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Peter D. Klein [40]Peter de Klein [1]
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Profile: Peter Klein (Rutgers University)
  1. Peter D. Klein & John Turri, Infinitism in Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Infinitism in Epistemology This article provides an overview of infinitism in epistemology. Infinitism is a family of views in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. It contrasts naturally with coherentism and foundationalism. All three views agree that knowledge or justification requires an appropriately structured chain of reasons. What form may such a […].
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  2. Peter D. Klein (2011). Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
  3. Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
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  4. Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. de Gruyter.
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  5. Peter D. Klein, Self-Profile. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology.
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  6. Peter D. Klein (2008). Useful False Beliefs. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 25--63.
  7. Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  8. Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism. Veritas 50 (4).
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
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  9. Peter D. Klein (2005). Reply to Ginet. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  10. Peter D. Klein (2004). Ascent and Assent? In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics.
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  11. Peter D. Klein (2004). There is NO Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic. In Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge. Longman.
  12. Peter D. Klein (2004). What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.
  13. Peter D. Klein (2003). Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer. 281--297.
  14. Peter D. Klein (2003). How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism. In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press. 75--94.
     
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  15. Peter D. Klein (2003). Knowledge is True, Non-Defeated Justified Belief. In Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge. :ongman.
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  16. Peter D. Klein (2000). The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism. Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
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  17. Peter D. Klein (2000). Why Not Infinitism? Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  18. Peter D. Klein (2000). Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism. Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.
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  19. Peter D. Klein (1999). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
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  20. Peter D. Klein (1998). Certainty. In Craig Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
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  21. Peter D. Klein (1998). Epistemology. In Craig Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998.
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  22. Peter D. Klein (1996). Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility. In Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  23. Peter D. Klein (1995). Closure. In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
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  24. Peter D. Klein (1992, 2010). Certainty. In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companion to Epitemology. Blackwell.
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  25. Peter D. Klein (1992, 2010). Contemporary Scepticism. In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companion ti Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  26. Peter D. Klein (1992, 2010). Scepticism. In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companiion to Epistemology.
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  27. Peter D. Klein (1990). Epistemic Compatibilism and Cannonical Beliefs. In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Kluwer.
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  28. Peter D. Klein (1987). On Behalf of the Skeptic. In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  29. Peter D. Klein (1986). Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  30. Peter D. Klein (1986). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  31. Peter D. Klein (1983). Real Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
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  32. Peter D. Klein (1982). Reply to Professor Odegard. Philosophical Books 23 (4):409-19.
  33. Peter D. Klein (1981). Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism. University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  34. Peter D. Klein (1980). Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification. Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
  35. Peter D. Klein (1979). Misleading "Misleading Defeaters&Quot;. Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
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  36. Peter D. Klein (1976). Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility. Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
  37. Peter D. Klein (1976). Review of Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Philosophical Review, 85.2 1976, 225-227. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 82 (5):225-227.
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  38. Peter D. Klein (1971). A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
  39. Peter D. Klein (1969). The Private Language Argument and the Sense-Datum Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.
  40. Peter D. Klein (1969). Theprivate Language Argument Andthesense-Datum Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.