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Peter Van Inwagen [54]Peter Inwagen [12]
  1. Peter Van Inwagen & E. J. Lowe (1996). Why Is There Anything at All? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70:95 - 120.
  2.  27
    Harold W. Noonan & Peter Van Inwagen (1992). Material Beings. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):239.
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  3. Peter Van Inwagen (1994). Composition as Identity. Philosophical Perspectives 8:207 - 220.
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  4.  30
    Peter van Inwagen (1986). An Essay on Free Will. OUP Oxford.
  5.  19
    Peter Van Inwagen (1990). Symposia Papers: Four-Dimensional Objects. Noûs 24 (2):245 - 255.
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  6.  47
    Peter Van Inwagen (1992). Reply to Christopher Hill. Analysis 52 (2):56 - 61.
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  7. Peter Van Inwagen (1975). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.
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  8.  4
    Peter Inwagen (forthcoming). The Neo-Carnapians. Synthese:1-26.
    This essay defends the neo-Quinean approach to ontology against the criticisms of two neo-Carnapians, Huw Price and Amie Thomasson.
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  9.  20
    Peter Van Inwagen (1989). When is the Will Free? Philosophical Perspectives 3:399 - 422.
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  10.  15
    Peter Inwagen (2002). The Number of Things. Philosophical Issues 12 (1):176-196.
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  11.  77
    Peter Van Inwagen (1998). Meta-Ontology. Erkenntnis 48 (2/3):233 - 250.
    Quine has called the question, ‘What is there?’ the “ontological question.” But if we call this question by that name, what name shall we use for the question, ‘What are we asking when we ask “What is there?”’? I shall call it ‘the meta-ontological question’. I shall call the attempt to answer the meta-ontological question ‘meta-ontology’ and any proposed answer to it ‘a meta-ontology’. In this essay, I shall briefly sketch a meta-ontology. The meta-ontology I shall present is broadly Quinean. (...)
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  12.  31
    Peter Van Inwagen (1991). The Problem of Evil, The Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence. Philosophical Perspectives 5:135 - 165.
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  13.  18
    Peter Van Inwagen (1977). Creatures of Fiction. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4):299 - 308.
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  14.  43
    Peter Van Inwagen (1987). When Are Objects Parts? Philosophical Perspectives 1:21 - 47.
  15.  37
    Peter Inwagen (1994). When the Will is Not Free. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):95-113.
  16.  71
    Peter Van Inwagen (1993). Précis of Material Beings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):683 - 686.
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  17.  34
    Peter Van Inwagen (1995). Dualism and Materialism. Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):475-488.
    The thesis that dualism is a Greek import into Christianity and that the Christian hope of eternal life does not presuppose dualism has recently begun to win adherents. This paper is a defense of this thesis. One philosophical argument for dualism (that dualism best explains the phenomenon of sensuous experience) is briefly discussed and is rejected. The body of the paper addresses the relevant creedal and biblical data. The paper closes with a discussion of the question whether the doctrine of (...)
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  18.  84
    Peter Inwagen (1978). The Possibility of Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2):114 - 121.
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  19.  2
    Peter van Inwagen (2002). What Do We Refer to When We Say “I”? In Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell Publishers 175-189.
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  20.  13
    Peter Van Inwagen (1993). Reply to Reviewers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):709 - 719.
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  21.  18
    Peter Van Inwagen (1978). Ability and Responsibility. Philosophical Review 87 (2):201 - 224.
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  22.  93
    Peter Inwagen (1981). Why I Don't Understand Substitutional Quantification. Philosophical Studies 39 (3):281 - 285.
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  23.  21
    Peter Inwagen (1997). Against Middle Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 21 (1):225-236.
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  24.  2
    Thomas McKay & Peter Van Inwagen (1977). Counterfactuals with Disjunctive Antecedents. Philosophical Studies 31 (5):353 - 356.
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  25.  3
    Peter van Inwagen (2016). In Defense of Transcendent Universals. In Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. De Gruyter 51-70.
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  26.  36
    Peter Van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture. Noûs 34 (s14):1 - 19.
  27.  43
    Peter Van Inwagen (1985). On Two Arguments for Compatibilism. Analysis 45 (3):161 - 163.
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  28.  22
    Peter van Inwagen (2008). How to Think About the Problem of Free Will. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):327 - 341.
    In this essay I present what is, I contend, the free-will problem properly thought through, or at least presented in a form in which it is possible to think about it without being constantly led astray by bad terminology and confused ideas. Bad terminology and confused ideas are not uncommon in current discussions of the problem. The worst such pieces of terminology are "libertarian free will" and "compatibilist free will." The essay consists partly of a defense of the thesis that (...)
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  29.  22
    Peter Van Inwagen (1997). Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity. Noûs 31:305 - 319.
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  30.  15
    Peter Van Inwagen (1994). When the Will Is Not Free. Philosophical Studies 75 (1/2):95 - 113.
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  31.  5
    Peter van Inwagen (2015). Nothing Is Impossible. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. De Gruyter 33-58.
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  32.  20
    Peter Van Inwagen (2004). The Self: The Incredulous Stare Articulated. Ratio 17 (4):478-491.
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  33.  41
    Peter Van Inwagen (1974). A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism. Theoria 40 (1):9-22.
  34.  13
    Peter Van Inwagen (1980). Indexicality and Actuality. Philosophical Review 89 (3):403 - 426.
  35.  35
    Peter Van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):341 - 350.
    In his classic paper, "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the "compatibilists" and the "incompatibilists" (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed (...)
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  36.  29
    Peter Van Inwagen (1979). Laws and Counterfactuals. Noûs 13 (4):439 - 453.
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  37.  20
    Peter Van Inwagen (1977). Ontological Arguments. Noûs 11 (4):375 - 395.
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  38.  14
    Peter van Inwagen (2000). Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time. The Monist 83 (3):437 - 459.
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  39.  10
    Peter Inwagen (1978). A Definition of Chisholm's Notion of Immanent Causation. Philosophia 7 (3-4):567-581.
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  40.  8
    Peter Van Inwagen (1993). Naive Mereology, Admissible Valuations, and Other Matters. Noûs 27 (2):229 - 234.
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  41.  12
    Peter Van Inwagen (1996). Problems In Philosophy. Philosophical Review 105 (2):253-256.
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  42.  16
    Peter Van Inwagen (1997). A Reply to Professor Hick. Faith and Philosophy 14 (3):299-302.
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  43.  10
    Peter Van Inwagen (2012). Three Versions of the Ontological Argument. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today. Ontos Verlag 143.
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  44.  18
    Peter Van Inwagen (2000). The Argument From Particular Horrendous Evils. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 74:65-80.
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  45.  8
    Peter van Inwagen (2008). Was George Orwell a Metaphysical Realist? Philosophia Scientiae 12:161-185.
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  46.  18
    Peter Van Inwagen (1980). The Incompatibility of Responsibility and Determinism. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:30-37.
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  47.  19
    Peter Van Inwagen (1980). Compatibilism and the Burden of Proof. Analysis 40 (2):98 - 100.
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  48.  22
    Peter Inwagen (2002). “Carnap” and “the Polish Logician”. Acta Analytica 17 (1):7-17.
    InThe Many Faces of Realism and elsewhere, Hilary Putnam has presented an argument for the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter as to how many objects there are. In brief: Carnap says that a certain imaginary world contains three objects, ×1, ×2, and ×3. The Polish logician says that this same world must contain four other objects (×1 + ×2, ×1 + ×2 + ×3, etc.). Putnam maintains that there can be no fact of the matter as (...)
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  49.  2
    Peter Van Inwagen (1977). Reply to Narveson. Philosophical Studies 32 (1):89 - 98.
  50.  14
    Peter Van Inwagen (2000). Double Dactyls. Mind 109:23 - 24.
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