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  1. William L. Harper, Kent W. Staley, Henk W. De Regt & Peter Achinstein (forthcoming). Objective Evidence and Rules of Strategy: Achinstein on Method. Metascience:1-30.
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  2. Peter Achinstein (2013). Evidence and Method: Scientific Strategies of Isaac Newton and James Clerk Maxwell. Oup Usa.
    In this book, Peter Achinstein proposes and defends several objective concepts of evidence. He then explores the question of whether a scientific method, such as that represented in the four "Rules for the Study of Natural Philosophy" that Isaac Newton invoked in proving his law of gravity, can be employed in demonstrating how the proposed definitions of evidence are to be applied to real scientific cases.
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  3. Peter Achinstein (2012). Dasgupta, Shamik 123 N5 Davidson, Donald 219, 219 N10, 223, 225-6, 244 N12. In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge University Press. 306.
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  4. Peter Achinstein (2010). Evidence, Explanation, and Realism: Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
    The essays in this volume address three fundamental questions in the philosophy of science: What is required for some fact to be evidence for a scientific ...
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  5. Peter Achinstein (2010). Induction and Severe Testing. In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press. 170.
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  6. Peter Achinstein (2010). Mill's Sins or Mayo's Errors? In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press.
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  7. Peter Achinstein (2010). The War on Induction: Whewell Takes On Newton and Mill (Norton Takes On Everyone). Philosophy of Science 77 (5):728-739.
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  8. Peter Achinstein (2010). What to Do If You Want to Defend a Theory You Cannot Prove: A Method of “Physical Speculation”. Journal of Philosophy 107 (1):35-56.
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  9. Peter Achinstein (2007). Atom's Empirical Eve: Methodological Disputes and How to Evaluate Them. Perspectives on Science 15 (3):359-390.
    : This paper examines the debate in the late 19th and early 20th centuries over the acceptability of atomic and molecular physics. It focuses on three prominent figures: Maxwell, who defended atomic physics, Ostwald, who initially rejected it but changed his mind as a result of experiments by Thomson and Perrin, and Duhem, who never accepted it. Each scientist defended the position he did in the light of strongly held methodological views concerning empirical evidence. The paper critically evaluates each of (...)
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  10. Peter Achinstein (2005). Four Mistaken Theses About Evidence, and How to Correct Them. In P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 35--50.
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  11. Sherrilyn Roush, Peter Achinstein & Positive Relevance Defended (2005). Positive Relevance: A Defense and a Challenge. In P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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  12. Peter Achinstein (2004). A Challenge to Positive Relevance Theorists: Reply to Roush. Philosophy of Science 71 (4):521-524.
    Recently in this journal Sherrilyn Roush (2004) defends positive relevance as a necessary (albeit not a sufficient) condition for evidence by rejecting two of the counterexamples from my earlier (2001) work. In this reply I argue that Roush's critique is not successful.
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  13. Peter Achinstein (ed.) (2004). Science Rules: A Historical Introduction to Scientific Methods. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    Is there a universal set of rules for discovering and testing scientific hypotheses? Since the birth of modern science, philosophers, scientists, and other thinkers have wrestled with this fundamental question of scientific practice. Efforts to devise rigorous methods for obtaining scientific knowledge include the twenty-one rules Descartes proposed in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind and the four rules of reasoning that begin the third book of Newton's Principia , and continue today in debates over the very possibility (...)
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  14. Paul Teller, Stefano Gattei, Kent W. Staley, Eric Winsberg, James Hawthorne, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Peter Achinstein & Mathias Frisch (2004). 10. Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution (Pp. 550-570). Philosophy of Science 71 (4).
     
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  15. Peter Achinstein (2002). Is There a Valid Experimental Argument for Scientific Realism? Journal of Philosophy 99 (9):470-495.
  16. Peter Achinstein (2001). Subjective Views of Kuhn. Perspectives on Science 9 (4):423-432.
    : In response to a charge of subjectivism, Kuhn in his Postscript emphasizes the importance of "values" (accuracy, simplicity, explanatory power, etc) that are shared by scientists generally. However, Kuhn adds, these values are applied differently by different scientists. By employing a comparison with partially subjective views of Carnap on confirming evidence, this paper raises questions about Kuhn's position on values by considering ways it might be interpreted as subjective and ways it may not.
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  17. Peter Achinstein (2001). The Book of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
    What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, (...)
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  18. Peter Achinstein (2001). Who Really Discovered the Electron? In A. Warwick (ed.), Histories of the Electron: The Birth of Microphysics. 403--24.
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  19. Peter Achinstein (2000). Is It a Good Thing? In Paul Feyerabend, John Preston, Gonzalo Munévar & David Lamb (eds.), The Worst Enemy of Science?: Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend. Oxford University Press. 37.
     
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  20. Peter Achinstein (2000). Proliferation: Is It a Good Thing? In John Preston, Gonzalo Munévar & David Lamb (eds.), 'The Worst Enemy of Science'?: Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend. Oup Usa.
     
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  21. Peter Achinstein (2000). Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be) Ignored by Scientists. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):192.
    There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: (1) Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and (2) They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation.
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  22. Deborah Mayo & Peter Achinstein (2000). Experiment and Conceptual Change-Evidence, Data Generation, and Scientific Practice: Toward a Reliabilist Philosophy of Experiment-Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be). Philosophy of Science 67 (3).
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  23. Peter Achinstein (1997). On Evidence: A Reply to McGrew. Analysis 57 (1):81–83.
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  24. Peter Achinstein (1996). Swimming in Evidence: A Reply to Maher. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):175-182.
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  25. Peter Achinstein (1995). Are Empirical Evidence Claims a Priori? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):447-473.
    An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent to which, e, (...)
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  26. Peter Achinstein (1994). Explanation V. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:156 - 164.
    Do predictions of novel facts provide stronger evidence for a theory than explanations of old ones? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Which obtains has nothing to do with whether the evidence is predicted or explained, but only with the selection procedure used to generate the evidence. This is demonstrated by reference to a series of hypothetical drug cases and to Heinrich Hertz's 1883 cathode ray experiments.
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  27. Peter Achinstein (1994). Jean Perrin and Molecular Reality. Perspectives on Science 2:396-427.
     
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  28. Peter Achinstein (1994). Stronger Evidence. Philosophy of Science 61 (3):329-350.
    According to a standard account of evidence, one piece of information is stronger evidence for an hypothesis than is another iff the probability of the hypothesis on the one is greater than it is on the other. This condition, I argue, is neither necessary nor sufficient because various factors can strengthen the evidence for an hypothesis without increasing (and even decreasing) its probability. Contrary to what probabilists claim, I show that this obtains even if a probability function can take these (...)
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  29. Peter Achinstein & Laura J. Snyder (eds.) (1994). Scientific Methods: Conceptual and Historical Problems. Krieger Pub. Co..
  30. Peter Achinstein (1993). Explanation and "Old Evidence". Philosophica 51 (1):125-137.
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  31. Peter Achinstein (1993). How to Defend a Theory Without Testing It: Niels Bohr and the "Logic of Pursuit". Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):90-120.
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  32. Peter Achinstein (1992). Inference to the Best Explanation: Or, Who Won the Mill-Whewell Debate? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (2):349-364.
  33. Peter Achinstein (1992). Inference to the Best Explanation: Or, Who Won the Mill-Whewell Debate?: Peter Lipton (London: Routledge, 1991), X+ 194 Pp. ISBN 0-415-05886-4 Cloth£ 35.00. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (2):349-364.
     
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  34. Peter Achinstein (1992). The Evidence Against Kronz. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):169 - 175.
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  35. Peter Achinstein (1992). Waves and Scientific Method. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:193 - 204.
    Laudan and Cantor maintain that there exists a methodological gulf between 19th century wave theorists of light, who employed a method of hypothesis, and 18th and 19th century particle theorists, who were inductivists. This paper examines how in fact wave theorists typically argued for their theory, in order to see to what extent their reasoning corresponds to the method of hypothesis or to inductivism in sophisticated versions of these doctrines offered by Whewell and Mill. It also examines how, given the (...)
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  36. Peter Achinstein (1991). Particles and Waves: Historical Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
    This volume brings together eleven essays by the distinguished philosopher of science, Peter Achinstein. The unifying theme is the nature of the philosophical problems surrounding the postulation of unobservable entities such as light waves, molecules, and electrons. How, if at all, is it possible to confirm scientific hypotheses about "unobservables"? Achinstein examines this question as it arose in actual scientific practice in three nineteenth-century episodes: the debate between particle and wave theorists of light, Maxwell's kinetic theory of gases, and J.J. (...)
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  37. Peter Achinstein, Brian Barry, Clarendon Press Oxford, John Bigelow, Robert Pargetter, Cambridge Uni Cambridge, H. James Birx, Richard J. Blackwell, Univer Indiana & C. Blok (1991). L22000. 00. Mind 100:399.
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  38. Peter Achinstein (1990). Exploring Science. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):107-108.
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  39. Peter Achinstein (1990). Hypotheses, Probability, and Waves. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):73-102.
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  40. Peter Achinstein (1990). Light Problems: Reply to Chen. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (4):677-684.
  41. Peter Achinstein (1990). The Only Game in Town. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):179 - 201.
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  42. Peter Achinstein (1989). Explanation and Acceptability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):467.
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  43. Peter Achinstein (1988). The Illocutionary Theory of Explanation. In Joseph C. Pitt (ed.), Theories of Explanation. Oxford University Press. 74--94.
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  44. Peter Achinstein (1987). Fischer, John Martin, 215/I28 Fisher, RA, 113/I84 Fogelin, Robert, 265/M5 Foley, Richard, 9, 15, 180/tlO, 264/I9, 280/Il, 313/Tl3. [REVIEW] In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield. 327.
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  45. Peter Achinstein (1987). Light Hypotheses. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 18 (3):293-337.
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  46. Peter Achinstein (1987). Scientific Discovery and Maxwell's Kinetic Theory. Philosophy of Science 54 (3):409-434.
    By reference to Maxwell's kinetic theory, one feature of hypothetico-deductivism is defended. A scientist need make no inference to a hypothesis when he first proposes it. He may have no reason at all for thinking it is true. Yet it may be worth considering. In developing his kinetic theory there were central assumptions Maxwell made (for example, that molecules are spherical, that they exert contact forces, and that their motion is linear) that he had no reason to believe true. In (...)
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  47. Peter Achinstein (1986). Theoretical Derivations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (4):375-414.
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  48. Peter Achinstein (1984). The Pragmatic Character of Explanation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:275 - 292.
    Theories of explanation are characterized as being either pragmatic or non-pragmatic, without a clear sense of what this is supposed to mean. The present paper offers a definition of a "pragmatic explanation-sentence", and in terms of this, of a "pragmatic theory of explanation". It is argued that van Fraassen's theory of explanation, despite claims to the contrary, is not genuinely pragmatic. By contrast, the author's own "illocutionary" theory is pragmatic. Attention is devoted particularly to sentences of the form "E is (...)
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  49. Peter Achinstein (1984). A Type of Non-Causal Explanation1. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):221-243.
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  50. Peter Achinstein (ed.) (1983). The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
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