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Peter Barker [34]Peter E. Barker [3]
  1. Peter Barker (forthcoming). Stoic Alternatives to Aristotelian Cosmology: Pena and Rothmann. Revue d'Histoire des Sciences.
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  2. Peter Barker, Peter Dear, J. R. Christianson & Robert S. Westman (forthcoming). Why Was Copernicus a Copernican? Metascience:1-21.
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  3. Peter Barker (2011). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Erkenntnis 75 (3):445-465.
    For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these (...)
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  4. Peter Barker (2008). Stoic alternatives to Aristotelian cosmology : Pena, Rothmann and Brahe. Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 2:265-286.
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  5. Katherine A. Tredwell & Peter Barker (2007). Copernicus' First Friends: Physical Copernicanism From 1543 to 1610. Filozofski Vestnik 2.
    Between the appearance of Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus in 1543 and the works of Kepler and Galileo that appeared in 1609–10, there were probably no more than a dozen converts to physical heliocentrism. Following Westman we take this list to include Rheticus, Maestlin, Rothmann, Kepler, Bruno, Galileo, Digges, Harriot, de Zúńiga, and Stevin, but we include Gemma Frisius and William Gilbert, and omit Thomas Harriot. In this paper we discuss the reasons this tiny group of true Copernicans give for believing that (...)
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  6. Peter Barker, Xiang Chen & Hanne Andersen (2003). Kuhn on Concepts and Categorization. In Thomas Nickles (ed.), Thomas Kuhn. Cambridge University Press. 212--245.
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  7. Peter Barker (2002). Constructing Copernicus. Perspectives on Science 10 (2):208-227.
    : This paper offers my current view of a joint research project, with Bernard R. Goldstein, that examines Kepler's unification of physics and astronomy. As an organizing theme, I describe the extent to which the work of Kepler led to the appearance of the form of Copernicanism that we accept today. In the half century before Kepler's career began, the understanding of Copernicus and his work was significantly different from the modern one. In successive sections I consider the modern conception (...)
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  8. Peter Barker (2002). New Foundations in the History of Astronomy: Four Papers in Honor of Bernard R. Goldstein. Perspectives on Science 10 (2):151-154.
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  9. Peter Barker (2001). Incommensurability and Conceptual Change During the Copernican Revolution. In. In Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Howard Sankey (eds.), Incommensurability and Related Matters. Kluwer. 241--273.
  10. Peter Barker (2001). Kuhn, Incommensurability, and Cognitive Science. Perspectives on Science 9 (4):433-462.
    : This paper continues my application of theories of concepts developed in cognitive psychology to clarify issues in Kuhn's mature account of scientific change. I argue that incommensurability is typically neither global nor total, and that the corresponding form of scientific change occurs incrementally. Incommensurability can now be seen as a local phenomenon restricted to particular points in a conceptual framework represented by a set of nodes. The unaffected parts in the framework constitute the basis for continued communication between the (...)
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  11. Peter Barker (2000). R. Jordan (Ed.): Virgil : Aeneid II . Pp. Xvi + 105, Ills. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1999. Paper, £8.95. ISBN: 1-85399-542-. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 50 (01):292-.
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  12. Peter Barker (2000). The Role of Religion in the Lutheran Response to Copernicus. In Margaret J. Osler (ed.), Rethinking the Scientific Revolution. Cambridge University Press. 59--88.
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  13. Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.
    In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican revolution are (...)
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  14. Nancy Nerssessian, Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Experiment and Conceptual Change-Kuhn, Cognitive Science, and Conceptual Change-Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3).
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  15. Peter Barker (1998). The World of Rome. The Classical Review 48 (2):417-419.
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  16. Peter Barker & Bernard R. Goldstein (1998). Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century Astronomy: A Reappraisal. Perspectives on Science 6 (3):232-258.
    : We question the claim, common since Duhem, that sixteenth century astronomy, and especially the Wittenberg interpretation of Copernicus, was instrumentalistic rather than realistic. We identify a previously unrecognized Wittenberg astronomer, Edo Hildericus (Hilderich von Varel), who presents a detailed exposition of Copernicus's cosmology that is incompatible with instrumentalism. Quotations from other sixteenth century astronomers show that knowledge of the real configuration of the heavens was unattainable practically, rather than in principle. Astronomy was limited to quia demonstrations, although demonstration propter (...)
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  17. Xiang Chen, Hanne Andersen & Peter Barker (1998). Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5 – 28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...)
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  18. Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker & Xiang Chen (1996). Kuhn's Mature Philosophy of Science and Cognitive Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):347 – 363.
    Drawing on the results of modem psychology and cognitive science we suggest that the traditional theory of concepts is no longer tenable, and that the alternative account proposed by Kuhn may now be seen to have independent empirical support quite apart from its success as part of an account of scientific change. We suggest that these mechanisms can also be understood as special cases of general cognitive structures revealed by cognitive science. Against this background, incommensurability is not an insurmountable obstacle (...)
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  19. Peter Barker (1994). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 40 (2):285-288.
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  20. Peter Barker & Bernard R. Goldstein (1994). Distance and Velocity in Kepler's Astronomy. Annals of Science 51 (1):59-73.
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  21. Roger Ariew & Peter Barker (1992). Duhem and Continuity in the History of Science. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 46 (182):323-343.
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  22. Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (1992). Cognitive Appraisal and Power: David Brewster, Henry Brougham, and the Tactics of the Emission—Undulatory Controversy During the Early 1850s. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (1):75-101.
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  23. Peter E. Barker (1991). Intron Subtleties Intervening Sequences in Evolution and Development E. M. Stone R. J. Schwartz. BioScience 41 (4):268-270.
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  24. Roger Ariew & Peter Barker (1990). Introduction. Synthese 83 (2):179-182.
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  25. Peter Barker (1990). Copernicus, the Orbs, and the Equant. Synthese 83 (2):317 - 323.
    I argue that Copernicus accepted the reality of celestial spheres on the grounds that the equant problem is unintelligible except as a problem about real spheres. The same considerations point to a number of generally unnoticed liabilities of Copernican astronomy, especially gaps between the spheres, and the failure of some spheres to obey the principle that their natural motion is to rotate. These difficulties may be additional reasons for Copernicus's reluctance to publish, and also stand in the way of strict (...)
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  26. Peter Barker (1989). Kepler's Geometrical Cosmology. Review of Metaphysics 42 (4):826-828.
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  27. Peter Barker (1989). The Reflexivity Problem in the Psychology of Science. In Barry Gholson (ed.), Psychology of Science: Contributions to Metascience. Cambridge University Press. 92--114.
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  28. Peter Barker & Bernard R. Goldstein (1988). The Role of Comets in the Copernican Revolution. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (3):299-319.
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  29. Peter E. Barker (1987). Stress Changes in Eukaryotic Gene Expression in Response to Environmental Stress B. G. Atkinson D. B. Walden. BioScience 37 (1):75-75.
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  30. Roger Ariew & Peter Barker (1986). Duhem on Maxwell: A Case-Study in the Interrelations of History of Science and Philosophy of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:145 - 156.
    We examine Duhem's critique of Maxwell, especially Duhem's complaints that Maxwell's theory is too bold or not systematic enough, that it is too dependent on models, and that its concepts are not continuous with those of the past. We argue that these complaints are connected by Duhem's historical criterion for the evaluation of physical theories. We briefly compare Duhem's criterion of historical continuity with similar criteria developed by "historicists" like Kuhn and Lakatos. We argue that Duhem's rejection of theoretical pluralism (...)
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  31. Peter E. Barker (1986). Genes and Development. BioScience 36 (2):122-123.
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  32. Larry Laudan, Arthur Donovan, Rachel Laudan, Peter Barker, Harold Brown, Jarrett Leplin, Paul Thagard & Steve Wykstra (1986). Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research. Synthese 69 (2):141 - 223.
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  33. Peter Barker (1985). Jean Pena (1528-58) and Stoic Physics in the Sixteenth Century. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (S1):93-107.
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  34. Peter Barker (1984). Jean Pena and Stoic Physics in the 16th Century. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (Supplement):93-107.
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  35. Peter Barker (1982). Uncle Ludwig's Book About Science. Philosophical Topics 13 (Supplement):71-78.
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  36. Peter Barker (1980). Can Scientific History Repeat? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:20 - 28.
    Although Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan disagree on many points, these three widely accepted accounts of scientific growth do agree on certain key features of scientific revolutions. This minimal agreement is sufficient to place stringent restraints on the historical development of science. In particular it follows from the common features of their accounts that scientific history can never repeat. Using the term 'supertheory' to denote indifferently the large scale historical entitites employed in all three accounts, it is shown that a supertheory (...)
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  37. Peter Barker (1980). Hertz and Wittgenstein. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 11 (3):243-256.