The first example of a simultaneous inductive-recursive definition in intuitionistic type theory is Martin-Löf's universe á la Tarski. A set U 0 of codes for small sets is generated inductively at the same time as a function T 0 , which maps a code to the corresponding small set, is defined by recursion on the way the elements of U 0 are generated. In this paper we argue that there is an underlying general notion of simultaneous inductive-recursive definition which is (...) implicit in Martin-Löf's intuitionistic type theory. We extend previously given schematic formulations of inductive definitions in type theory to encompass a general notion of simultaneous induction-recursion. This enables us to give a unified treatment of several interesting constructions including various universe constructions by Palmgren, Griffor, Rathjen, and Setzer and a constructive version of Aczel's Frege structures. Consistency of a restricted version of the extension is shown by constructing a realisability model in the style of Allen. (shrink)

Induction–recursion is a powerful definition method in intuitionistic type theory. It extends inductive definitions and allows us to define all standard sets of Martin-Löf type theory as well as a large collection of commonly occurring inductive data structures. It also includes a variety of universes which are constructive analogues of inaccessibles and other large cardinals below the first Mahlo cardinal. In this article we give a new compact formalization of inductive–recursive definitions by modeling them as initial algebras in slice categories. (...) We give generic formation, introduction, elimination, and equality rules generalizing the usual rules of type theory. Moreover, we prove that the elimination and equality rules are equivalent to the principle of the existence of initial algebras for certain endofunctors. We also show the equivalence of the current formulation with the formulation of induction–recursion as a reflection principle given in Dybjer and Setzer 93). Finally, we discuss two type-theoretic analogues of Mahlo cardinals in set theory: an external Mahlo universe which is defined by induction–recursion and captured by our formalization, and an internal Mahlo universe, which goes beyond induction–recursion. We show that the external Mahlo universe, and therefore also the theory of inductive–recursive definitions, have proof-theoretical strength of at least Rathjen's theory KPM. (shrink)

This book brings together philosophers, mathematicians and logicians to penetrate important problems in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In philosophy, one has been concerned with the opposition between constructivism and classical mathematics and the different ontological and epistemological views that are reflected in this opposition. The dominant foundational framework for current mathematics is classical logic and set theory with the axiom of choice. This framework is, however, laden with philosophical difficulties. One important alternative foundational programme that is actively pursued (...) today is predicativistic constructivism based on Martin-Löf type theory. Associated philosophical foundations are meaning theories in the tradition of Wittgenstein, Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf. What is the relation between proof-theoretical semantics in the tradition of Gentzen, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf and Wittgensteinian or other accounts of meaning-as-use? What can proof-theoretical analyses tell us about the scope and limits of constructive and predicative mathematics? (shrink)

This book brings together philosophers, mathematicians and logicians to penetrate important problems in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In philosophy, one has been concerned with the opposition between constructivism and classical mathematics and the different ontological and epistemological views that are reflected in this opposition. The dominant foundational framework for current mathematics is classical logic and set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). This framework is, however, laden with philosophical difficulties. One important alternative foundational programme that is actively (...) pursued today is predicativistic constructivism based on Martin-Löf type theory. Associated philosophical foundations are meaning theories in the tradition of Wittgenstein, Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf. What is the relation between proof-theoretical semantics in the tradition of Gentzen, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf and Wittgensteinian or other accounts of meaning-as-use? What can proof-theoretical analyses tell us about the scope and limits of constructive and predicative mathematics? (shrink)