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Profile: Peter Klein (Rutgers University - New Brunswick)
  1. Peter D. Klein (2008). Useful False Beliefs. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press 25--63.
  2. Peter D. Klein (1999). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
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  3. Peter Klein (2007). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
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  4. Peter Klein (1995). ``Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails". Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213--236.
  5. Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1994). What Price Coherence? Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
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  6. Peter D. Klein (2005). Reply to Ginet. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell
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  7. Peter D. Klein (1981). Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism. University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  8. Peter D. Klein (1971). A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
  9. Peter Klein (2003). When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
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  10. Peter D. Klein (2004). What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.
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  11. Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. De Gruyter 487-508.
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  12.  70
    Peter Klein (1998). Review: Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919 - 925.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  13. Peter Klein (2007). How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
  14. Peter D. Klein (2000). Why Not Infinitism? Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  15. Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1996). No Help for the Coherentist. Analysis 56 (2):118–121.
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  16.  89
    Peter Klein (2004). Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165–184.
  17. Peter D. Klein (1976). Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility. Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
  18.  51
    Peter Klein (1985). The Virtues of Inconsistency. The Monist 68 (1):105-135.
    I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets.
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  19.  8
    Peter Klein & John Turri, Infinitism. Oxford Bibliographies.
    Infinitism, along with foundationalism and coherentism, is a logically possible solution to the epistemic regress problem. But unlike the other two views, infinitism has only been developed and defended as a plausible solution since the late 1990’s. Infinitists grant that although there is an ending point of any actual chain of cited reasons for a belief, no belief (including the last one cited) is fully justified until a reason for it is provided. In addition to differing with foundationalism about the (...)
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  20. Peter D. Klein (2003). How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism. In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press 75--94.
     
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  21.  39
    Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):153-172.
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
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  22. Peter Klein (2008). Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press
    This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides a brief evaluation of foundationalism, emergent coherentism, and infinitism.
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  23. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Laurence Bonjour, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, Peter Klein, Jonathan Kvanvig, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Peter Markie, George Pappas, Alvin Plantinga, Ernest Sosa, Marshall Swain & Bas van Fraassen (1996). Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    In his widely influential two-volume work, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga argued that warrant is that which explains the difference between knowledge and true belief. Plantinga not only developed his own account of warrant but also mapped the terrain of epistemology. Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a (...)
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  24.  53
    Peter D. Klein (2000). Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism. Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.
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  25. Peter D. Klein (1992, 2010). Certainty. In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companion to Epitemology. Blackwell
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  26.  57
    Peter D. Klein (1980). Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification. Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
  27. Peter D. Klein (2000). The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism. Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
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  28. Peter Klein (2008). ``Useful False Beliefs&Quot. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press 25-63.
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  29.  56
    Peter D. Klein & John Turri, Infinitism in Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Infinitism in Epistemology This article provides an overview of infinitism in epistemology. Infinitism is a family of views in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. It contrasts naturally with coherentism and foundationalism. All three views agree that knowledge or justification requires an appropriately structured chain of reasons. What form may such a […].
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  30.  71
    Peter D. Klein (1979). Misleading "Misleading Defeaters". Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
  31.  21
    Peter Klein (2010). Skepticism and Closure. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.
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  32.  25
    Peter Klein (1986). Immune Belief Systems. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
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  33. Peter D. Klein (2004). Ascent and Assent? In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics.
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  34.  28
    Peter D. Klein (2011). Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer
  35.  62
    Peter D. Klein (1983). Real Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
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  36. Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge 245-256.
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  37. Peter Klein (2004). ``Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge". Philosophical Issues 14:165--184.
  38.  2
    Peter D. Klein (2000). Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism. Philosophical Issues 10 (1):108-116.
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  39. Peter D. Klein (1998). Epistemology. In Craig Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998
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  40. Peter D. Klein (1986). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  41. Peter D. Klein (2004). There is NO Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic. In Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge. Longman
  42.  65
    Peter D. Klein (1969). The Private Language Argument and the Sense-Datum Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.
  43.  60
    Peter K. Klein (1998). Insanity and the Sublime: Aesthetics and Theories of Mental Illness in Goya's Yard with Lunatics and Related Works. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 61:198-252.
  44.  20
    Peter D. Klein (2003). Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer 281--297.
  45. Peter Klein (2008). Useful Falsehoods. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. OUP Oxford
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  46.  3
    Peter Klein (2002). 1, Two Basic Forms of Philosophical Skepticism. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press 336.
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  47. Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell
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  48.  9
    Peter D. Klein (1982). Reply to Professor Odegard. Philosophical Books 23 (4):409-19.
  49.  8
    Peter Klein (2008). El conocimiento humano Y el progreso Infinito Del razonamiento. Signos Filosóficos 10 (19):175-204.
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  50. Peter D. Klein (1998). Certainty. In Craig Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge
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