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Penelope Maddy [51]Penelope J. Maddy [1]
  1. Penelope Maddy, Romanell Lecture.
    There’s a tendency to suppose that a naturalist is automatically, by virtue of her naturalism, committed to some particular view of logic. These days, for example, the classical Quinean picture is sometimes taken to be the naturalistic standard: logic lies at the center of the web of belief; remote from sense experience, but widely confirmed by its role in all our successful theorizing; a posteriori like the rest, but also the most resistant to change, given the principle of minimum mutilation; (...)
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  2. Penelope Maddy, Skepticism, Naturalism, and Therapy.
    Our goal in this course is to investigate radical skepticism about the external world, primarily to compare and contrast various naturalist and therapeutic reactions to it. We’ll largely side-step attempts to refute the skeptic and focus instead on naturalistic and therapeutic ways of reacting without refuting (though the boundary between these isn’t always sharp). The hope is that this exercise will help differentiate various strains of naturalism and clarify their interrelations with a range of therapeutic approaches.
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  3. Penelope Maddy (2013). A Second Philosophy of Arithmetic. Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):1-28.
    This paper outlines a second-philosophical account of arithmetic that places it on a distinctive ground between those of logic and set theory.
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  4. Penelope Maddy (2012). The Philosophy of Logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (4):481-504.
    This talk surveys a range of positions on the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions about elementary logic, for example, as a starting point: what is the subject matter of logic—what makes its truths true? how do we come to know the truths of logic? A taxonomy is approached by beginning from well-known schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics—Logicism, Intuitionism, Formalism, Realism—and sketching roughly corresponding views in the philosophy of logic. Kant, Mill, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Quine, and Putnam (...)
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  5. Penelope Maddy (2011). Defending the Axioms: On the Philosophical Foundations of Set Theory. Oxford University Press.
    Mathematics depends on proofs, and proofs must begin somewhere, from some fundamental assumptions. For nearly a century, the axioms of set theory have played this role, so the question of how these axioms are properly judged takes on a central importance. Approaching the question from a broadly naturalistic or second-philosophical point of view, Defending the Axioms isolates the appropriate methods for such evaluations and investigates the ontological and epistemological backdrop that makes them appropriate. In the end, a new account of (...)
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  6. Penelope Maddy (2011). Naturalism and Common Sense. Philosophical Books 52 (1):2-34.
    My topic here is metaphilosophy, the question of how philosophy is properly done. For some years now, I've been developing a particularly austere, roughly naturalistic approach to philosophical questions that I call 'second philosophy'. It has seemed to me that one effective way to convey the spirit of second philosophy is to compare and contrast it with other more familiar methods, like transcendental or therapeutic philosophy. Here I hope to pursue this sort of engagement with two other venerable schools of (...)
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  7. Penelope Maddy (2011). Transcendentalism, and Therapy. In Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (eds.), Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford University Press. 120.
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  8. Penelope Maddy (2008). How Applied Mathematics Became Pure. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):16-41.
    My goal here is to explore the relationship between pure and applied mathematics and then, eventually, to draw a few morals for both. In particular, I hope to show that this relationship has not been static, that the historical rise of pure mathematics has coincided with a gradual shift in our understanding of how mathematics works in application to the world. In some circles today, it is held that historical developments of this sort simply represent changes in fashion, or in (...)
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  9. Penelope Maddy (2007). Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method. Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers these days consider themselves naturalists, but it's doubtful any two of them intend the same position by the term. In Second Philosophy, Penelope Maddy describes and practices a particularly austere form of naturalism called "Second Philosophy". Without a definitive criterion for what counts as "science" and what doesn't, Second Philosophy can't be specified directly ("trust only the methods of science" for example), so Maddy proceeds instead by illustrating the behaviors of an idealized inquirer she calls the "Second Philosopher". (...)
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  10. John Baldwin, Lev Beklemishev, Michael Hallett, Valentina Harizanov, Steve Jackson, Kenneth Kunen, Angus J. MacIntyre, Penelope Maddy, Joe Miller & Michael Rathjen (2005). Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA May 19–23, 2004. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (1).
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  11. Penelope Maddy (2005). Mathematical Existence. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):351-376.
    Despite some discomfort with this grandly philosophical topic, I do in fact hope to address a venerable pair of philosophical chestnuts: mathematical truth and existence. My plan is to set out three possible stands on these issues, for an exercise in compare and contrast.' A word of warning, though, to philosophical purists (and perhaps of comfort to more mathematical readers): I will explore these philosophical positions with an eye to their interconnections with some concrete issues of set theoretic method.
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  12. Penelope Maddy (2002). A Naturalistic Look at Logic. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 76 (2):61 - 90.
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  13. William G. Lycan, Penelope Maddy, Gideon Rosen & Nathan Salmon (2001). Externalism, Naturalism, Nominalism, and Mathematics. Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-117.
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  14. Penelope Maddy (2001). Naturalism: Friends and Foes. Noûs 35 (s15):37-67.
    The goal of this paper is to sketch a distinctive version of naturalism in the philosophy of science, both by tracing historical antecedents and by addressing contemporary objections.
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  15. Penelope J. Maddy (2001). Some Naturalistic Reflections on Set Theoretic Method. Topoi 20 (1):17-27.
    My ultimate goal in this paper is to illuminate, from a naturalistic point of view, the significance of the application of mathematics in the natural sciences for the practice of contemporary set theory.
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  16. Solomon Feferman, Harvey M. Friedman, Penelope Maddy & John R. Steel (2000). Does Mathematics Need New Axioms? Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):401-446.
    Part of the ambiguity lies in the various points of view from which this question might be considered. The crudest di erence lies between the point of view of the working mathematician and that of the logician concerned with the foundations of mathematics. Now some of my fellow mathematical logicians might protest this distinction, since they consider themselves to be just more of those \working mathematicians". Certainly, modern logic has established itself as a very respectable branch of mathematics, and there (...)
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  17. Penelope Maddy (2000). Mathematical Progress. In Emily Grosholz & Herbert Breger (eds.), The Growth of Mathematical Knowledge. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 341--352.
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  18. Penelope Maddy (2000). Naturalism and the A Priori. In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. 92--116.
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  19. Penelope Maddy (1999). Logic and the Discursive Intellect. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):94-115.
    The effort to fit simple logical truths–like `if it's either red or green and it's not red, then it must be green'–into Kant's account of knowledge turns up a position more subtle and intriguing than might be expected at first glance.
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  20. Penelope Maddy (1998). Naturalizing Mathematical Methodology. In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Clarendon Press.
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  21. Penelope Maddy (1997). Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
    Naturalism in Mathematics investigates how the most fundamental assumptions of mathematics can be justified. One prevalent philosophical approach to the problem--realism--is examined and rejected in favor of another approach--naturalism. Penelope Maddy defines this naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be successfully applied in set theory. Her clear, original treatment of this fundamental issue is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both disciplines.
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  22. Penelope Maddy (1996). Ontological Commitment: Between Quine and Duhem. Philosophical Perspectives 10:317 - 341.
  23. Penelope Maddy (1996). Set Theoretic Naturalism. Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (2):490-514.
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  24. Penelope Maddy (1996). The Legacy of Mathematical Truth. In Adam Morton & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), Benacerraf and His Critics. Blackwell. 60--72.
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  25. Penelope Maddy (1995). Naturalism and Ontology. Philosophia Mathematica 3 (3):248-270.
    Naturalism in philosophy is sometimes thought to imply both scientific realism and a brand of mathematical realism that has methodological consequences for the practice of mathematics. I suggest that naturalism does not yield such a brand of mathematical realism, that naturalism views ontology as irrelevant to mathematical methodology, and that approaching methodological questions from this naturalistic perspective illuminates issues and considerations previously overshadowed by (irrelevant) ontological concerns.
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  26. Penelope Maddy (1993). Does V. Equal L? Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (1):15-41.
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  27. Penelope Maddy (1993). Guy Sircello 1992. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (5):89 - 90.
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  28. Penelope Maddy (1992). Indispensability and Practice. Journal of Philosophy 89 (6):275-289.
  29. Penelope Maddy (1992). Spring Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, San Francisco, 1991. Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (1):366-371.
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  30. Penelope Maddy (1991). Philosophy of Mathematics: Prospects for the 1990s. Synthese 88 (2):155 - 164.
    For some time now, academic philosophers of mathematics have concentrated on intramural debates, the most conspicuous of which has centered on Benacerraf's epistemological challenge. By the late 1980s, something of a consensus had developed on how best to respond to this challenge. But answering Benacerraf leaves untouched the more advanced epistemological question of how the axioms are justified, a question that bears on actual practice in the foundations of set theory. I suggest that the time is ripe for philosophers of (...)
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  31. Penelope Maddy (1991). Review: Stephen Pollard, Philosophical Introduction to Set Theory. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (2):755-756.
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  32. Penelope Maddy (1990). A Problem in the Foundations of Set Theory. Journal of Philosophy 87 (11):619-628.
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  33. Penelope Maddy (1990). Mathematics and Oliver Twist. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3):189-205.
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  34. Penelope Maddy (1990). Realism in Mathematics. Oxford University Prress.
    Mathematicians tend to think of themselves as scientists investigating the features of real mathematical things, and the wildly successful application of mathematics in the physical sciences reinforces this picture of mathematics as an objective study. For philosophers, however, this realism about mathematics raises serious questions: What are mathematical things? Where are they? How do we know about them? Offering a scrupulously fair treatment of both mathematical and philosophical concerns, Penelope Maddy here delineates and defends a novel version of mathematical realism. (...)
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  35. Penelope Maddy (1989). A Survey/Expository Paper: The Roots of Contemporary Platonism. Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1121-1144.
     
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  36. Penelope Maddy (1989). The Roots of Contemporary Platonism. Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1121-1144.
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  37. Penelope Maddy (1988). Believing the Axioms. I. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):481-511.
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  38. Penelope Maddy (1988). Believing the Axioms. II. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (3):736-764.
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  39. Penelope Maddy (1988). Review: Saunders Mac Lane, Mathematics: Form and Function. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):643-645.
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  40. Penelope Maddy (1988). Mathematical Realism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):275-285.
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  41. Penelope Maddy (1986). Mathematical Alchemy. British Journal of Philosophy of Science 46 (September):555-575.
  42. Penelope Maddy (1985). Charles Parsons, Mathematics in Philosophy Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 5 (3):125-126.
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  43. Penelope Maddy (1985). Book Review:The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge Philip Kitcher. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 52 (2):312-.
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  44. Penelope Maddy (1984). Mathematical Epistemology. The Monist 67 (1):46-55.
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  45. Penelope Maddy (1984). New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:427 - 448.
    Mathematical axioms have traditionally been thought of as obvious or self-evident truths, but current set theoretic work in the search for new axioms belies this conception. This raises epistemological questions about what other forms of justification are possible, and how they should be judged.
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  46. Penelope Maddy (1984). How the Causal Theorist Follows a Rule. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):457-477.
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  47. Penelope Maddy (1983). Proper Classes. Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (1):113-139.
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  48. Penelope Maddy (1982). Abstract of Comments: Mathematical Epistemology: What is the Question? Noûs 16 (1):106 - 107.
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  49. Penelope Maddy (1981). Sets and Numbers. Noûs 15 (4):495-511.
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  50. Penelope Maddy (1980). Perception and Mathematical Intuition. Philosophical Review 89 (2):163-196.
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