Search results for 'Perceptualism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sonia Sedivy (1996). Conventional Naturalism: A Perceptualist Account of Pictorial Representation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (2):103 – 125.score: 12.0
    Abstract This paper proposes that pictures are functional objects which figure in norm?governed practices of usage yet whose specific function is to present the world as it looks to acculturated perceivers. Pictorial content presents the way the world looks to a subject's acculturated perceptual grasp. Hence, pictorial content needs to be explained in terms of a theory of perceptual content, but a novel theory which departs from the two?stage sensation?based approach to perception and the polarization between naturalism and conventionalism that (...)
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  2. Antti Kauppinen (2013). A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):360-381.score: 9.0
    According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, according to which (...)
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  3. David Bain (2011). The Imperative View of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.score: 6.0
    Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this paper, I reject (...)
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  4. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.score: 3.0
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. (...)
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  5. Ivan V. Ivanov (2011). Pains and Sounds. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):143-163.score: 3.0
    I argue that an analogy between pains and sounds suggests a way to give an objective account of pain which fits well with a naïve perceptualist account of feeling pain. According to the proposed metaphysical account, pains are relational physical events with shared qualitative nature, each of which is constituted by tissue damage and the activation of nociceptors. I proceed to show that the metaphysical proposal is compatible with platitudes about pains being animate, private, and self-intimating states.
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  6. David Bain (2007). The Location of Pains. Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.score: 3.0
    Perceptualists say that having a pain in a body part consists in perceiving the part as instantiating some property. I argue that perceptualism makes better sense of the connections between pain location and the experiences undergone by people in pain than three alternative accounts that dispense with perception. Turning to fellow perceptualists, I also reject ways in which David Armstrong and Michael Tye understand and motivate perceptualism, and I propose an alternative interpretation, one that vitiates a pair of (...)
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  7. Graham McFee (1999). Wittgenstein on Art and Aspects. Philosophical Investigations 22 (3):262–284.score: 3.0
    For some aestheticians, Wittgenstein's notion of _seeing as (or aspect perception) could be used to explain perception of artworks as artworks (artistic appreciation). This paper urges that the idea of aspect perception cannot provide such a model, even for a perceptualist about artistic appreciation (like the author). First, this would be inconsistent with Wittgenstein's argumentative strategy in key passages in _Philosophical Investigations Part Two. Second, the characteristics of aspect perception make it unsuitable as a model, whatever Wittgenstein's intentions. Moreover (one (...)
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  8. Charles A. Baylis (1960). Review: Peter Fireman, Perceptualistic Theory of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (1):76-76.score: 3.0
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  9. Peter Fireman (1954). Perceptualistic Theory Of Knowledge. Philosophical Library.score: 3.0
  10. Ephrem McCarthy (1955). The Perceptualistic Theory of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 5:162-162.score: 3.0
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