12 found
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  1. Paul Tappenden (2011). Evidence and Uncertainty in Everett's Multiverse. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):99-123.
    How does it come about then, that great scientists such as Einstein, Schrödinger and De Broglie are nevertheless dissatisfied with the situation? Of course, all these objections are levelled not against the correctness of the formulae, but against their interpretation. [...] The lesson to be learned from what I have told of the origin of quantum mechanics is that probable refinements of mathematical methods will not suffice to produce a satisfactory theory, but that somewhere in our doctrine is hidden a (...)
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  2.  63
    Paul Tappenden (2011). Expectancy and Rational Action Prior to Personal Fission. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):299 - 306.
    Some analyses of personal fission suggest that an informed subject should expect to have a distinct experience of each outcome simultaneously. Is rational provision for the future possible in such unfamiliar circumstances? I argue that, with some qualification, the subject can reasonably act as if faced with alternative possible outcomes with precise probabilities rather than multiple actual outcomes.
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  3.  22
    Paul Tappenden, Identity and Uncertainty in Everett's Multiverse.
    In the current debate on the concept of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics Saunders and Wallace argue for a notion of pre-measurement uncertainty whilst Greaves and Myrvold attempt to do without uncertainty altogether. Both these approaches are controversial and I suggest a middle way. I develop in detail an argument which Wallace has hinted at and Greaves has seen as beside the point in order to show that Vaidman’s concept of post-measurement uncertainty has more relevance to pre-measurement (...)
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  4.  57
    Paul Tappenden (2008). Saunders and Wallace on Everett and Lewis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):307-314.
    Simon Saunders and David Wallace attempt to use a modified form of David Lewis's analysis of personal fission to ground the claim that prior to undergoing Everett branching an informed subject can be uncertain about which outcome s/he will observe. I argue that a central assumption of this seductive idea is questionable despite appearing innocuous and that at the very least further argument is needed in support of it. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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  5.  16
    Paul Tappenden, The World as Wavefunction.
    Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle have made an original proposal for a version of decoherent histories quantum mechanics which is specifically tailored so as not to imply the emergence of multiple quasi-classical worlds. I argue that there is an explanatory gap in the proposal but that there remains an important insight which might be used to tackle what can be seen as an outstanding problem for Hugh Everett III’s “relative state” interpretation of quantum mechanics, if it is understood as giving (...)
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  6. Paul Tappenden (2004). The Ins and Outs of Schrödinger's Cat Box: A Response to Papineau. Analysis 64 (2):157–164.
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  7.  69
    Paul Tappenden, Varieties of Divergence: A Response to Saunders and Wallace.
    I continue to maintain that David Lewis’s concept of overlapping persons cannot yield pre-measurement uncertainty in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics in the way that Simon Saunders and David Wallace originally seemed to suggest. However, I argue that in their reply to me they make it clear that they do not wish to invoke overlap of persons after all. That makes it mysterious why they defended their interpretation of personal overlap in the first place and questionable what role overlap (...)
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  8.  43
    Paul Tappenden (2011). A Metaphysics for Semantic Internalism. Metaphysica 12 (2):125-136.
    The contemporary popularity of semantic externalism has arisen from so-called Twin Earth thought experiments which suggest that the representational content of a natural kind term cannot be wholly determined by processes within a speaker's body. Such arguments depend on the intuition that the extensions of natural kind terms cannot have changed as the result of the scientific investigation of natural kinds' constitutions. I demonstrate that this externalist intuition depends on an assumption about the mentality of isomorphic doppelgangers which has never (...)
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  9.  64
    Paul Tappenden, Sider's Stage Theory and Expectancy Prior to Personal Fission.
    According to Sider’s stage theory a subject about to undergo personal fission should expect to experience each outcome simultaneously as distinct persons. How is the subject to make sense of this ? I argue that their most paradigmatically self-interested future-directed behaviour, betting for personal gain, ought to be exactly the same as in equivalent games of chance where the possible outcomes correspond to the fission output branches. So this novel form of expectancy, albeit strange, can be a reliable guide to (...)
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  10.  59
    Paul Tappenden (2006). No Worries for Captain Kirk, Pace Brueckner (or at Least Different Worries). Analysis 66 (290):171-172.
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  11.  19
    Paul Tappenden (1991). The Very Real Ghost of a Demon. Philosophy Now 2:5-9.
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  12.  10
    Paul Tappenden (1996). The Roundsquare Copula: A Semantic Internalist's Rejoinder. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:395-400.