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Paul W. Humphreys [9]Paul William Humphreys [1]
  1. Paul W. Humphreys (1997). How Properties Emerge. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):1-17.
    A framework for representing a specific kind of emergent property instance is given. A solution to a generalized version of the exclusion argument is then provided and it is shown that upwards and downwards causation is unproblematical for that kind of emergence. One real example of this kind of emergence is briefly described and the suggestion made that emergence may be more common than current opinions allow.
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  2. Paul W. Humphreys (1997). Emergence, Not Supervenience. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):337-45.
    I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.
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  3.  40
    Paul W. Humphreys (1996). Aspects of Emergence. Philosophical Topics 24 (1):53-71.
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  4.  15
    Paul W. Humphreys (1978). Is 'Physical Randomness' Just Indeterminism in Disguise? In Peter D. Asquith & Ian Hacking (eds.), PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. University of Chicago Press 98--113.
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  5.  22
    Paul W. Humphreys (1984). Quantitative Probabilistic Causality and Structural Scientific Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:329 - 342.
    The elements of structural models used in the social sciences are built up from four fundamental assumptions. It is then shown how the central idea of qualitative probabilistic causality follows as a special case of this covariational account. The relationships of both instrumentalism and common cause arguments for scientific realism to these structures is demonstrated. It is concluded that a predictivist argument against a thoroughgoing instrumentalism can be given, and hence why the difference between experimental and non-experimental contexts is important (...)
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  6.  17
    Paul W. Humphreys (1977). Randomness, Independence, and Hypotheses. Synthese 36 (4):415 - 426.
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  7. Paul W. Humphreys (1989). Scientific Explanation-the Causes, Some of the Causes, and Nothing but the Causes. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13:283-306.
     
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  8.  6
    James H. Fetzer & Paul W. Humphreys (1995). Editorial Preface. Synthese 104 (2):177-177.
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  9. Paul W. Humphreys (1978). Review: Nicholas Rescher, Plausible Reasoning. An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Plausibilistic Inference. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 43 (1):159-160.
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