18 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Peter Brian Barry (Saginaw Valley State University)
  1. Peter Brian Barry, Evil Actions, Evildoers, and Evil People.
    Typically, philosophers interested in evil have typically been concerned with reconciling (or not) the apparent existence of gratuitous suffering with the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient and supremely loving and caring Deity. Undeniably, ‘evil’ functions as a mass noun: note the intelligibility of asking “Why is there so much evil in the world?” But ‘evil’ sometimes functions as an adjective and is used variously to describe persons, actions, desires, motives, and intentions; Joel Feinberg even speaks of “evil smells.” In (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Peter Brian Barry, Intentional Action, Causation, and Deviance.
    It is reasonably well accepted that the explanation of intentional action is teleological explanation. Very roughly, an explanation of some event, E, is teleological only if it explains E by citing some goal or purpose or reason that produced E. Alternatively, teleological explanations of intentional action explain “by citing the state of affairs toward which the behavior was directed” thereby answering questions like “To what end was the agent’s behavior directed?” Causalism—advocated by causalists—is the thesis that explanations of intentional action (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Peter Brian Barry, Two Dogmas of Moral Psychology.
    I contend that there are two dogmas that are still popular among philosophers of action: that agents can only desire what they think is good and that they can only intentionally pursue what they think is good. I also argue that both dogmas are false. Broadly, I argue that our best theories of action can explain the possibility of intentionally pursuing what one thinks is not at all good, that we need to allow for the possibility of intentionally pursuing what (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Peter Brian Barry, The Liberal Case Against Same-Sex Marriage Prohibitions.
    Experience clearly suggests that most legal philosophers and ethicists are not surprised to be told that liberal states cannot permissibly prohibit same-sex marriage (henceforth: SSM). It is somewhat less clear just what the appropriate liberal strategy is and should be in defense of this thesis. Rather than try to defend SSM directly, I shall proceed indirectly by arguing that SSM prohibitions are indefensible on liberal grounds. Initially, I shall consider what I take to be the most powerful liberal argument against (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Peter Brian Barry (forthcoming). Capital Punishment as a Response to Evil. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-20.
    Some jurisdictions acknowledge, as a matter of positive law, the relevance of evil to capital punishment. At one point, the state of Florida counted that the fact that a murderer’s crime was “especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel” as an aggravating factor for purposes of capital sentencing. I submit that Florida may be onto something. I consider a thesis about capital punishment that strikes me as plausible on its face: if capital punishment is ever morally permissible, it is permissible as (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Peter Brian Barry (2013). Allhoff, Fritz. Terrorism, Ticking Time-Bombs, and Torture: A Philosophical Analysis. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):675-676.
  7. Peter Brian Barry (2013). Brake , Elizabeth . Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality, and the Law . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 240. $99.00 (Cloth); $24.95 (Paper). [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (2):349-353.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Peter Brian Barry (2012). Evil and Moral Psychology. Routledge.
    Preliminary matters -- Appendix to chapter 1: evil and experimental philosophy -- Taxonomies of wickedness -- The structure of evil character -- The content of evil character -- Appendix to chapter 4: evil and social psychology -- Evil and moral responsibility -- Evil and abnormal psychology -- Evil and capital punishment.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Peter Brian Barry (2011). In Defense of the Mirror Thesis. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):199-205.
    In this journal, Luke Russell defends a sophisticated dispositional account of evil personhood according to which a person is evil just in case she is strongly and highly fixedly disposed to perform evil actions in conditions that favour her autonomy. While I am generally sympathetic with this account, I argue that Russell wrongly dismisses the mirror thesis—roughly, the thesis that evil people are the mirror images of the morally best sort of persons—which I have defended elsewhere. Russell’s rejection of the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Peter Brian Barry (2011). Same-Sex Marriage and the Charge of Illiberality. Social Theory and Practice 37 (2):333-357.
    However liberalism is best understood, liberals typically seek to defend a wide range of liberty. Since same-sex marriage [henceforth: SSM] prohibitions limit the liberty of citizens, there is at least some reason to suppose that they are inconsistent with liberal commitments. But some have argued that it is the recognition of SSM—not its prohibition—that conflicts with liberalism’s commitments. I refer to the thesis that recognition of SSM is illiberal as “The Charge.” As a sympathetic liberal, I take The Charge seriously (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Peter Brian Barry (2011). Saving Strawson: Evil and Strawsonian Accounts of Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):5-21.
    Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal Freedom and Resentment, Peter Strawson denies that the truth of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Peter Brian Barry (2011). Wickedness Redux. Philo 14 (2):137-160.
    Some philosophers have argued that the concepts of evil and wickedness cannot be well grasped by those inclined to a naturalist bent, perhaps because evil is so intimately tied to religious discourse or because it is ultimately not possible to understand evil, period. By contrast, I argue that evil—or, at least, what it is to be an evil person—can be understood by naturalist philosophers, and I articulate an independently plausible account of evil character.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Peter Brian Barry (2010). Extremity of Vice and the Character of Evil. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:25-42.
    It is plausible that being an evil person is a matter of having a particularly morally depraved character. I argue that suffering from extreme moral vices—and not consistently lacking moral vices, for example—suffices for being evil. Alternatively, I defend an extremity account concerning evil personhood against consistency accounts of evil personhood. After clarifying what it is for vices to be extreme, I note that the extremity thesis I defend allows that a person could suffer from both extremely vicious character traits (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Peter Brian Barry (2009). Moral Saints, Moral Monsters, and the Mirror Thesis. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):163 - 176.
    A number of philosophers have been impressed with the thought that moral saints and moral monsters—or, evil people, to put it less sensationally—“mirror” one another, in a sense to be explained. Call this the mirror thesis. The project of this paper is to cash out the metaphorical suggestion that moral saints and evil persons mirror one other and to articulate the most plausible literal version of the mirror thesis. To anticipate, the most plausible version of the mirror thesis implies that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Peter Brian Barry (2007). Book Review. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (1):121-125.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Peter Brian Barry (2007). John Kekes, The Roots of Evil:The Roots of Evil. Ethics 117 (2):369-372.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Peter Brian Barry (2007). Sergio Tenenbaum, Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason:Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason. Ethics 118 (1):181-184.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Peter Brian Barry, David I. Copp, Anton Tupa, Marina Oshana, Crystal Thorpe & Dolores Albarracin, Wanting the Bad and Doing Bad Things: An Essay in Moral Psychology.
    Title from title page of source document.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation