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Profile: Peter Klein (Rutgers University - New Brunswick)
  1.  378 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1999). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
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  2.  296 DLs
    Peter Klein (2007). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
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  3.  284 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1971). A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
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  4.  176 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2004). What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.
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  5.  168 DLs
    Peter Klein (1995). ``Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails". Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213--236.
  6.  134 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2000). Why Not Infinitism? Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  7.  121 DLs
    Peter Klein (2007). How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
  8.  116 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1981). Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism. University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  9.  107 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1976). Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility. Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
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  10.  82 DLs
    Peter Klein (2003). When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
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  11.  79 DLs
    Peter Klein (2004). Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165–184.
  12.  78 DLs
    Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1996). No Help for the Coherentist. Analysis 56 (2):118–121.
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  13.  57 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. De Gruyter
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  14.  57 DLs
    Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1994). What Price Coherence? Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
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  15.  56 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1979). Misleading "Misleading Defeaters". Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
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  16.  54 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1969). The Private Language Argument and the Sense-Datum Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.
  17.  54 DLs
    Peter Klein (1998). Review: Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919 - 925.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  18.  53 DLs
    Peter K. Klein (1998). Insanity and the Sublime: Aesthetics and Theories of Mental Illness in Goya's Yard with Lunatics and Related Works. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 61:198-252.
  19.  50 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2000). Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism. Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.
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  20.  47 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1983). Real Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
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  21.  43 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1980). Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification. Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
  22.  40 DLs
    Peter D. Klein & John Turri, Infinitism in Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Infinitism in Epistemology This article provides an overview of infinitism in epistemology. Infinitism is a family of views in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. It contrasts naturally with coherentism and foundationalism. All three views agree that knowledge or justification requires an appropriately structured chain of reasons. What form may such a […].
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  23.  31 DLs
    Peter Klein (1985). The Virtues of Inconsistency. The Monist 68 (1):105-135.
    I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets.
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  24.  27 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):153-172.
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
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  25.  18 DLs
    Peter Klein (1986). Immune Belief Systems. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
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  26.  16 DLs
    Peter Klein (2010). Skepticism and Closure. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.
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  27.  15 DLs
    Peter Klein (1969). “Are Strawson's Persons Immortal?” A Reply. Philosophical Studies 20 (5):65 - 70.
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  28.  13 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2003). Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer 281--297.
  29.  13 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2011). Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer
  30.  12 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1969). Theprivate Language Argument Andthesense-Datum Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.
  31.  5 DLs
    Peter Klein (2008). El conocimiento humano Y el progreso Infinito Del razonamiento. Signos Filosóficos 10 (19):175-204.
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  32.  5 DLs
    Jonathan Harrison, Jennifer Trusted, Alan White, Douglas Odegard, Peter Klein, Robert Shope & Marshall Swain (1985). Recent Work in EpistemologyAn Introduction to the Philosophy of Knowledge.The Nature of Knowledge.Knowledge and Scepticism.Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism.The Analysis of Knowing. A Decade of Research.Reason and Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 35 (138):95.
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  33.  3 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2003). How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism. In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press 75--94.
     
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  34.  3 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1982). Reply to Professor Odegard. Philosophical Books 23 (4):409-19.
  35.  3 DLs
    Peter Klein (2000). El contextualismo y la verdadera naturaleza del escepticismo académico. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):127-140.
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  36.  1 DLs
    Peter Klein (2008). Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press
  37.  1 DLs
    John Turri & Peter D. Klein (eds.) (2014). Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism. OUP Oxford.
    This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs--an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning, responsibility, disagreement, and trust.
     
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  38.  1 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2005). Reply to Ginet. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell
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  39.  1 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1976). Review of Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Philosophical Review, 85.2 1976, 225-227. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 82 (5):225-227.
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  40.  1 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1986). Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell
  41.  1 DLs
    Peter Klein (2004). ``Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge". Philosophical Issues 14:165--184.
  42.  0 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell
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  43.  0 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge
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  44.  0 DLs
    Peter Klein (2008). Useful Falsehoods. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. OUP Oxford
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  45.  0 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2000). The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism. Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
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  46.  0 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (2008). Useful False Beliefs. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press 25--63.
  47.  0 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1992, 2010). Scepticism. In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companiion to Epistemology.
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  48.  0 DLs
    Peter W. Klein (1991). Evaluation of Wastepaper Recycling.
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  49.  0 DLs
    Nicolai Foss & Peter Klein (2009). Austrian Economics and the Transaction Cost Approach to the Firm. Libertarian Papers 1.
    As the transaction cost theory of the firm was taking shape in the 1970s, another important movement in economics was emerging: a revival of the ‘Austrian’ tradition in economic theory associated with such economists as Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek . As Oliver Williamson has pointed out, Austrian economics is among the diverse sources for transaction cost economics. In particular, Williamson frequently cites Hayek , particularly Hayek’s emphasis on adaptation as a key problem of economic organisation . Following (...)
     
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  50.  0 DLs
    Peter D. Klein (1995). Closure. In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press
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