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  1. Paul T. Sagal & Gunnar Borg (1993). The Range Principle and the Problem of Other Minds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):477-91.
  2. Paul T. Sagal (1992). Nagarjuna's "Paradox". American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1):79 - 85.
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  3. Timothy Cleveland & Paul T. Sagal (1989). Bold Hypotheses: The Bolder the Better? Ratio 2 (2):109-121.
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  4. Paul T. Sagal (1989). Coherence. Idealistic Studies 19 (2):121-130.
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  5. Paul T. Sagal (1989). Meaning, Privacy and the Ghost of Verifiability. Metaphilosophy 20 (2):127–133.
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  6. Paul T. Sagal (1989). Searle on Minds and Brains. The Modern Schoolman 66 (4):301-302.
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  7. Paul T. Sagal (1980). On Science. Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (3-4):301-307.
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  8. Paul T. Sagal (1977). Epistemology of Economics. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 8 (1):144-162.
    Summary Methodological disputes in economics have been with us since Mill and Senior fought over the nature of economic science in the first half of the 19th Century. Progress has been extremely slow, and there is good reason for this as the present essay hopes to show.
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  9. Paul T. Sagal (1976). Paradox, Confirmation and Inquiry. Philosophy 51 (198):467 - 470.
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  10. Joseph Agassi & Paul T. Sagal (1975). The Problem of Universals. Philosophical Studies 28 (4):289 - 294.
    The pair democreteanism-Platonism (nothing/something is outside space-Time) differs from the pair nominalism-Realism (universals are/are not nameable entities). Nominalism need not be democretean, And democreateanism is nominalist only if conceptualism is rejected. Putnam's critique of nominalism is thus invalid. Quine's theory is democretean-When-Possible: quine is also a minimalist platonist. Conceptualists and realists agree that universals exist but not as physical objects. Nominalists accept universals only as "facons de parler".
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  11. Paul T. Sagal (1974). Countering Counterpart Theory. Metaphilosophy 5 (2):151–154.
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  12. Paul T. Sagal (1974). Dewey and the Dogmas of Empiricism. Metaphilosophy 5 (4):333–339.
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  13. Paul T. Sagal (1973). How Many Numbers Are There? Philosophia Mathematica (2):155-164.
  14. Paul T. Sagal (1973). Implicit Definition. The Monist 57 (3):443-450.
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  15. Paul T. Sagal (1973). On Refuting and Defending Supposition Theory. New Scholasticism 47 (1):84-87.
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  16. Paul T. Sagal (1972). Incommensurability Then and Now. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 3 (2):298-301.
    Summary The incommensurability of scientific theories is not the only famous incommensurability issue in the history of western philosophy. The commensurability of all magnitudes (things) by means of ratios of integers (arithmetical ratios) wasthe thesis of Pythagoreanism. The diagonal and side of a square, however, are not commensurable, thus the Pythagorean thesis is refuted. Most philosophers ancient and contemporary would agree that Pythagoreanism was refuted by the counter-example and the concommitant argument or proof. The incommensurabilists were victorious. The present paper (...)
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