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  1. Penelope Mackie (forthcoming). Transworld Identity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  2. Penelope Mackie (2013). Counterfactuals and the Fixity of the Past. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):1-19.
    I argue that David Lewis’s attempt, in his ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, to explain the fixity of the past in terms of counterfactual independence is unsuccessful. I point out that there is an ambiguity in the claim that the past is counterfactually independent of the present (or, more generally, that the earlier is counterfactually independent of the later), corresponding to two distinct theses about the relation between time and counterfactuals, both officially endorsed by Lewis. I argue that Lewis’s attempt (...)
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  3. Penelope Mackie (2013). Sortal Concepts and Modality. In Christian Hubert-Rodier (ed.), None. Hôtel des Bains Éditions.
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  4. Penelope Mackie (2011). Property Dualism and Substance Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):181-199.
    I attempt to rebut Dean Zimmerman's novel argument (2010), which he presents in support of substance dualism, for the conclusion that, in spite of its popularity, the combination of property dualism with substance materialism represents a precarious position in the philosophy of mind. I take issue with Zimmerman's contention that the vagueness of ‘garden variety’ material objects such as brains or bodies makes them unsuitable candidates for the possession of phenomenal properties. I also argue that the ‘speculative materialism’ that is (...)
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  5. Dean Zimmerman & Penelope Mackie (2011). Mind-Body Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111:181 - 199.
    I attempt to rebut Dean Zimmerman's novel argument (2010), which he presents in support of substance dualism, for the conclusion that, in spite of its popularity, the combination of property dualism with substance materialism represents a precarious position in the philosophy of mind. I take issue with Zimmerman's contention that the vagueness of 'garden variety' material objects such as brains or bodies makes them unsuitable candidates for the possession of phenomenal properties. I also argue that the 'speculative materialism' that is (...)
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  6. Penelope Mackie (2008). Coincidence and Identity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (62):151-176.
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  7. Penelope Mackie (2008). Material Objects and Metaphysics. Journal of Philosophy 105 (12):756-771.
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  8. Penelope Mackie (2007). Coincidence and Modal Predicates. Analysis 67 (1):21–31.
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  9. Penelope Mackie (2006). How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Published in the United States by Oxford University Press.
    Penelope Mackie's book is a novel treatment of an issue central to much current work in metaphysics: the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. Mackie challenges widely held views, and arrives at what she calls "minimalist essentialism," an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. Mackie's clear and accessible discussions of issues surrounding necessity and essentialism mean that the book will appeal as much to graduate students as it will to seasoned (...)
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  10. Penelope Mackie (2003). Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Noûs 37 (4):672-689.
  11. Penelope Mackie (2002). Deep Contingency and Necessary a Posteriori Truth. Analysis 62 (3):225-236.
  12. Penelope Mackie (2000). A Modern Metaphysical Song. Mind 109:39 - 40.
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  13. Penelope Mackie (2000). Causes, Chances, and Degrees of Effectiveness: Reply to Mellor. Analysis 60 (4):359–363.
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  14. Penelope Mackie (2000). Mellor on Causes, Chances and Degrees of Effectiveness. Analysis 60 (265):63–71.
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  15. Penelope Mackie (1998). Identity, Time, and Necessity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):59–78.
    The paper offers an explanation of the intuitive appeal of Saul Kripke's necessity of origin thesis, exhibiting it as the consequence of a temporally asymmetrical 'branching model' of possibilities which, in turn, rests on two plausible principles concerning possibility, time, and identity. Unlike some other accounts, my explanation dissociates the necessity of origin thesis from a commitment to individual essences or other sufficient conditions for identity across possible worlds. I conclude that although the branching model is not irresistible, its rejection (...)
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  16. Penelope Mackie (1997). Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind By Baker Lynne Rudder Cambridge University Press, 1995, Xi + 246 Pp., £12.95 & £37.50. ISBN 0 521 42190 X; 0 521 42053 9. [REVIEW] Philosophy 72 (279):143-.
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  17. Penelope Mackie (1994). Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):311-333.
    The paper discusses sortal essentialism': the view that some sortal concepts represent essential properties of the things that fall under them. Although sortal essentialism is widely accepted, there is a dearth of theories purporting to explain why some sortals should have this characteristic. The paper examines two theories that do attempt this explanatory task, theories proposed by Baruch Brody and David Wiggins. It is argued that Brody's theory rests on an untenable principle about "de re" modality, while Wiggins' theory appeals (...)
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  18. Penelope Mackie (1993). Material Beings. Philosophical Books 34 (2):75-83.
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  19. Penelope Mackie (1993). Ordinary Language and Metaphysical Commitment. Analysis 53 (4):243 - 251.
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  20. Penelope Mackie (1992). Causing, Delaying, and Hastening: Do Rains Cause Fires? Mind 101 (403):483-500.
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  21. Penelope Mackie (1991). Causing, Enabling, and Counterfactual Dependence. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):325 - 330.
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  22. Penelope Mackie (1991). Gerald Vision, Modern Anti· Realism and Manufactured Truth Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 11 (5):373-375.
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  23. Penelope Mackie (1991). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. Philosophical Books 32 (4):237-240.
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  24. Penelope Mackie (1989). Identity and Extrinsicness: Reply to Garrett. Mind 98 (389):105-117.
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  25. Penelope Mackie (1987). Essence, Origin and Bare Identity. Mind 96 (382):173-201.
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