium. History of the Human Sciences 14 (2):87-97.
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  37.  11
    Paul A. Roth (1995). New Philosophy of Social Science: Problems of Indeterminacy. Metaphilosophy 26 (4):440-448.
    This article defends methodological and theoretical pluralism in the social sciences. While pluralistic, such a philosophy of social science is both pragmatic and normative. Only by facing the problems of such pluralism, including how to resolve the potential conflicts between various methods and theories, is it possible to discover appropriate criteria of adequacy for social scientific explanations and interpretations. So conceived, the social sciences do not give us fixed and universal features of the social world, but rather contribute to the (...)
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  38.  16
    Paul A. Roth (1991). Truth in Interpretation: The Case of Psychoanalysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (2):175-195.
    This article explores and attempts to resolve some issues that arise when psychoanalytic explanations are construed as a type of historical or narrative explanation. The chief problem is this: If one rejects the claim of narratives to verisimilitude, this appears to divorce the notion of explanation from that of truth. The author examines, in particular, Donald Spence's attempt to deal with the relation of narrative explanations and truth. In his critique of Spence's distinction between narrative truth and historical truth, the (...)
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  39.  6
    Paul A. Roth (1996). Dubious Liaisons: A Review of Alvin Goldman's Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):261 – 279.
    Alvin Goldman's recent collection (Goldman, 1992) includes many of the important and seminal contributions made by him over the last three decades to epistemology, philosophy of mind, and analytic metaphysics. Goldman is an acknowledged leader in efforts to put material from cognitive and social science to good philosophical use. This is the “liaison” which Goldman takes his own work to exemplify and advance. Yet the essays contained in Liaisons chart an important evolution in Goldman's own views about the relation between (...)
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  40.  33
    Paul A. Roth (2008). 4. Three Dogmas (More or Less) of Explanation. History and Theory 47 (1):57–68.
    What ought to count as an explanation? Such normative questions—what “ought to be” the case?—typically mark the domain that those with a type of philosophical aspiration call their own. Debates in the philosophy of history have for too long been marred by bad advice from just such aspirants. The recurrent suggestion has been that historians have a particular need for a theory of explanation since they seem to have none of their own. But neither the study of the natural sciences (...)
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  41.  32
    Paul A. Roth (2005). Three Grades of Normative Involvement: Risjord, Stueber, and Henderson on Norms and Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):339-352.
    What makes for a good explanation of a person’s actions? Their reasons, or soa natural reply goes. But how do reasons function as part of explanations, that is, within an account of the causes of action? Here philosophers divide concerning the logical relation in which reasons stand to actions. For, tradition holds, reasons evaluatively characterized must be causally inert, inasmuch as the normative features cannot be found in any account of the empirical/descriptive. To countenance reasons as causes thus seems to (...)
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  42.  19
    Paul A. Roth (2011). Editor’s Introduction:“What Does History Matter To...?”. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (3):301-307.
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  43.  12
    Paul A. Roth (1982). Logic and Translation: A Reply to Alan Berger. Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):154-163.
    The article argues, "contra" berger, that quine's advocacy alleged of classical logic is not based on any alleged "fit" between classical logic and some empirical account of language learning. roth begins by examining berger's claim that quine has changed his position on the acceptability of alternative logics. in berger's account, quine now accepts alternative logics because he could not defend his commitment to classical logic alone based on empirical evidence (e.g., verdict tables). roth argues that berger is mistaken both in (...)
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  44.  9
    Paul A. Roth (2013). Hayden White in Philosophical Perspective: Review Essay of Herman Paul's Hayden White: The Historical Imagination. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (1):0048393113480609.
    For almost half a century, the person most responsible for fomenting brouhahas regarding degrees of plasticity in the writing of histories has been Hayden White. Yet, despite the voluminous responses provoked by White’s work, almost no effort has been made to treat White’s writings in a systematic yet sympathetic way as a philosophy of history. Herman Paul’s book begins to remedy that lack and does so in a carefully considered and extremely scholarly fashion. In his relatively brief six chapters (plus (...)
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  45.  20
    Paul A. Roth (2008). The Epistemology of Science After Quine. In Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge 3.
  46.  1
    Paul A. Roth (2013). The Silence of the Norms: The Missing Historiography of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):545-552.
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  47.  5
    Paul A. Roth (2012). Searleworld1. History and Theory 51 (1):123-142.
    ABSTRACTJohn Searle's most recent effort to account for human social institutions claims to provide a synthesis of the explanatory and the normative while simultaneously dismissing as confused and wrongheaded theorists who held otherwise. Searle, although doubtless alert to the usual considerations for separating the normative and the explanatory projects, announces at the outset that he conceives of matters quite differently. Searle's reason for reconceiving the field rests on his claim that both ends can be achieved by a single “underlying principle (...)
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  48.  2
    Paul A. Roth (1980). Theories of Nature and the Nature of Theories. Mind 89 (355):431-438.
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  49.  12
    Paul A. Roth (1999). Naturalizing Goldman. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):89-111.
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  50.  4
    Paul Roth (2011). The Philosophy of Social Science in the Twentieth Century: Analytic Traditions: Reflections on the Rationalitätstreit. In Ian Jarvie Jesus Zamora Bonilla (ed.), The Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences. 103.
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