Search results for 'Peter K. Klein' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Peter K. Klein (1998). Insanity and the Sublime: Aesthetics and Theories of Mental Illness in Goya's Yard with Lunatics and Related Works. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 61:198-252.score: 870.0
  2. Carsten Klein (1997). Peter Schmitter, Hg., Zur Theorie und Methode der Geschichtsschreibung der Linguistik. Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 2 (1):303-311.score: 360.0
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  3. Carsten Klein (1997). Peter Schmitter, Hg., Zur Theorie und Methode der Geschichtsschreibung der Linguistik. [REVIEW] Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 2 (1):303-311.score: 360.0
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  4. Sally Allen, Joanna Hubbs, Outrunning Atalanta, Feminine Destiny, Rita Arditti, Renate Dueli Klein & Shelley Minden (1987). Abel, Elizabeth, and Emily K. Abel, Eds., The Signs Reader: Women, Gender and Scholarship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1983. Allen, Jeffner, Lesbian Philosophy: Explorations. Palo Alto: Institute of Lesbi-an Studies 1986. [REVIEW] In Marsha Hanen & Kai Nielsen (eds.), Science, Morality and Feminist Theory. University of Calgary Press. 423.score: 360.0
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  5. Hans Kamp, Boem-mo Kang, Paul Kay, Ali Kazmi, Edward L. Keenan, Jeff King, Ewan Klein, Angelika Kratzer, Manfred Krifka & William Ladusaw (1995). 688 ACKNOWLEDGMENT Iwanska, Lucia Johnson, Mark Kadmon, Nirit K~ Ilm~ N, L~ Zlo. Linguistics and Philosophy 18:687-688.score: 360.0
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  6. Rudolf Klein (1989). From Global Rationing to Target Setting in the U.K. Hastings Center Report 19 (4):3-4.score: 360.0
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  7. Peter D. Klein (1999). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.score: 240.0
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  8. Peter Klein (2007). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.score: 240.0
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
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  9. Peter D. Klein (1971). A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.score: 240.0
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  10. Peter D. Klein (2004). What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.score: 240.0
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  11. Peter Klein (1995). ``Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails&Quot;. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213--236.score: 240.0
  12. Peter D. Klein (1981). Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism. University of Minnesota Press.score: 240.0
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  13. Peter Klein (2007). How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.score: 240.0
  14. Peter D. Klein (2000). Why Not Infinitism? Epistemology 5:199-208.score: 240.0
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  15. Peter D. Klein (1976). Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility. Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.score: 240.0
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  16. Peter Klein (2004). Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165–184.score: 240.0
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  17. Peter Klein (2003). When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.score: 240.0
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  18. Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1996). No Help for the Coherentist. Analysis 56 (2):118–121.score: 240.0
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  19. Peter Klein (1998). Review: Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919 - 925.score: 240.0
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  20. Peter D. Klein (1969). The Private Language Argument and the Sense-Datum Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.score: 240.0
  21. Peter D. Klein (2000). Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism. Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.score: 240.0
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  22. Peter D. Klein (1983). Real Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.score: 240.0
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
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  23. Peter D. Klein (1979). Misleading "Misleading Defeaters&Quot;. Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.score: 240.0
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  24. Peter D. Klein (1980). Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification. Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.score: 240.0
  25. Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1994). What Price Coherence? Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.score: 240.0
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  26. Peter D. Klein & John Turri, Infinitism in Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 240.0
    Infinitism in Epistemology This article provides an overview of infinitism in epistemology. Infinitism is a family of views in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. It contrasts naturally with coherentism and foundationalism. All three views agree that knowledge or justification requires an appropriately structured chain of reasons. What form may such a […].
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  27. Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism. Veritas 50 (4).score: 240.0
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
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  28. Peter Klein (1985). The Virtues of Inconsistency. The Monist 68 (1):105-135.score: 240.0
    I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets.
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  29. Peter Klein (1986). Immune Belief Systems. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.score: 240.0
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  30. Peter D. Klein (1969). Theprivate Language Argument Andthesense-Datum Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.score: 240.0
  31. Peter Klein (1969). “Are Strawson's Persons Immortal?” A Reply. Philosophical Studies 20 (5):65 - 70.score: 240.0
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  32. Peter D. Klein (2011). Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.score: 240.0
  33. Peter D. Klein (2003). Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer. 281--297.score: 240.0
  34. Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. de Gruyter.score: 240.0
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  35. Peter Klein (2010). Skepticism and Closure. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.score: 240.0
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  36. Daniel J. Grodner, Natalie M. Klein, Kathleen M. Carbary & Michael K. Tanenhaus (2010). “Some,” and Possibly All, Scalar Inferences Are Not Delayed: Evidence for Immediate Pragmatic Enrichment. Cognition 116 (1):42-55.score: 240.0
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  37. Peter Klein (2008). El conocimiento humano Y el progreso Infinito Del razonamiento. Signos Filosóficos 10 (19):175-204.score: 240.0
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  38. Natalie M. Klein, Whitney M. Gegg-Harrison, Greg N. Carlson & Michael K. Tanenhaus (2013). Experimental Investigations of Weak Definite and Weak Indefinite Noun Phrases. Cognition 128 (2):187-213.score: 240.0
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  39. Jonathan Harrison, Jennifer Trusted, Alan White, Douglas Odegard, Peter Klein, Robert Shope & Marshall Swain (1985). Recent Work in EpistemologyAn Introduction to the Philosophy of Knowledge.The Nature of Knowledge.Knowledge and Scepticism.Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism.The Analysis of Knowing. A Decade of Research.Reason and Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 35 (138):95.score: 240.0
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  40. Peter D. Klein (1982). Reply to Professor Odegard. Philosophical Books 23 (4):409-19.score: 240.0
  41. Peter Klein (2004). ``Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge&Quot;. Philosophical Issues 14:165--184.score: 240.0
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  42. E. Klein, J. Bahnmueller, A. Mann, S. Pixner, L. Kaufmann, H.-C. Nuerk & K. Moeller (2013). Language Influences on Numerical Development-Inversion Effects on Multi-Digit Number Processing. Frontiers in Psychology 4 (August).score: 240.0
    In early numerical development, children have to become familiar with the Arabic number system and its place-value structure. The present review summarizes and discusses evidence for language influences on the acquisition of the highly transparent structuring principles of digital-Arabic digits by means of its moderation through the transparency of the respective language's number word system. In particular, the so-called inversion property (i.e., 24 named as "four and twenty" instead of "twenty four") was found to influence number processing in children not (...)
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  43. Peter D. Klein (1986). Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.score: 240.0
  44. Peter D. Klein (1976). Review of Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Philosophical Review, 85.2 1976, 225-227. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 82 (5):225-227.score: 240.0
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  45. D. Pimentel, C. Fried, L. Olson, S. Schmidt, K. Wagner-Johnson, A. Westman, A. Whelan, K. Foglia, P. Poole, T. Klein, R. Sobin & A. Bochner (1984). Environmental and Social Costs of Biomass Energy. BioScience 34 (2):89-94.score: 240.0
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  46. C. K. Jansen, B. Bonke, J. Theodore Klein & J. Bezstarosti (1990). Unconscious Perception During Balanced Anesthesia? In B. Bonke, W. Fitch, K. Millar & 1990 Unconscious perception during balanced anesthesia? (eds.), Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia. Swets & Zeitlinger.score: 240.0
  47. Peter D. Klein (2004). Ascent and Assent? In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics.score: 240.0
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  48. Peter D. Klein (1992, 2010). Certainty. In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companion to Epitemology. Blackwell.score: 240.0
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  49. Peter D. Klein (1995). Closure. In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.score: 240.0
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  50. Peter D. Klein (1998). Certainty. In Craig Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.score: 240.0
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