Search results for 'Percept' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. S. V. Mcdaniel (1963). A Note on the Percept Theory. Mind 72 (July):409-413.score: 15.0
  2. Roderick Firth (1949). Sense-Data and the Percept Theory, Part I. Mind 58 (October):434-465.score: 15.0
     
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  3. Roderick Firth (1950). Sense-Data and the Percept Theory, Part II. Mind 59 (January):35-56.score: 15.0
     
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  4. Jeffrey E. Foss (1988). The Percept and Vector Function Theories of the Brain. Philosophy of Science 55 (December):511-537.score: 14.0
    Physicalism is an empirical theory of the mind and its place in nature. So the physicalist must show that current neuroscience does not falsify physicalism, but instead supports it. Current neuroscience shows that a nervous system is what I call a vector function system. I provide a brief outline of the resources that empirical research has made available within the constraints of the vector function approach. Then I argue that these resources are sufficient, indeed apt, for the physicalist enterprise, by (...)
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  5. Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Tony Ro, Haluk Ögmen & Steven Todd (2007). Unconscious, Stimulus-Dependent Priming and Conscious, Percept-Dependent Priming with Chromatic Stimuli. Perception and Psychophysics 69 (4):550-557.score: 12.0
     
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  6. Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Tony Ro & Neel S. Singhal (2004). Unconscious Color Priming Occurs at Stimulus- Not Percept-Dependent Levels of Processing. Psychological Science 15 (3):198-202.score: 11.0
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  7. M. O. Ernst & H. H. Bülthoff (2004). Merging the Senses Into a Robust Percept. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):162-169.score: 11.0
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  8. Gerald M. Murch (1969). Growth of a Percept as a Function of Interstimulus Interval. Journal of Experimental Psychology 82 (1p1):121.score: 11.0
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  9. J. Beeckmans (2004). Chromatically Rich Phenomenal Percepts. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):27-44.score: 10.0
    Visual percepts frequently appear chromatically rich, yet their paucity in reportable information has led to widely accepted minimalist models of vision. The discrepancy may be resolved by positing that the richness of natural scenes is reflected in phenomenal consciousness but not in detail in the phenomenal judgments upon which reports about qualia are based. Conceptual awareness (including phenomenal judgments) arises from neural mechanisms that categorize objects, and also from mechanisms that conceptually characterize textural properties of pre-categorically segmented regions in the (...)
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  10. Hermann Burchard (2011). The Role of Conscious Attention in Perception. Foundations of Science 16 (1):67-99.score: 9.0
    Impressions, energy radiated by phenomena in the momentary environmental scene, enter sensory neurons, creating in afferent nerves a data stream. Following Kant, by our inner sense the mind perceives its own thoughts as it ties together sense data into an internalized scene. The mind, residing in the brain, logically a Language Machine, processes and stores items as coded grammatical entities. Kantian synthetic unity in the linguistic brain is able to deliver our experience of the scene as we appear to see (...)
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  11. David Lewis (1966). Percepts and Color Mosaics in Visual Experience. Philosophical Review 75 (July):357-368.score: 9.0
  12. David A. Givner (1982). Concepts, Percepts and Perceptal Systems: The Relevance of Psychology to Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 13 (July-October):209-216.score: 9.0
  13. John O. Wisdom (1949). Perception-Statements. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49:47-64.score: 9.0
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  14. Robert J. Richman (1958). The Whereabouts of Percepts. Journal of Philosophy 55 (April):344-347.score: 9.0
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  15. Leslie A. Paul (1961). Persons And Perception. Faber & Faber.score: 9.0
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  16. Joerg Fingerhut (2011). Sensorimotor Signature, Skill, and Synaesthesia. Two Challenges for Enactive Theories of Perception. In Synaesthesia and Kinaesthetics. Habitus in Habitat III. Peter Lang.score: 8.0
    The condition of ‘genuine perceptual synaesthesia’ has been a focus of attention in research in psychology and neuroscience over the last decades. For subjects in this condition stimulation in one modality automatically and consistently over the subject’s lifespan triggers a percept in another modality. In hearing→colour synaesthesia, for example, a specific sound experience evokes a perception of a specific colour. In this paper, I discuss questions and challenges that the phenomenon of synaesthetic experience raises for theories of perceptual experience (...)
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  17. Aaron Wilson (2012). The Perception of Generals. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (2):169-190.score: 8.0
    In this paper I argue that, according to Peirce’s mature account of perception, we directly perceive generals, or "Thirds," in external reality which should be described as physical and not as mental. I argue against three other interpretations of the role of Thirdness in Peirce’s account: (I) we do not directly perceive Thirds, although they are involved in the interpretive and judgmental part of perception; (II) we directly perceive Thirds, but they are imposed on external objects by our minds; and (...)
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  18. Robert Lane (2007). Peirception : Haack's Critical Common-Sensism About Perception. In Cornelis De Waal (ed.), Susan Haack: A Lady of Distinctions: The Philosopher Responds to Critics. Prometheus Books. 109-122.score: 8.0
    Susan Haack has argued that an account of perception based on that developed by Charles Peirce can overcome the false dichotomy between realist theories that downplay perception's interpretative character and irrealist theories that deny its directness. Haack believes that this dichotomy is overcome by Peirce's distinction between the perceptual judgment, the belief that accompanies a perceptual experience, and the percept, the phenomenal, interactive aspect of a perceptual experience. But I provide reasons for thinking that Haack's account of perception is (...)
     
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  19. Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). Active Perception and the Representation of Space. In Dustin Stokes, Stephen Biggs & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press.score: 7.0
    Kant argued that the perceptual representations of space and time were templates for the perceived spatiotemporal ordering of objects, and common to all modalities. His idea is that these perceptual representations were specific to no modality, but prior to all—they are pre-modal, so to speak. In this paper, it is argued that active perception—purposeful interactive exploration of the environment by the senses—demands premodal representations of time and space.
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  20. Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). Speech Perception. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford.score: 7.0
    Is speech special? This paper evaluates the evidence that speech perception is distinctive when compared with non-linguistic auditory perception. It addresses the phenomenology, contents, objects, and mechanisms involved in the perception of spoken language. According to the account it proposes, the capacity to perceive speech in a manner that enables understanding is an acquired perceptual skill. It involves learning to hear language-specific types of ethologically significant sounds. According to this account, the contents of perceptual experience when listening to familiar speech (...)
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  21. Susanna Schellenberg (2008). The Situation-Dependency of Perception. Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.score: 6.0
    I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their (...)
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  22. Susanna Schellenberg (2007). Action and Self-Location in Perception. Mind 115 (463):603-632.score: 6.0
    I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that (...)
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  23. Hanne De Jaegher (2009). Social Understanding Through Direct Perception? Yes, by Interacting. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):535-542.score: 6.0
    This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I (...)
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  24. Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.score: 6.0
    Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
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  25. Mark Eli Kalderon, Form Without Matter, Empedocles and Aristotle on Color Perception.score: 6.0
    Aristotle’s definition in De Anima of perception as the assimilation of sensible form without the matter of the perceived object is notoriously difficult to interpret. The present essay provides a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s definition by reading it in light of a puzzle about sensory presentation to be found in the work of Empedocles. Empedocles held a general conception of sensory awareness for which ingestion provides the model. In order for something to be perceived it must be taken within so (...)
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  26. Dustin Stokes (2014). Cognitive Penetration and the Perception of Art. Dialectica 68 (1):1-34.score: 6.0
    There are good, even if inconclusive, reasons to think that cognitive penetration of perception occurs: that cognitive states like belief causally affect, in a relatively direct way, the contents of perceptual experience. The supposed importance of – indeed as it is suggested here, what is definitive of – this possible phenomenon is that it would result in important epistemic and scientific consequences. One interesting and intuitive consequence entirely unremarked in the extant literature concerns the perception of art. Intuition has it (...)
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  27. Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). Affordances and the Contents of Perception. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content?score: 6.0
  28. Anders Nes (2006). Content in Thought and Perception. Dissertation, Oxford Universityscore: 6.0
    The dissertation addresses a debate in the philosophy of perception between conceptualists and nonconceptualists. Its principal thesis is that the intentional content of a perceptual experience is the content of a thought that a reflective subject is in a position to think if she has the experience. I call this claim, endorsed by conceptualists, the thesis of content congruence. Two principal lines of argument are put forward for it. The first, ‘simple’ argument contends that a perceptual experience is a state (...)
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  29. Harry Heft (1989). Affordances and the Body: An Intentional Analysis of Gibson's Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 19 (1):1–30.score: 6.0
    In his ecological approach to perception, james gibson introduced the concept of affordance to refer to the perceived meaning of environmental objects and events. this paper examines the relational and causal character of affordances, as well as the grounds for extending affordances beyond environmental features with transcultural meaning to include those features with culturally-specific meaning. such an extension is seen as warranted once affordances are grounded in an intentional analysis of perception. toward this end, aspects of merleau-ponty's treatment of perception (...)
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  30. Ryan Perkins (2012). Vagueness and the Philosophy of Perception. Dissertation, University of Oxfordscore: 6.0
    This dissertation explores several illuminating points of intersection between the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of vagueness. Among other things, I argue: (i) that it is entirely unhelpful to theorize about perception or consciousness using Nagelian "what it's like" talk; (ii) that a popular recent account of perceptual phenomenology (representationalism) conflicts with our best theory of vagueness (supervaluationism); (iii) that there are no vague properties, for Evans-esque reasons; (iv) that it is impossible to insert "determinacy" operators into representationalism in (...)
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  31. Susanna Siegel (2006). Which Properties Are Represented in Perception? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 481--503.score: 6.0
    In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.
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  32. Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239 - 254.score: 6.0
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we (...)
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  33. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.score: 6.0
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, (...)
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  34. Dustin Stokes (2013). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.score: 6.0
    Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of the phenomenon, (...)
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  35. Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Beyond Appearances : The Content of Sensation and Perception. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 434--460.score: 6.0
    There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally.
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  36. Alva Noë (2008). Précis of Action in Perception: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):660–665.score: 6.0
    The main idea of this book is that perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do. Think of a blind person taptapping his or her way around a cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world makes itself available to (...)
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  37. Stephen J. Boulter (2004). Metaphysical Realism as a Pre-Condition of Visual Perception. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.score: 6.0
    In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These (...)
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  38. Daniel Jacobson (2005). Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):387 - 409.score: 6.0
    Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism (...)
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  39. Justin P. McBrayer (2010). A Limited Defense of Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.score: 6.0
    One popular reason for rejecting moral realism is the lack of a plausible epistemology that explains how we come to know moral facts. Recently, a number of philosophers have insisted that it is possible to have moral knowledge in a very straightforward way—by perception. However, there is a significant objection to the possibility of moral perception: it does not seem that we could have a perceptual experience that represents a moral property, but a necessary condition for coming to know that (...)
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  40. Michael Huemer (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.score: 6.0
    This book develops and defends a version of direct realism: the thesis that perception gives us direct awareness, and non-inferential knowledge, of the external...
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  41. David Morris, Andrew Robinson & Catherine Duchastel, Concordance of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception.score: 6.0
    This is a concordance of page numbers in the following editions of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: English editions prior to the Routledge Classics 2002; Routledge Classics edition, with the new pagination; the French edition from Gallimard, prior to 2005; the 2e edition from Gallimard, 2005, with new pagination.
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  42. Edoardo Zamuner (2011). A Theory of Affect Perception. Mind and Language 26 (4):436-451.score: 6.0
    What do we see when we look at someone's expression of fear? I argue that one of the things that we see is fear itself. I support this view by developing a theory of affect perception. The theory involves two claims. One is that expressions are patterns of facial changes that carry information about affects. The other is that the visual system extracts and processes such information. In particular, I argue that the visual system functions to detect the affects of (...)
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  43. Casey O'Callaghan (2008). Object Perception: Vision and Audition. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):803-829.score: 6.0
    Vision has been the primary focus of naturalistic philosophical research concerning perception and perceptual experience. Guided by visual experience and vision science, many philosophers have focused upon theoretical issues dealing with the perception of objects. Recently, however, hearing researchers have discussed auditory objects. I present the case for object perception in vision, and argue that an analog of object perception occurs in auditory perception. I propose a notion of an auditory object that is stronger than just that of an intentional (...)
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  44. Sonam Thakchoe (2012). Candrakīrti’s Theory of Perception: A Case for Non-Foundationalist Epistemology in Madhyamaka. Acta Orientalia Vilnensia 11 (1):93-125.score: 6.0
    Some argue that Candrakīrti is committed to rejecting all theories of perception in virtue of the rejection of the foundationalisms of the Nyāya and the Pramāṇika. Others argue that Candrakīrti endorses the Nyāya theory of perception. In this paper, I will propose an alternative non-foundationalist theory of perception for Candrakīriti. I will show that Candrakrti’s works provide us sufficient evidence to defend a typical Prāsagika’s account of perception that, I argue, complements his core non-foundationalist ontology.
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  45. Casey O'Callaghan (2009). Introduction: The Philosophy of Sounds and Auditory Perception. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 6.0
  46. Casey O'Callaghan (2008). Seeing What You Hear: Cross-Modal Illusions and Perception. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):316-338.score: 6.0
    Cross-modal perceptual illusions occur when a stimulus to one modality impacts perceptual experience associated with another modality. Unlike synaesthesia, cross-modal illusions are intelligible as results of perceptual strategies for dealing with sensory stimulation to multiple modalities, rather than as mere quirks. I argue that understanding cross-modal illusions reveals an important flaw in a widespread conception of the senses, and of their role in perceptual experience, according to which understanding perception and perceptual experience is a matter of assembling independently viable stories (...)
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  47. K. Ramakrishna Rao (2005). Perception, Cognition, and Consciousness in Classical Hindu Psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (3):3-30.score: 6.0
    Perception is sensory awareness. Cognition is reflective awareness. Consciousness is awareness-as-such. In Indian psychology, as represented by Samkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedanta systems, consciousness and mind are fundamentally different. Reality is the composite of being (sat), knowing (cit) and feeling (ananda). Consciousness is the knowledge side of the universe. It is the ground condition of all awareness. Consciousness is not a part or aspect of the mind. Mind is physical and consciousness is not. Consciousness does not interact with the mind, the (...)
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  48. A. D. Smith (2002). The Problem of Perception. Harvard University Press.score: 6.0
    The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...
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  49. Mark Eli Kalderon, Experiential Pluralism and the Power of Perception.score: 6.0
    Sight is a capacity, and seeing is its exercise. Reflection on the sense in which sight is for the sake of seeing reveals distinct relations of dependence between sight and seeing, the capacity and its exercise. Moreover, these relations of dependence in turn reveal the nature of our perceptual capacities and their exercise. Specifically, if sight is for the sake of seeing, then sight will depend, in a certain sense, upon seeing, in a manner inconsistent with experiential monism. Thus reflection (...)
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  50. Bill Brewer (1998). Experience and Reason in Perception. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 203-227.score: 6.0
    The question I am interested in is this. What exactly is the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of knowledge on the basis of perception? The problem here, as I see it, is to solve simultaneously for the nature of this experience, and its role in acquiring and sustaining the relevant beliefs, in such a away as to vindicate what I regard as an undeniable datum, that perception is a basic source of knowledge about the mind- independent world, in (...)
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