We study how the optimal contract in team production is a¤ected when employees are averse to inequity in the sense described by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). By designing a reward scheme that creates inequity o¤ the desired equilibrium, the employer can induce employees to perform e¤ort at a lower total wage cost than when they are not inequity averse. We also show that the optimal output choice might change when employees are inequity averse. Finally, we show that an employer can (...) gain, and never lose, by designing a contract that accounts for inequity aversion, even if employees have standard preferences. (shrink)
Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual state we regularly enter (...) as a result of being stimulated by the wave forms we regularly produce when we execute our intentions to utter such tokens (a view I call “Folieism”). In his Ignorance of Language, Michael Devitt objects to this view, arguing that, “On Rey’s view, communication seems to rest on miraculous guesses.” I argue here that my view is not prey to his objections, and actually affords a scientifically more plausible view than his “empiricist” alternative. Specifically, I reply to his objections that my view couldn’t explain the conventionality of language and success of communication (§2.1), that I am faced with intractable difficulties surrounding the identity of intentional inexistents (§2.2), and that, contrary to my view, SLEs can be relationally defined (§2.3). Not only can Folieism survive Devitt’s objections, but (§3) it also provides a more satisfactory account of the role of linguistic intuitions than the “empirical” account on which he insists. (shrink)
Wittgenstein’s views invite a modest, functionalist account of mental states and regularities, or more specifically a causal/computational, representational theory of the mind (CRTT). It is only by understandingWittgenstein’s remarks in the context of a theory like CRTT that his insights have any real force; and it is only by recognizing those insights that CRTT can begin to account for sensations and our thoughts about them. For instance, Wittgenstein’s (in)famous remark that “an inner process stands in need of outward criteria” (PI:§580), (...) so implausible read behaviorally, is entirely plausible if the “outward” is allowed to include computational facts about our brains. But what is especially penetrating about Wittgenstein’s discussion is his unique diagnosis of our puzzlement in this area, in particular, his suggestion that it is due to our captivation by “pictures” whose application to reality is left crucially under-specified. It is only by understanding. What sustains the naive picture is not a captivation by language, but, at least in part, our largely involuntary reactions to things that look and act like our conspecifics. We project a property into them correlative to that reaction in ourselves, and are, indeed, unwilling to project it into things that do not induce that reaction. (shrink)
A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...) of explanatory commitments; and claims that such commitments are satisfied will be as (dis) confirmable as other empirical claims. (shrink)
Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionalism, but I see no reason (...) for him to resist a properly deflated version of it that I sketch. Moreover, such intentionalism seems to me to stand a better chance than Clark's reliance on properties in explaining the peculiar ways in which experience appears to us that so concern the qualiaphile. (shrink)
The present article articulates the strategy of much of my work to date, which has been concerned to understand how we can possibly come to have any objective understanding of the mind. Generally, I align myself with those who think the best prospect of such an understanding lies in a causal/computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT). However, there is a tendency in recent developments of this and related philosophical views to burden the crucial property of intentionality with what I call Strong (...) Externalism, a state’s intentional content being determined by some real external phenomenon to which the state is causally related. I argue against this tendency, drawing attention to the crucial role in cognitive scientific explanations of empty concepts, such as [angel], and the “intentional inexistents” that such concepts “represent.” This obliges me to take a brief excursion into what I hope is a minimal metaphysics, defending a methodology I call the “LEXX” strategy that treats phenomena as real only insofar as they are needed in genuine explanations. After a brief discussion of the need for greater patience generally regarding a theory of intentionality, I deploy this strategy with regard to many phenomena that are the purported objects of mental states, e.g. triangles, cones, words, sentences, colors, mental images and qualia. I argue that these phenomena do not actually exist: they are mere intentional inexistents, unreal projections of the intentional content of various mental states, and not themselves needed in any genuine explanations. In a concluding section, I summarize my suggestions about how a CRTT can explain the various illusions we have in this regard, particularly those concerning consciousness and qualia. (shrink)
I argue that, pace Chomsky (2000, 2003), standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking talk of representations seriously, in particular, to recognizing that the “of x” clause that invariably follows “representation” is a way of specifying that representation’s intentional content. One reason to insist upon intentional content in such cases is that the “x” in “of x” may not exist (as in "of Zeus"). This issue is especially relevant to linguistics since, recapitulating considerations raised by many linguists, I (...) go on to argue that most of the SLEs themselves seldom, if ever exist: it is doubtful there are many, if any, tokens of them in space and time; indeed, their existence is by and large inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. All that linguistic theory requires to be real in this regard are the representations, presumably entokened in people’s brains, understood, however, in terms of their intentional contents. (shrink)
“Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved in (...) the natural sciences. Thus, according to Normativism, whether or not someone thinks that fish sleep, or even can represent fish at all, depends upon making a judgment about the person’s goodness or rationality, of a sort that would not be involved in merely determining whether or not fish in fact sleep. (shrink)
The article gives a graphical interpretation of the concept of risk vulnerability. It shows that in a specific context of binary lotteries the assumption of risk vulnerability adds to prudence what the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion adds to risk aversion. We end the presentation showing that results can be extended to the concept of multiplicative risk vulnerability.
According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying error is (...) a failure to appreciate the important shift of the explanatory locus in modern linguistics, from external objects to internal conceptions. I go on to show how (i) pace Devitt, this shift is entirely compatible with there being conventional aspects to language, and also serves to distinguish the ease of natural language from the waggle dance of the bees; and (ii) pace Barber and Smith, it is compatible with an appearance / reality distinction, and with reliance on testimony in epistemology. I conclude with further arguments about why, pace Collins and Matthews, intentionality is a crucial feature of linguistic explanation, even if it is ultimately spelt out largely in terms of computational role. (shrink)
This note examines the theory of optimal insurance purchasing in the presence of a nonpecuniary background risk. The occurrence of the qualitative uninsurable background loss can increase, decrease or can leave the marginal utility of wealth unchanged, whereas a financial background loss (as in Doherty and Schlesinger, 1883a) always increases it. Existing theorems on the optimal level of insurance and the optimal form of insurance contracts are shown to hold only under restrictive assumptions on the correlation level between risks. The (...) paper shows that sufficient conditions for the validity of the theorems depend not only on the correlation between the insurable and noninsurable losses, but also on the variation of the marginal utility of wealth with respect to the nonpecuniary variable. (shrink)
This paper investigates the link between the total bivariate risk premium and the sum of partial bivariate risk premia. Whereas in the case of small risks, the non interaction between risks is a sufficient condition to obtain the equality between the total risk premium and the sum of partial risk premia, the paper shows that this condition is not sufficient for large risks. The non interaction between risks occurs in two cases: if risks are independent or if individual's marginal utility (...) of one good is independent of the endowment in the other. Without restriction on the utility function, none of these two conditions is sufficient for large risks. If attention is restricted to preferences that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, the non variability of the marginal utility of good one with respect to variations in endowment in the other remains a sufficient condition, while the independence between risks does not. (shrink)
Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...) have abundant reason to reject. Once we reject it, we can see how issues of the absorbtion of conventions, the revisability of belief, and confirmation holism are compatible with the Traditional Distinctions, and that Quine's discussion only serves to camouflage the question of whether some confirmation relations are constitutive of meaning and knowable a priori. (shrink)
We offer a review of some of the most influential views on the status of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause (RPCC) for genuinely indeterministic systems. We first argue that the RPCC is properly a conjunction of two distinct claims, one metaphysical and another methodological. Both claims can and have been contested in the literature, but here we simply assume that the metaphysical claim is correct, in order to focus our analysis on the status of the methodological claim. We briefly (...) review the most entrenched or classical positions, including Salmon’s ‘interactive forks’, van Fraassen’s scepticism, and Cartwright’s generalisation of the fork criterion. We then go on to review the results of the ‘Budapest school’ on the existence of formally defined screening off events for any correlation —by means of the ideas of probability space extensibility and (Reichenbachian common cause) completability. We distinguish the Budapest doctrine clearly from any of the classical conceptions, and thus present an overall framework for discussions of causal inference in quantum mechanics. We argue that this review is preliminary essential work for a thorough assessment of the conditions under which RCCP may be a reliable tool for causal inference in a genuinely probabilistic (indeterministic) context. (shrink)
Uno de los fenómenos característicos de la sociedad española, a partir del año simbólico de 1492, es la progresiva adopción de los estatutos de pureza de sangre por parte de diversas administraciones. La Compañía de Jesús, sin embargo, se negó durante casi todo el siglo XVI a aplicar estos estatutos, alegando para ello la voluntad expresada en tal sentido por el mismo Ignacio de Loyola. Sin embargo, en 1593 la Quinta Congregación General decide implantar el examen de pureza para el (...) ingreso en los Colegios de la Compañía. Este artículo describe la tenaz oposición que contra esta decisión realizó el jesuita español Pedro de Ribadeneyra, de origen judío, en una serie de cartas dirigidas al entonces General, Claudio Aquaviva. Asimismo, contextualiza la polémica jesuita en torno a los estatutos de pureza de sangre dentro del giro que la Compañía realiza tras el ascenso al generalato de Everardo Mercuriano y, después, con Aquaviva, y cuya principal característica es el alejamiento de los conversos de los puestos de poder. (shrink)
This paper discusses archaeological, historical, and contemporary ethnographic evidence for the use of the San Pedro cactus in northern Peru as a vehicle for traveling between worlds and for imparting the “vista” (magical sight) necessary for shamanic healers to divine the cause of their patients' ailments. Using iconographic, ethnohistorical, and ethnographic evidence for the uninterrupted use of this sacred plant as a means of access to the Divine and as a tool for healing, it describes the relationship between San (...)Pedro, ancestor worship, water/fertility cults and also the common symbolic associations between San Pedro and wind-spirits. It closes by suggesting that the more than 2000 year time-depth of using this plant as a means for accessing the realms of Spirit and as a tool for healing should serve to challenge the unfortunate tendency in the contemporary United States to consider this plant as a “recreational drug.”. (shrink)
, Pietroski and Rey () suggested a reconstruction of ceteris paribus (CP)-laws, which — as they claim — saves CP-laws from vacuity. This discussion note is intended to show that, although Pietroski and Rey's reconstruction is an improvement in comparison to previous suggestions, it cannot avoid the result that CP-laws are almost vacuous. It is proved that if Cx is an arbitrary (nomological) event-type which has independently identifiable deterministic causes, then for every other (nomological) event-type Ax which is not strictly (...) connected with Cx or with ¬Cx, ‘CP if Ax then Cx’ satisfies the conditions of Pietroski and Rey for CP-laws. It is also shown that Pietroski and Rey's reconstruction presupposes the assumption of determinism. The conclusion points towards some alternatives to Piectroski and Rey's reconstruction. (shrink)
Jeﬀrey conditioning allows updating in Bayesian style when the evidence is uncertain. A weighted average, essentially, over classically updating on the alternatives. Unlike classical Bayesian conditioning, this allows learning to be unlearned.
Rey does not try to achieve an overall statement of the view he is discussing; rather, he fastens on to a series of individual passages in Reference and Consciousness and expresses disagreement with each of them. Most of his complaints rest on imprecision in his understanding of the relevant passage. To make it easier to match my responses to the detail of Rey’s comments, I have organized my responses to the four sections of his article under the same headings as (...) he uses. (shrink)
Williams’s famous story of Jim exemplifies a general class of dilemmas caused by recalcitrant agents. Like Williams himself, most commentators have focused on Jim and the idea that he has special responsibility for his actions. This paper shifts attention to Pedro, exploring his significance in the story and arguing that Jim has a reason not to shoot that depends on Pedro’s best possible response. In so doing, it sketches a new approach to the general class of dilemmas posed (...) by recalcitrant agents, drawing attention to the advantages of this approach and to the difficulties it faces and comparing it to rival views associated with Ross and Kamm. (shrink)
In Bernard Williams’s famous story, Jim must choose whether to shoot an innocent hostage. If he does not, Pedro will shoot that person plus nineteen more. If Jim does shoot, Pedro will release the other nineteen hostages. Jim must decide whether to do something terrible. If he does not, these innocent people will bear an enormous cost.1 The main point of Williams’s discussion is not about whether Jim should shoot—he allows that, perhaps, he should—but instead about what Jim’s (...) reasons are. Williams supposes that, whatever the verdict about what Jim should do, Jim certainly has a strong reason not to shoot. This, he thinks, is sufficient to show that Act Utilitarianism is strongly counter-intuitive, since Act Utilitarianism apparently cannot account for this reason. Suppose that Williams is right that Jim has a strong reason not to shoot. Let us add, as seems undeniable, that Jim has a strong reason to shoot—since doing so would save nineteen innocent lives.2 Let us also shelve the question of what Jim should do, all things considered. Which sort of ethical theory seems best placed to explain the existence of these countervailing reasons? This question is importantly broader than the one that Williams and most of his commentators went on to discuss. Their question was about how to account for Jim’s strong reason not to shoot—whether in terms of integrity, or agent-relativity, for example, or something else. The broader question is how best to account for both of Jim’s reasons: to shoot, and not to shoot. Ideally, we would like a satisfying ethical theory to explain the strong conviction that there are conflicting reasons in cases such as this. These are cases in which failing to do the thing that we are certain is morally wrong in ordinary cases has a very high cost. A theory which explains one of Jim’s reasons without explaining the other. (shrink)
Este texto se propone la lectura de la novela Pedro Páramo a la luz de algunos de los conceptos que, a fin de caracterizar la hermenéutica literaria, y la teoría de la interpretación, elabora Paul Ricoeur en su texto Teoría de la argumentación. La primera parte consiste en una breve presentación de los mismos y la segunda en la lectura a partir de estos conceptos, y en particular del concepto de referente, de algunos pasajes de la novela de Juan (...) Rulfo. (shrink)
The paper discusses Rey’s projectivism. It offers an argument against it and in favor of the reliability of introspection. In short, if it is fallible, then at least sometimes it has to be veridical. Therefore, introspection can’t be systematically deceptive. But then, some introspective beliefs are true and at least some phenomenal conscious states exist.
I discuss two forms of the thesis that to have a sensation is to token a sentence in a language of thought-what I call, following Georges Rey, the sensational sentences thesis. One form of the thesis is a version of standard functionalism, while the other is a version of the increasingly popular thesis that for a sensation to have qualia is for it to have a certain kind of intentional content-that is, intentionalism. I defend the basic idea behind the sensational (...) sentences thesis, and argue that the intentionalist version is either false or collapses into the standard functionalist thesis. (shrink)