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Profile: Peter Klein (Rutgers University)
  1. Peter Klein & John Turri (forthcoming). Infinitism. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
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  2. John Turri & Peter D. Klein (eds.) (2014). Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism. Oup Oxford.
    This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs--an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning, responsibility, disagreement, and trust.
     
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  3. Peter D. Klein & John Turri, Infinitism in Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Infinitism in Epistemology This article provides an overview of infinitism in epistemology. Infinitism is a family of views in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. It contrasts naturally with coherentism and foundationalism. All three views agree that knowledge or justification requires an appropriately structured chain of reasons. What form may such a […].
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  4. Peter D. Klein (2011). Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
  5. Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
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  6. Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. de Gruyter.
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  7. Peter Klein (2010). Skepticism and Closure. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.
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  8. Peter D. Klein, Self-Profile. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology.
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  9. Peter Klein (2008). Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
  10. Peter Klein (2008). El conocimiento humano Y el progreso Infinito Del razonamiento. Signos Filosóficos 10 (19):175-204.
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  11. Peter Klein (2008). Useful Falsehoods. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oup Oxford.
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  12. Peter Klein (2008). ``Useful False Beliefs&Quot. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. 25-63.
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  13. Peter D. Klein (2008). Useful False Beliefs. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 25--63.
  14. Peter Klein (2007). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
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  15. Peter Klein (2007). How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
  16. Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  17. Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism. Veritas 50 (4).
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
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  18. Peter D. Klein (2005). Reply to Ginet. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  19. Peter Klein (2004). Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165–184.
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  20. Peter Klein (2004). ``Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge&Quot;. Philosophical Issues 14:165--184.
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  21. Peter D. Klein (2004). Ascent and Assent? In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics.
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  22. Peter D. Klein (2004). There is NO Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic. In Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge. Longman.
  23. Peter D. Klein (2004). What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.
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  24. Peter Klein (2003). 30. There is No Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic. In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. 299.
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  25. Peter Klein (2003). When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
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  26. Peter D. Klein (2003). Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer. 281--297.
  27. Peter D. Klein (2003). How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism. In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press. 75--94.
     
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  28. Peter D. Klein (2003). Knowledge is True, Non-Defeated Justified Belief. In Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge. :ongman.
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  29. Wang Yanfeng, Jean‐Pierre Saint‐Jeannet & Peter S. Klein (2003). Wnt–Frizzled Signaling in the Induction and Differentiation of the Neural Crest. Bioessays 25 (4):317-325.
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  30. Peter Klein (2002). 1, Two Basic Forms of Philosophical Skepticism. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 336.
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  31. Peter Klein (2000). El contextualismo y la verdadera naturaleza del escepticismo académico. Teorema 19 (3):127-140.
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  32. Peter D. Klein (2000). The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism. Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
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  33. Peter D. Klein (2000). Why Not Infinitism? Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  34. Peter D. Klein (2000). Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism. Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.
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  35. Peter D. Klein (1999). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
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  36. Peter Klein (1998). Review: Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919 - 925.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  37. Peter D. Klein (1998). Certainty. In Craig Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
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  38. Peter D. Klein (1998). Epistemology. In Craig Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998.
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  39. Peter K. Klein (1998). Insanity and the Sublime: Aesthetics and Theories of Mental Illness in Goya's Yard with Lunatics and Related Works. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 61:198-252.
  40. Peter D. Klein (1996). Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility. In Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  41. Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1996). No Help for the Coherentist. Analysis 56 (2):118–121.
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  42. Peter Klein (1995). ``Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails&Quot;. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213--236.
  43. Peter D. Klein (1995). Closure. In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
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  44. Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1994). What Price Coherence? Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
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  45. Peter D. Klein (1992, 2010). Certainty. In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companion to Epitemology. Blackwell.
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  46. Peter D. Klein (1992, 2010). Contemporary Scepticism. In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companion ti Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  47. Peter D. Klein (1992, 2010). Scepticism. In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companiion to Epistemology.
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  48. Peter D. Klein (1990). Epistemic Compatibilism and Cannonical Beliefs. In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Kluwer.
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  49. Peter D. Klein (1987). On Behalf of the Skeptic. In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  50. Peter Klein (1986). Immune Belief Systems. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
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