Search results for 'Peter Graham Thielke' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Peter Graham Thielke (2010). Who's Who From Kant to Hegel I: In the Kantian Wake. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):385-397.score: 870.0
    While almost all of Kant's contemporaries agreed that the Critique of Pure Reason effected a philosophically epochal change, there was far less consensus about what precisely Kant's new critical philosophy had brought about. In large part, this uncertainty was a result of a methodological crisis that Kant's work had sparked: the Critique had shown that traditional dogmatic metaphysics was suspect at best, but what new methods needed to be adopted in the wake of Kant's 'Copernican Revolution'? The Critique stood as (...)
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  2. Peter Graham Thielke (2010). Who's Who From Kant to Hegel II: Art and the Absolute. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):398-411.score: 870.0
    Kant's 'Copernican Revolution', which began in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), had, by the early 1790s, fundamentally altered the terrain of German philosophy – but not entirely in the way that Kant had foreseen. Skeptical challenges to Kant's discursive account of cognition, in which experience arises from the separate faculties of sensibility and understanding, had led thinkers such as K.L. Reinhold and J.G. Fichte to attempt to provide a first, foundational principle for the critical philosophy. These efforts were enormously (...)
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  3. Peter J. Graham (2011). Perceptual Entitlement and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):467-475.score: 480.0
    Perceptual entitlement and basic beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9603-3 Authors Peter J. Graham, University of California, 900 University Avenue, Riverside, CA USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  4. Gordon Graham (1992). Book Review of Information UK 2000 Edited by John Martyn, Peter Vickers and Mary Feeney. [REVIEW] Logos 3 (2):108-108.score: 360.0
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  5. Peter A. Graham (2010). Against the Mind Argument. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):273 - 294.score: 300.0
    The Mind Argument is an argument for the incompatibility of indeterminism and anyone's having a choice about anything that happens. Peter van Inwagen rejects the Mind Argument not because he is able to point out the flaw in it, but because he accepts both that determinism is incompatible with anyone's having a choice about anything that happens and that it is possible for someone to have a choice about something that happens. In this paper I first diagnose and clear (...)
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  6. Peter J. Graham (2011). Does Justification Aim at Truth? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.score: 240.0
    Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer 'Yes'; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In 'The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism' they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. 'Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding' of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no 'connection to the truth.' A 'truth-aimed ... epistemology is not entitled to (...)
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  7. Peter A. Graham (2010). In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation. Ethics 121 (1):88-115.score: 240.0
    There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s current moral (...)
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  8. Peter J. Graham (forthcoming). The Function of Perception. In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Scientia: Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library.score: 240.0
    What is the biological function of perception? I hold perception, especially visual perception in humans, has the biological function of accurately representing the environment. Tyler Burge argues this cannot be so in Origins of Objectivity (Oxford, 2010), for accuracy is a semantical relationship and not, as such, a practical matter. Burge also provides a supporting example. I rebut the argument and the example. Accuracy is sometimes also a practical matter if accuracy partly explains how perception contributes to survival and reproduction.
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  9. Peter J. Graham (2011). Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3:67-88.score: 240.0
  10. Peter J. Graham (2012). Epistemic Entitlement. Noûs 46 (3):449-482.score: 240.0
  11. Peter J. Graham (2004). Metaphysical Libertarianism and the Epistemology of Testimony. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):37-50.score: 240.0
    Reductionism about testimony holds that testimonial warrant or entitlement is just a species of inductive warrant. Anti-Reductionism holds that it is different from inductive but analogous to perceptual or memorial warrant. Perception receives much of its positive epistemic status from being reliably truthconducive in normal conditions. One reason to reject the epistemic analogy is that testimony involves agency – it goes through the will of the speaker – but perception does not. A speaker might always choose to lie or otherwise (...)
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  12. Peter A. Graham (2014). A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):388-409.score: 240.0
    In this paper I sketch an account of moral blame and blameworthiness. I begin by clarifying what I take blame to be and explaining how blameworthiness is to be analyzed in terms of it. I then consider different accounts of the conditions of blameworthiness and, in the end, settle on one according to which a person is blameworthy for φ-ing just in case, in φ-ing, she violates one of a particular class of moral requirements governing the attitudes we bear, and (...)
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  13. Peter J. Graham (forthcoming). Functions, Warrant, History. In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.score: 240.0
    I hold that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Evolution by natural selection is the central source of etiological functions. This leads many to think that on my view warrant requires a history of natural selection. What then about learning? What then about Swampman? Though functions require history, natural selection is not the only source. Self-repair and trial-and-error learning are both sources. Warrant requires (...)
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  14. Peter J. Graham (1997). What is Testimony? Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):227-232.score: 240.0
    C.A.J. Coady, in his book Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), offers conditions on an assertion that p to count as testimony. He claims that the assertion that p must be by a competent speaker directed to an audience in need of evidence and it must be evidence that p. I offer examples to show that Coady’s conditions are too strong. Testimony need not be evidence; the speaker need not be competent; and, the statement need not be relevant (...)
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  15. Peter A. Graham (2008). A Defense of Local Miracle Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 140 (1):65 - 82.score: 240.0
    David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
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  16. Peter J. Graham (2010). Theorizing Justification. In Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press.score: 240.0
    The standard taxonomy of theories of epistemic justification generates four positions from the Foundationalism v. Coherentism and Internalism v. Externalism disputes. I develop a new taxonomy driven by two other distinctions: Fundamentalism v. Non-Fundamentalism and Actual-Result v. Proper-Aim conceptions of epistemic justification. Actual-Result theorists hold that a belief is justified only if, as an actual matter of fact, it is held or formed in a way that makes it more likely than not to be true. Proper-Aim theorists hold that a (...)
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  17. Peter A. Graham (2008). The Standard Argument for Blame Incompatibilism. Noûs 42 (4):697-726.score: 240.0
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  18. Peter J. Graham (2006). Can Testimony Generate Knowledge? Philosophica 78:105-127.score: 240.0
    Orthodoxy in epistemology maintains that some sources of belief, e.g. perception and introspection, generate knowledge, while others, e.g. testimony and memory, preserve knowledge. An example from Jennifer Lackey B the Schoolteacher case B purports to show that testimony can generate knowledge. It is argued that Lackey's case fails to subvert the orthodox view, for the case does not involve the generation of knowledge by testimony. A modified version of the case does. Lackey's example illustrates the orthodox view; the revised case (...)
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  19. Peter J. Graham (2006). Liberal Fundamentalism and its Rivals. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford. 93--115.score: 240.0
    Many hold that perception is a source of epistemically basic (direct) belief: for justification, perceptual beliefs do not need positive inferential support from other justified beliefs, especially from beliefs about one’s current sensory episodes. Perceptual beliefs can, however, be defeated or undermined by other things one believes, and so to be justified in the end there must be no undefeated undermining grounds. Similarly for memory and introspection.1..
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  20. Peter J. Graham (2010). Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension. In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 148--174.score: 240.0
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  21. Peter J. Graham (2000). The Reliability of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):695-709.score: 240.0
  22. Peter A. Graham (2011). Fischer on Blameworthiness and “Ought” Implies “Can”. Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):63-80.score: 240.0
    I argue that Fischer’s attempts to undermine the “Ought” Implies “Can” principle (OIC) fail. I argue both against his construal of the natural motivation for OIC and against his argument for the falsity of OIC. I also consider some attempts to salvage Fischer’s arguments and argue that they can work only if the true moral theory is motive determinative--i.e., it is such that, necessarily, any action performed from a motive which renders one of the blame emotions appropriate is morally impermissible, (...)
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  23. Peter Thielke (2006). Fate and the Fortune of the Categories: Kant on the Usurpation and Schematization of Concepts. Inquiry 49 (5):438 – 468.score: 240.0
    In the early steps of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant briefly addresses the threat posed by usurpatory concepts such as 'fate' and 'fortune'. Commentators have largely passed over these remarks, but in this paper I argue that a careful analysis of the reasons why 'fate' and 'fortune' are usurpatory reveals an important point about the relation between the Deduction and the Principles chapters of the Critique. In particular, I argue that 'fate' and 'fortune' are usurpatory (...)
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  24. Peter J. Graham (2007). The Theoretical Diagnosis of Skepticism. Synthese 158 (1):19 - 39.score: 240.0
    Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion). Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show (...)
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  25. Peter Thielke (2004). Review: Challenges to German Idealism: Schelling, Fichte and Kant. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):548-552.score: 240.0
  26. Peter J. Graham (2007). Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).score: 240.0
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  27. Peter J. Graham (2000). Transferring Knowledge. Noûs 34 (1):131–152.score: 240.0
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  28. Peter Thielke (2008). Apostate Rationalism and Maimon's Hume. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):pp. 591-618.score: 240.0
    The paper examines the way in which Salomon Maimon (1753-1800) combines Humean skepticism and Leibnizian rationalism to mount an innovative challenge to Kant. Maimon’s position can be described as an “apostate rationalism,” which holds that reason makes unavoidable demands on us that are nonetheless not satisfied in experience. An appreciation of Maimon’s arguments also sheds new and interesting light on the surprising role that this apostate rationalism plays as a component of Hume’s skeptical naturalism.
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  29. Peter Thielke (2001). Discursivity and Causality: Maimon's Challenge to the Second Analogy. Kant-Studien 92 (4):440-463.score: 240.0
  30. Peter J. Graham (1999). Defending Millianism. Mind 108 (431):555-561.score: 240.0
    Millianism is the view that all there is to the meaning of a name is its bearer. In a recent paper Bryan Frances seeks to undercut the traditional argument against Millianism as well as offer a new argument in favor of Millianism. I argue that both endeavors fail.
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  31. Peter Thielke (2001). Getting Maimon's Goad: Discursivity, Skepticism, and Fichte's Idealism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (1):101-134.score: 240.0
  32. Peter J. Graham (1999). Brandom on Singular Terms. Philosophical Studies 93 (3):247-264.score: 240.0
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  33. Peter J. Graham (2000). Conveying Information. Synthese 123 (3):365-392.score: 240.0
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  34. Peter J. Graham (2006). Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential? Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):84-95.score: 240.0
    Anti-Reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehending (both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. Comprehension as such, like perceptual representation, confers non-inferential justification on belief. Reductionists, on the other hand, reject this. Comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief. Beliefs based on comprehension are justified only if inferentially supported by other things the subject believes. I discuss an argument from Elizabeth Fricker from her ‘Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant?’ She (...)
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  35. Peter Thielke, Salomon Maimon. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 240.0
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  36. Peter A. Graham (2013). Blame: Its Nature and Norms By D Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini. Analysis 74 (1):ant108.score: 240.0
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  37. Peter A. Graham (2008). Warfield on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 25 (1):75-78.score: 240.0
    Warfield (1997, 2000) argues that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. He assumes for conditional proof that there is a necessarilyexistent omniscient being. He also assumes that it is possible for there to be a person who both does something and could have avoided doing it. As supportfor this latter premise he points to the fact that nearly every participant to the debate accepts the falsity of logical fatalism. Appealing to this consensus, however, renders the argument question-begging, for that (...)
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  38. Peter J. Graham (2002). Review of Gabor Forrai, Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes: A Defense of Internal Realism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (2).score: 240.0
    Gabor Forrai has written a very clear and articulate defense of internal realism, the view that the categories and structures of the world are a function of our conceptual schemes. Internal realism is opposed to metaphysical realism, the view that the world’s structure is wholly independent, both causally and ontologically, of the human mind. For the metaphysical realist, the world is one thing and the mind is another. For the internal realist, on the other hand, though the world is causally (...)
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  39. Peter Thielke (2007). Review of Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy As Critical Interpretation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (6).score: 240.0
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  40. Peter Thielke (2013). Recent Work on Early German Idealism (1781–1801). Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (2):149-192.score: 240.0
    One of the Key Questions Facing anyone interested in German Idealism concerns the puzzling transition from Kant to Hegel: how, in the course of a mere two decades, did Kant’s critical idealism, with its emphasis on the need to limit reason’s aspirations, come to be replaced by the seemingly boundless Absolute Idealism of the late 1790s and early 1800s? The traditional—though admittedly caricatured—answer follows an appealingly straightforward path from Kant to the idealist triumvirate of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The central (...)
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  41. Peter J. Graham (2014). Against Transglobal Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):525-535.score: 240.0
    David Henderson and Terry Horgan argue that doxastic epistemic justification requires the transglobal reliability of the belief-forming process. Transglobal reliability is reliability across a wide range of experientially possible global environments. Focusing on perception, I argue that justification does not require transglobal reliability, for perception is non-accidentally reliable and confers justification but not always transglobally reliable. Transglobal reliability is an epistemically desirable property of belief-forming processes, but not necessary for justification.
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  42. Peter A. Graham (2013). M.S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):244-246.score: 240.0
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  43. Peter Graham (2013). Nature's Challenge to Free Will, by Berofsky Bernard. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):1-4.score: 240.0
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  44. Peter W. Schuhmann, Robert T. Burrus, Preston D. Barber, J. Edward Graham & M. Fara Elikai (2013). Using the Scenario Method to Analyze Cheating Behaviors. Journal of Academic Ethics 11 (1):17-33.score: 240.0
    Using student self-reported cheating admissions and answers from a hypothetical cheating scenario, this paper analyzes the effects of individual and situational factors on potential cheating behavior. Results confirm several conclusions about student factors that are related to cheating. The probability of cheating is associated with younger students, lower GPAs, alcohol consumption, fraternity/sorority membership, and having cheated in high school. Student perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment appear to have a negative and significant impact on the probability of cheating (...)
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  45. David J. Feith, Seth Andrew, Charles F. Bahmueller, Mark Bauerlein, John M. Bridgeland, Bruce Cole, Alan M. Dershowitz, Mike Feinberg, Senator Bob Graham, Chris Hand, Frederick M. Hess, Eugene Hickok, Michael Kazin, Senator Jon Kyl, Jay P. Lefkowitz, Peter Levine, Harry Lewis, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Secretary Rod Paige, Charles N. Quigley, Admiral Mike Ratliff, Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Jason Ross, Andrew J. Rotherham, John R. Thelin & Juan Williams (2011). Teaching America: The Case for Civic Education. R&L Education.score: 240.0
    This book taps the best American thinkers to answer the essential American question: How do we sustain our experiment in government of, by, and for the people?
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  46. Peter Thielke (2003). Hume, Kant and the Sea of Illusion. Hume Studies 29 (1):63-88.score: 240.0
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  47. Peter Thielke (2014). What Would It Take to Change Your Mind? Metaphilosophy 45 (3):462-472.score: 240.0
    Most of us have settled views about various intellectual debates, and much of the activity of philosophers is devoted to giving arguments that are designed to convince one's opponents to change their minds about a certain issue. But, what might this process require? More pointedly, can you clearly imagine what it would take to make you change your mind about a position you currently hold? This article argues that the surprising answer to this question is no—you cannot imagine what would (...)
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  48. George Graham & Peter Killeen (1985). Behaviorism: The Next Generation. Behaviorism 13 (1):1-2.score: 240.0
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  49. Peter Graham (2013). Nature's Challenge to Free Will, by Berofsky Bernard: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, Pp. 280,£ 40 (Hardback). Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.score: 240.0
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