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  1. Amy Kind & Peter Kung (eds.) (forthcoming). Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press.
  2. Peter Kung (2014). You Really Do Imagine It: Against Error Theories of Imagination. Noûs 49 (1):n/a-n/a.
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  3. Peter Kung (2012). Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):806-809.
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  4. Peter Kung (2011). On the Possibility of Skeptical Scenarios. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):387-407.
    Abstract: It is generally accepted that skeptical scenarios must be possible to raise legitimate skeptical doubt. I argue that if the possibility in question is supposed to be genuine metaphysical possibility, the skeptic's reasoning does not straightforwardly succeed. I first motivate the metaphysical possibility requirement on skeptical scenarios: it's a plausible position that several authors accept and that a family of prominent views—sensitivity, safety, relevant alternatives—are committed to. I argue that plausible constraints in modal epistemology show that justification for believing (...)
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  5. Peter Kung (2010). Imagining as a Guide to Possibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
  6. Peter Kung (2010). On Having No Reason: Dogmatism and Bayesian Confirmation. Synthese 177 (1):1 - 17.
    Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes' and Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you're unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences based (...)
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  7. Peter Kung & Masahiro Yamada (2010). A Neglected Way of Begging the Question. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):287.
    Some arguments beg the question. Question-begging arguments are bad arguments and cannot increase the level of justification one has for the conclusion. Question-begging arguments, unlike some other bad arguments, need not suffer the problem of having unjustified premises. Even if the premises are justified and even if the premises entail the conclusion, a question-begging argument fails to have any force when it comes to increasing one's justification for the conclusion. For example, many regard Moore's famous response to skepticism as a (...)
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  8. Peter Kung, Imaginability as a Guide to Possibility.
  9. Peter Kung, Imaginability as a Guide to Possibility, Part II.
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  10. Peter Kung (2002). Imagination and Modal Epistemology. Dissertation, New York University
    It seems undeniable that we have many items of modal knowledge. Tradition has it that conceivability is the evidence for possibility that gets us to this modal knowledge. But "conceive" cannot mean think, understand, entertain, suppose, or find believable, because none of these are suited to serve as evidence for possibility, and if it is none of these, it is mysterious what conceivability is, and why it is evidence for possibility. I argue that sensory imagination is the most promising candidate (...)
     
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