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Profile: Peter Kugel (Boston College)
  1. Peter Kugel (2004). The Chinese Room is a Trick. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):153-154.
    To convince us that computers cannot have mental states, Searle (1980) imagines a “Chinese room” that simulates a computer that “speaks” Chinese and asks us to find the understanding in the room. It's a trick. There is no understanding in the room, not because computers can't have it, but because the room's computer-simulation is defective. Fix it and understanding appears. Abracadabra!
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  2. Peter Kugel (2002). Computing Machines Can't Be Intelligent (...And Turing Said So). Minds and Machines 12 (4):563-579.
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  3. Peter Kugel (1996). Implicit Learning From a Computer-Science Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):556-557.
    Shanks and St. John (1994a) suggest that From the viewpoint of a computer scientist who tries to construct learning systems, that claim seems rather implausible. In this commentary I wish to suggest why, in the hopes of shedding light on the relationship between consciousness and learning.
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  4. Peter Kugel (1986). Thinking May Be More Than Computing. Cognition 22 (2):137-198.
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  5. Peter Kugel (1986). When is a Computer Not a Computer? Cognition 23 (1):89-94.
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