This article argues that Agamben's ?paradigmatic method? leads to particular choices in his depiction of the figure of the homo sacer. Reviewing this project also suggests that there's more to history?the example given is the story of homo sacer?than Agamben's method would ever leave us to say. In other words, there are still resources in the tradition for something new, and thus there is much more left to say about its legacies.
The context for these interviews was a seminar [Peter Gratton] conducted on speculative realism in the Spring 2010. There has been great interest in speculative realism and one reason Gratton surmise[s] is not just the arguments offered, though [Gratton doesn't] want to take away from them; each of these scholars are vivid writers and great pedagogues, many of whom are in constant contact with their readers via their weblogs. Thus these interviews provided an opportunity to forward student questions about their (...) respective works. Though each were conducted on different occasions, the interviews stand as a collected work, tying together the most classical questions about “realism” to ancillary movements about the non-human in politics, ecology, aesthetics, and video gaming—all to point to future movements in this philosophical area. (shrink)
“What must be thought,” Jacques Derrida writes in the closing pages of Rogues, “is this inconceivable and unknowable thing, a freedom that would no longer be the power of a subject, a freedom without autonomy, a heteronomy without servitude, in short, something like a passive decision.”1 To certain readers of Derrida, this passage, coming near the end of Rogues, written some two years before he passed away, would mark the fundamental failure of his thought. “What must be thought …”: an (...) exhortation, an ethical injunction, but seemingly also a final plea at the end of a long career that, many…. (shrink)
Emmanuel Levinas’s contribution to philosophical conceptions of time can be understood fully only in terms of his debt to Heidegger. Taking up Levinas’s critiques of Heidegger’s Destruktion of the Aristotelian conception of time in Being and Time, this paper argues that Levinas is ultimately unable to refuse fully, for reasons having to do with Heidegger’s disastrous alignment with the Nazis in the 1930s, the debt he owes to Heidegger, his earliest and most lasting influence. Despite his problems with the Dasein (...) analytic, Levinas does not repudiate Heidegger’s essential contributions to a deconstruction of the history of ontology. Indeed, Levinas assumes this de-structuring as providing the necessary opening for his own contribution to rethinking the notion of time. In the last section of this paper, we tease out what Levinas’s analysis means for his ambivalent relationship to Heidegger, but also in his quest to go “beyond” phenomenology. (shrink)