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Profile: Peter V. Forrest (Oxford University)
  1. Peter Forrest, Sets As Mereological Tropes.
    Either from concrete examples such as tomatoes on a plate, an egg carton full of eggs and so on, or simply because of the braces notation, we come to have some intuitions about the sorts of things sets might be. (See Maddy 1990.) First we tend to think of a set of particulars as itself a particular thing.. Second, even after the distinction between settheory and mereology has been carefully explained we tend to think of the members of a set (...)
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  2. Peter Forrest (forthcoming). 'The Entanglement of Truth-Makers. Logique Et Analyse.
     
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  3. Peter Forrest (2013). An Examination of John Schellenberg's Austere Ultimism. [REVIEW] Sophia 52 (3):535-551.
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  4. Peter Forrest (2013). Exemplification and Parthood. Axiomathes 23 (2):323-341.
    Consider the things that exist—the entities—and let us suppose they are mereologically structured, that is, some are parts of others. The project of ontology within the bounds of bare mereology use this structure to say which of these entities belong to various ontological kinds, such as properties and particulars. My purpose in this paper is to defend the most radical section of the project, the mereological theory of the exemplification of universals. Along the way I help myself to several hypotheses: (...)
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  5. Peter Forrest (2012). On the Argument From Divine Arbitrariness. Sophia 51 (3):341-349.
    William Rowe in his Can God be Free? (2004) argues that God, if there is a God, necessarily chooses the best. Combined with the premise that there is no best act of creation, this provides an a priori argument for atheism. Rowe assumes that necessarily God is a ‘morally unsurpassable’ being, and it is for that reason that God chooses the best. In this article I drop that assumption and I consider a successor to Rowe’s argument, the Argument from Arbitrariness, (...)
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  6. Peter Forrest (2012). Replying to the Anti-God Challenge: A God Without Moral Character Acts Well. Religious Studies 48 (1):35 - 43.
    Several authors, including Stephen Law in this journal, have argued that the case for an evil God is (about) as strong as for a good God. In this article I take up the challenge on behalf of theists who, like Richard Swinburne, argue for an agent of unrestricted power and knowledge as the ultimate explanation of all contingent truths. I shall argue that an evil God is much less probable than a good one. I do so by (1) distinguishing the (...)
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  7. Peter Forrest (2012). Truths About Non-Existent Things. Metascience 21 (2):305-307.
    Truths about non-existent things Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9583-8 Authors Peter Forrest, Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  8. John Bigelow, Raymond D. Bradley, Andrew Brennan, Tony Coady, Peter Forrest, James Franklin, Karen Green, Russell Grigg, Matthew Sharpe, Jeanette Kennett, Neil Levy, Catriona Mackenzie, Gary Malinas, Chris Mortensen, Robert Nola, Paul Patton, Charles R. Pidgen, Val Plumwood, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, Jack Reynolds, Paul Thom & Michelle Boulous Walker (2011). The Antipodean Philosopher: Public Lectures on Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Lexington Books.
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  9. Peter Forrest (2011). In Defence of Anthropomorphic Theism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):105 - 122.
    I reply to seven objections to anthropomorphic theism: (1) That anthropomorphic theism is idolatrous. In reply I rely on the concept/conception distinction. (2) That faith requires certainty. In reply I argue that full belief may be based on probable inference. (3) That the truly infinite is incomprehensible. In reply I distinguish two senses of knowing what you mean. (4) "You Kant say that!" In reply I distinguish shallow from deep Kantianism. (5) "Shall Old Aquinas be forgot?" In reply I discuss (...)
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  10. Peter Forrest (2010). 2. Can a Soufflé Rise Twice? Van Inwagen's Irresponsible Time-Travelers1. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5 5:29.
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  11. Peter Forrest (2010). Mereotopology without mereology. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):229 - 254.
    Mereotopology is that branch of the theory of regions concerned with topological properties such as connectedness. It is usually developed by considering the parthood relation that characterizes the, perhaps non-classical, mereology of Space (or Spacetime, or a substance filling Space or Spacetime) and then considering an extra primitive relation. My preferred choice of mereotopological primitive is interior parthood . This choice will have the advantage that filters may be defined with respect to it, constructing “points”, as Peter Roeper has done (...)
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  12. Peter Forrest (2010). Spinozistic Pantheism, the Environment and Christianity. Sophia 49 (4):463-473.
    I am not a pantheist and I don’t believe that pantheism is consistent with Christianity. My preferred speculation is what I call the Swiss Cheese theory: we and our artefacts are the holes in God, the only Godless parts of reality. In this paper, I begin by considering a world rather like ours but without any beings capable of sin. Ignoring extraterrestrials and angels we could consider the world, say, 5 million years ago. Pantheism was, I say, true at that (...)
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  13. Peter Forrest (2010). 1. Why It Matters That We Cannot Alter the Past. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:29.
  14. Peter Forrest (2010). Why Richard Swinburne Won't 'Rot in Hell': A Defense of Tough-Minded Theodicy. [REVIEW] Sophia 49 (1):37-47.
    In his recent paper in Sophia , ‘Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?’ Nick Trakakis endorses the position that theodicy, whether intellectually successful or not, is a morally obnoxious enterprise. My aim in this paper is to defend theodicy from this accusation. I concede that God the Creator is a moral monster by human standards and neither to be likened to a loving parent nor imitated. Nonetheless, God is morally perfect. What is abhorrent (...)
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  15. Peter Forrest (2009). A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism – John Foster. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):740-743.
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  16. Peter Forrest (2009). Razor Arguments. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
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  17. Peter Forrest (2009). The Philosophical Scandal of the Wrong Kind of Religious Disagreement. Sophia 48 (2):151-166.
    I argue for the following four theses: (1) The Dread Thesis: human beings should fear having false religious beliefs concerning some religious doctrines; (2) The Radical Uncertainty Thesis: we, namely most human beings in our culture at our time, are in a situation where we have to commit ourselves on the truth or falsity of some propositions of ultimate importance; (3) The Radical Choice Thesis: considerations of expected loss or gain do not always provide guidance as to how to commit (...)
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  18. Peter Forrest (2009). Vectors on Curved Space. Dialectica 63 (4):491-501.
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  19. Peter Forrest, The Epistemology of Religion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Contemporary epistemology of religion may conveniently be treated as adebate over whether evidentialism applies to thebelief-component of religious faith, or whether we should insteadadopt a more permissive epistemology. Here evidentialism is theinitially plausible position that a belief is justified only if``it is proportioned to the evidence''. For example, supposea local weather forecaster has noticed that over the two hundred yearssince records began a wetter than average Winter is followed in 85% ofcases by a hotter than average Summer. Then, assuming for (...)
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  20. Peter Forrest, The Identity of Indiscernibles. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  21. Peter Forrest (2007). Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- Overview -- Theism, simplicity, and properly anthropocentric metaphysics -- Materialism and dualism -- The power, knowledge, and motives of the primordial God -- The existence of the primordial God -- God changes -- Understanding evil -- The Trinity -- The Incarnation -- Concluding remarks.
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  22. Peter Forrest (2007). Mereological Summation and the Question of Unique Fusion. Analysis 67 (295):237–242.
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  23. Peter Forrest (2007). Sprigge's Spinoza. In Pierfrancesco Basile & Leemon B. McHenry (eds.), Consciousness, Reality and Value: Essays in Honour of T.L.S. Sprigge. Ontos.
     
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  24. Peter Forrest (2007). The Tree of Life: Agency and Immortality in a Metaphysics Inspired by Quantum Theory. In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press. 245--53.
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  25. Peter Forrest (2006). 1. A Theory of Truth-Makers. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:137.
     
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  26. Peter Forrest (2006). Beyond “Justification”. Faith and Philosophy 23 (3):342-345.
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  27. Peter Forrest (2006). Collective Guilt; Individual Shame. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):145–153.
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  28. Peter Forrest (2006). Epistemic Bootstrapping1. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. 53.
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  29. Peter Forrest (2006). General Facts, Physical Necessity and the Metaphysics of Time. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:137-154.
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  30. Peter Forrest (2006). The Operator Theory of Instantiation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):213 – 228.
    Armstrong holds the Supervenience Theory of instantiation, namely that the instantiation of universals by particulars supervenes upon what particulars and what universals there are, where supervenience is stipulated to be explanatory or dependent supervenience. I begin by rejecting the Supervenience Theory of instantiation. Having done so it is then tempting to take instantiation as primitive. This has, however, an awkward consequence, undermining one of the main advantages universals have over tropes. So I examine another account hinted at by Armstrong. This (...)
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  31. Peter Forrest (2006). Uniform Grounding of Truth and the Growing Block Theory: A Reply to Heathwood. Analysis 66 (290):161–163.
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  32. Peter Forrest (2005). Universals as Sense-Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):622-631.
    This paper concerns the structure of appearances. I argue that to be appeared to in a certain way is to be aware of one or more universals. Universals therefore function like the sense-data, once highly favoured but now out of fashion. For instance, to be appeared to treely, in a visual way, is to be aware of the complex relation, being treeshaped and tree-coloured and being in front of, a relation of a kind which could be instantiated by a material (...)
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  33. Peter Forrest (2004). Grit or Gunk. The Monist 87 (3):351-370.
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  34. Peter Forrest (2004). Possible Worlds. Mind 113 (449):171-174.
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  35. Peter Forrest (2004). Review: Possible Worlds. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (449):171-174.
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  36. Peter Forrest (2004). The Real but Dead Past: A Reply to Braddon-Mitchell. Analysis 64 (4):358–362.
    In "How Do We Know It Is Now Now?" David Braddon-Mitchell (Analysis 2004) develops an objection to the thesis that the past is real but the future is not. He notes my response to this, namely that the past, although real, is lifeless and (a fortiori?) lacking in sentience. He argues, however, that this response, which I call 'the past is dead hypothesis', is not tenable if combined with 'special relativity'. My purpose in this reply is to argue that, on (...)
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  37. Graham Oppy, Peter Forrest, Sharon M. Kaye & Shalom Goldman (2004). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Sophia 43 (1):125-126.
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  38. John G. Quilter & Peter Forrest (2004). On the Special Symposium in This Issue and the Demise of Godfrey Tanner. Sophia 43 (1):1-2.
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  39. Joseph A. Bulbulia, Kristen Kingfield Kearns, Ilsup Ahn, Peter Forrest, Stephen R. Napier, Graeme Marshall & Patrick Hutchings (2003). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Sophia 42 (1):125-126.
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  40. Peter Forrest (ed.) (2003). Loque Et Analyse.
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  41. Peter Forrest (2002). Review of Barry Miller, The Fullness of Being: A New Paradigm for Existence. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (8).
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  42. Peter Forrest (2002). Nonclassical Mereology and Its Application to Sets. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):79-94.
    Part One of this paper is a case against classical mereology and for Heyting mereology. This case proceeds by first undermining the appeal of classical mereology and then showing how it fails to cohere with our intuitions about a measure of quantity. Part Two shows how Heyting mereology provides an account of sets and classes without resort to any nonmereological primitive.
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  43. Peter Forrest (2001). Counting the Cost of Modal Realism. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman and Littlefield. 93--103.
    Conceivability is, I say, prima facie evidence for possibility. Hence, we may count the cost of theories about possibility by listing the ways in which, according to the theory in question, something conceivable is said nonetheless to be impossible. More succinctly we may state a principle, Hume's razor to put alongside Ockham's. Hume's razor says that necessities are not to be multiplied more than necessary. In this paper I count the cost of David Lewis's modal realism, showing that many of (...)
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  44. Peter Forrest (2001). Mark Wynn's Defence of “The Supernatural”. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):101-104.
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  45. Peter Forrest (2000). The Incarnation: A Philosophical Case for Kenosis. Religious Studies 36 (2):127-140.
    As a preliminary, I shall clarify the kenotic position by arguing that a position which is often called kenotic is actually a quasi-kenotic version of the classical account, according to which Jesus had normal divine powers but chose not to exercise them. After this preliminary, I discuss three problems with the strict kenotic account. The first is that kenosis conflicts with the standard list of attributes considered essential to God. The second problem is posed by the Exaltation, namely the resumption (...)
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  46. Peter Forrest & Drew Khlentzos (2000). Introduction: Truth Maker and its Variants. Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):3-15.
     
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  47. Peter Forrest (1999). In Defence of the Phase Space Picture. Synthese 119 (3):299-311.
    While the Phase Space formulation of quantum mechanics has received considerable attention it has seldom been defended as a viable interpretation. In this paper I expound the Phase Space Picture, use it to provide a quasi-classical ‘hidden variables’ interpretation of quantum mechanics and offer a defence of it against various objections.
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  48. Peter Forrest (1999). Supertasks and Material Objects. Logique Et Analyse 166 (167):441-446.
     
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  49. Peter Forrest (1999). Towards an Epistemology of Religious Traditions. Sophia 38 (1):25-40.
    Starting from the acceptance of the Egalitarian Principle I exhibited a version which I considered too lax (BEP) and one I considered too strict (NEP), arriving at a version (MEP) which allows that there can be tolerance-limiting reasons for adhering to traditions but only if they are based on unreasoned knowledge claims. In fact, I hold that the situation most of us find ourselves in restricts such claims on religious topics to very general ones. Hence the choice between NEP and (...)
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