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  1. Christopher Peacocke, T H E a P R I O R I.
    The existence and nature of the a priori are defining issues for philosophy. A philosopher’s attitude to the a priori is a touchstone for his whole approach to the subject. Sometimes, as in Kant’s critical philosophy, or in Quine’s epistemology, a major new position emerges from reflection on questions that explicitly involve the notions of the a priori or the empirical. But even when no explicit use is made of the notion of the a priori in the questions addressed, a (...)
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  2. Christopher Peacocke (2014). Perception, Biology, Action, and Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):477-484.
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  3. Christopher Peacocke (2014). The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness. Oup Oxford.
    Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives.
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  4. Christopher Peacocke (2013). Interpersonal Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
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  5. Christopher Peacocke (2012). Conceiving of Conscious States. In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. Oup.
    For a wide range of concepts, a thinker’s understanding of what it is for a thing to fall under the concept plausibly involves knowledge of an identity. It involves knowledge that the thing has to have the same property as is exemplified in instantiation of the concept in some distinguished, basic instance. This paper addresses the question: can we apply this general model of the role of identity in understanding to the case of subjective, conscious states? In particular, can we (...)
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  6. Christopher Peacocke (2012). Descartes Defended. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):109-125.
    Drawing upon a conception of the metaphysics of conscious states and of first-person content, we can argue that Descartes's transition ‘Cogito ergo sum’ is both sound and one he is entitled to make. We can nevertheless formulate a version of Lichtenberg's objection that can still be raised after Bernard Williams's discussion. I argue that this form of Lichtenberg's revenge can also be undermined. In doing so it helps to compare the metaphysics of subjects, worlds and times. The arguments also apply (...)
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  7. Christopher Peacocke (2012). First Person Illusions: Are They Descartes', or Kant's? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):247-275.
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  8. Christopher Peacocke (2012). Understanding and Rule-Following. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
     
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  9. Christopher Peacocke (2011). Representing, Reasoning. In Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl & Stephen Andrew Butterfill (eds.), Tool Use and Causal Cognition. Oup Oxford. 148.
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  10. Christopher Peacocke (2011). Self-Consciousness. Revue de Métaphysique Et de Morale 4 (4):521-551.
  11. Christopher Peacocke (2011). Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):472 - 480.
    where F is a contradiction (I use his numbering). Tim says about these equivalences: (1) “modulo the implicit recognition of this equivalence, the epistemology of metaphysically modal thinking is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking. Whoever has what it takes to understand the counterfactual conditional and the elementary logical auxiliaries ~ and F has what it takes to understand possibility and necessity operators.” (158) (2) The idea that we evaluate metaphysically modal claims “by some quite different means (...)
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  12. Christopher Peacocke (2010). Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2):189-191.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  13. Christopher Peacocke (2010). Relation-Based Thought, Objectivity and Disagreement. Dialectica 64 (1):35-56.
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  14. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Concepts and Possession Conditions. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  15. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Experiencing Metaphorically-as in Music Perception: Clarifications and Commitments. British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (3):299-306.
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  16. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Frege's Hierarchy: A Puzzle. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 159.
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  17. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Mental Action and Self-Awareness : Epistemology. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
  18. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Means and Explanation in Epistemology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):730-737.
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  19. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Objectivity. Mind 118 (471):739 - 769.
    Judgement, perception, and other mental states and events have a minimal objectivity in this sense: making the judgement or being in the mental state does not in general thereby make the judgement correct or make the perception veridical. I offer an explanation of this minimal objectivity by developing a form of constitutive transcendental argument. The argument appeals to the proper individuation of the content of judgements and perceptions. In the case of the conceptual content of judgements, concepts are individuated by (...)
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  20. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Perception, Content and Rationality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):475 - 481.
    Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience is a stylish and stimulating contribution to our subject. My expectation is that those who disagree with some of its central theses will, like me, learn greatly from thinking through where and why they part company with Gupta's lucidly presented position. For the purposes of a Symposium, I select three points of disagreement. Each point in one way or another concerns the epistemic role of the content of experience.
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  21. Christopher Peacocke (2009). The Perception of Music: Sources of Significance. Modern Schoolman 86 (3-4):239-260.
    We can experience music as sad, as exuberant, as sombre. We can experience it as expressing immensity, identification with the rest of humanity, or gratitude. The foundational question of what it is for music to express these or anything else is easily asked; and it has proved extraordinarily difficult to answer satisfactorily. The question of what it is for emotion or other states to be heard in music is not the causal or computational question of how it comes to be (...)
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  22. Christopher Peacocke (2008). Foreword. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):441-452.
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  23. Christopher Peacocke (2008). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Lucy F. O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Action. Oxford University Press.
    We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
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  24. Christopher Peacocke (2008). Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:7-24.
    The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conceived. The existence (...)
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  25. Christopher Peacocke (2008). Truly Understood. Oxford University Press.
    A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case (...)
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  26. Christopher Peacocke (2007). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Book description: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. * Comprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind * Written by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates * A thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored * Organized into three sections which explore the ontology of (...)
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  27. Christopher Peacocke (2006). Entitlement, Reasons and Externalism. Philosophical Books 47 (2):120-128.
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  28. Christopher Peacocke (2006). Summary. Philosophical Books 47 (2):99-102.
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  29. Christopher Peacocke (2006). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    This paper is built around a single, simple idea. It is widely agreed that there is a distinctive kind of awareness each of us has of his own bodily actions. This action-awareness is different from any perceptual awareness a subject may have of his own actions; it can exist in the absence of such perceptual awareness. The single, simple idea around which this paper is built is that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a (...)
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  30. Christopher Peacocke & Gerhard Preyer (2006). B. Referate Uber Fremdsprachige Neuerscheinungen-The Realm of Reasori. Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 59 (3):330.
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  31. Christopher Peacocke (2005). 'Another I': Representing Conscious States, Perception, and Others. In Jose Luis Bermudez & José Luis Bermúdez (eds.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings?
     
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  32. Christopher Peacocke (2005). Another I" : Representing Conscious States, Perception, and Others. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press.
    What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings? This question is of philosophical interest for multiple reasons. Here are a few, in order of increasing generality. To understand, explain, and predict the thought and action of others, you must know what they perceive. This requires you to (...)
     
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  33. Christopher Peacocke (2005). Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. 298.
    The openness of joint awareness between two or more subjects is a perceptual phenomenon. It involves a certain mutual awareness between the subjects, an awareness that makes reference to that very awareness itself. Properly characterized, such awareness can generate iterated awareness ‘x is aware that y is aware that x is aware...’ to whatever level the subjects can sustain. The openness should not be characterized in terms of Lewis–Schiffer common knowledge, the conditions for which are not met in many basic (...)
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  34. Christopher Peacocke (2005). Justification, Realism and the Past. Mind 114 (455):639-670.
    This paper begins by considering Dummett's justificationist treatment of statements about the past in his book Truth and the Past (2004). Contrary to Dummett's position, there is no way of applying the intuitionistic distinction in the arithmetical case between direct and indirect methods of establishing a content to the case of past-tense statements. Attempts to do so either give the wrong truth conditions, or rely on notions not available to a justificationist position. A better, realistic treatment makes ineliminable use of (...)
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  35. Christopher Peacocke (2005). Rationale and Maxims in the Study of Concepts. Noûs 39 (1):167-78.
    Is there any good reason for thinking that a concept is individuated by the condition for a thinker to possess it? Why is that approach superior to alternative accounts of the individuation of concepts? These are amongst the fundamental questions raised by Wayne Davis.
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  36. Christopher Peacocke (2005). The a Priori. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
     
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  37. Christopher Peacocke (2004). Explaining Perceptual Entitlement. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 441--80.
  38. Christopher Peacocke (2004). Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure. Mind and Language 19 (1):85-98.
    What are the relations between the items mentioned in my title? This question is raised by Jerry Fodor.
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  39. Christopher Peacocke (2004). Moral Rationalism. Journal of Philosophy 101 (10):499 - 526.
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  40. Christopher Peacocke (2004). The Realm of Reason. Oxford University Press.
    The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content. To show how (...)
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  41. Christopher Peacocke (2004). Understanding Logical Constants: A Realist's Account. In T. J. Smiley & Thomas Baldwin (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. 163.
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  42. Christopher Peacocke (2003). Action: Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  43. Christopher Peacocke (2003). Implicit Conceptions, Understanding, and Rationality. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press. 43-88.
  44. Christopher Peacocke (2002). Principles for Possibilia. Noûs 36 (3):486–508.
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  45. Christopher Peacocke (2002). Précis of Being Known. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):636–640.
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  46. Christopher Peacocke (2002). Pr�Cis of Being Known. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):636-640.
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