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  1. Peter M. Simons (2009). Leśniewski's Logic. In Dov Gabbay (ed.), The Handbook of the History of Logic. Elsevier. 5--305.
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  2. Kevin Mulligan, Peter M. Simons & Barry Smith (2007). Truth-Makers. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. 18--9.
    Reprint of paper first published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 1984.
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  3. Peter M. Simons (2004). Judging Correctly: Brentano and the Reform of Elementary Logic. In Dale Jacquette (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge University Press. 45--65.
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  4. Uwe Meixner & Peter M. Simons (eds.) (1999). Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age: Papers of the 22st [Sic] International Wittgenstein Symposium, August 15-21, 1999, Kirchberg Am Wechsel. [REVIEW] Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
  5. Peter M. Simons (1999). Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian Realists. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), German Philosophy since Kant. Cambridge University Press. 109-136.
    Although Brentano generally regarded himself as at heart a metaphysician, his work then and subsequently has always been dominated by the Psychology. He is rightly celebrated as the person who reintroduced the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of intentio back into the study of the mind. Brentano's inspiration was Aristotle's theory of perception in De anima, though his terminology of intentional inexistence was medieval. For the history of the work and its position in his output may I refer to my Introduction to the (...)
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  6. Peter M. Simons (1999). Does the Sun Exist? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:89-97.
    Here is a dilemma. By robust common sense, the sun exists. Yet the sun is a vague object, lacking exact identity conditions, and therefore by widely accepted standards of objecthood does not exist. What goes for it goes for almost all other material things. Standard solutions to the problem of vagueness for predicates fall flat for vague objects. This paper attempts a theory which accounts for our common beliefs about vague objects by taking them as well-founded phenomena, founded on collections (...)
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  7. Peter M. Simons (1998). Farewell to Substance: A Differentiated Leave-Taking. Ratio 11 (3):235–252.
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  8. Peter M. Simons (1997). Un mondo senza stati di cose. Discipline Filosofiche 7:29-48.
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  9. Peter M. Simons (1995). Mind and Opacity. Dialectica 49 (2-4):131-46.
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  10. Peter M. Simons (1994). Meinong's Contribution to the Development of Non-Classical Logic. Conceptus 28 (71):187-202.
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  11. Peter M. Simons (1991). Free Part-Whole Theory. In Karel Lambert (ed.), Philosophical Applications of Free Logic. Oxford University Press. 285--306.
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  12. Peter M. Simons (1991). Inadequacies of Intension and Extension. In Georg Schurz (ed.), Advances in Scientific Philosophy. 24--393.
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  13. Peter M. Simons (1989). Tree Proofs for Syllogistic. Studia Logica 48 (4):539 - 554.
    This paper presents a tree method for testing the validity of inferences, including syllogisms, in a simple term logic. The method is given in the form of an algorithm and is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the obvious denotational semantics. The primitive logical constants of the system, which is indebted to the logical works of Jevons, Brentano and Lewis Carroll, are term negation, polyadic term conjunction, and functors affirming and denying existence, and use is also made (...)
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  14. Peter M. Simons & Jan Wolenski (1989). De Veritate: Austro-Polish Contributions to the Theory of Truth From Brentano to Tarski. In Klemens Szaniawski (ed.), The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School. Dordrecht.
  15. Peter M. Simons (1988). Functional Operations in Frege'sbegriffsschrift. History and Philosophy of Logic 9 (1):35-42.
    Frege uses Greek letters in two different ways in his Begriffsschrift. One way is the familiar use of bound variables, in conjunction with variable-binding operators, to mark and close argument-places. The other, which is quite unfamiliar, employs letters to mark places for operators to reach into, without thereby closing these places. Frege thereby invents a powerful and compact notation for functional operations which can be recommended even today. His regrettable double use of Greek letters obscured his invention, and this, together (...)
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  16. Peter M. Simons (1988). Brentano's Theory of Categories: A Critical Reappraisal. Brentano Studien 1:47-61.
    In his doctoral dissertation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles Brentano tried to show that (against criticism of this) one could indeed give a principle defense of Aristotle's table of categories as a coherent system. In later texts Brentano appears sharply critical of Aristotle, mainly in respect to Aristotle's mereology, or theory of part and whole, and to his theory of substance and accident. It is argued that Brentano hadn't observed that Aristotle's belief that there are as many (...)
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  17. Peter M. Simons (1988). Gestalt and Functional Dependence. In Barry Smith (ed.), Foundations of Gestalt Theory. Philosophia. 158--190.
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  18. Peter M. Simons (1987). Frege's Theory of Real Numbers. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (1):25--44.
    Frege's theory of real numbers has undeservedly received almost no attention, in part because what we have is only a fragment. Yet his theory is interesting for the light it throws on logicism, and it is quite different from standard modern approaches. Frege polemicizes vigorously against his contemporaries, sketches the main features of his own radical alternative, and begins the formal development. This paper summarizes and expounds what he has to say, and goes on to reconstruct the most important steps (...)
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  19. Peter M. Simons (1987). Brentano's Reform of Logic. Topoi 6 (1):25-38.
  20. Peter M. Simons (1987/2000). Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    Although the relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is, this is the first full-length study of this key concept. Showing that mereology, or the formal theory of part and whole, is essential to ontology, Simons surveys and critiques previous theories--especially the standard extensional view--and proposes a new account that encompasses both temporal and modal considerations. Simons's revised theory not only allows him to offer fresh solutions to long-standing problems, but also has far-reaching consequences for (...)
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  21. Peter M. Simons (1986). Unkindly Coincidences. Mind 95 (380):506-509.
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  22. Werner Loh, Paul K. Moser, Peter M. Simons, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Franz Wimmer & Boguslaw Wolniewfcz (1985). Die verfasser der beiträge. Conceptus 19.
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  23. Peter M. Simons (1985). Coincidence of Things of a Kind. Mind 94 (373):70-75.
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  24. Peter M. Simons (1985). Multicategorial Ontology and Logicism. Conceptus 19:87-99.
    This paper discusses the philosophical background to the paper by lejewski in this issue. lejewski offers an ontologically neutral logic for the first two types (individuals and classes thereof). some peculiarities of the logic used are noted, in particular the distinction between empty individual terms, empty class terms, and non-empty class terms designating the empty class. lejewski ends by denying the truth of the formula meaning "there are classes," but we argue that the way in which truth-conditions for formulae containing (...)
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  25. Peter M. Simons & J. N. Mohanty (1984). Husserl and Frege. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):420.
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  26. Peter M. Simons (1983). Class, Mass and Mereology. History and Philosophy of Logic 4 (1-2):157-180.
    LeSniewski?s systems of Ontology and Mereology, considered from a purely formal point of view, possessstriking algebraic parallels, ascan be seen in their respective relations to Boolean algebra. But there are alsoimportant divergences, above all that general Mereology is silent, where Ontology is not, on the existenceof ?atoms? (individuals). By employing plural terms, LeSniewski sought to accommodate talk of (distributive)classes, without according these an autonomous ontological status. His logic also ? like predicate logic? has no place for mass predication in its (...)
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  27. Peter M. Simons (1982). On Understanding Leśniewski. History and Philosophy of Logic 3 (2):165-191.
    This paper assesses those features of Lesniewski's Ontology which make it difficult to understand for logicians accustomed to more orthodox systems of logic. It is seen that certain general features of presentation and content can, by selective acceptance or modification, be accommodated with a fairly orthodox viewpoint. The chief difficulty lies in the interpretation of Le?niewski's names, and the constant ???. Four interpretations are suggested in turn: Le?niewski's names as monadic predicates; as class terms; as common nouns; and as empty, (...)
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  28. Peter M. Simons (1982). Against the Aggregate Theory of Number. Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):163-167.
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  29. Peter M. Simons (1982). Token Resistance. Analysis 42 (4):195 - 203.
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  30. Peter M. Simons, Paul Thom & Michael Clark (1982). The Syllogism.The Place of Syllogistic in Logical Theory. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127):175.
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  31. Peter M. Simons (1981). Brand on Event Identity. Analysis 41 (4):195 - 198.
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  32. Peter M. Simons (1981). Sameness and Substance. Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:176-182.
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  33. Peter M. Simons (1981). Unsaturatedness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:73-95.
    Frege's obscure key concept of the unsaturatedness of functions is clarified with the help of the concepts of dependent and independent parts and foundation relations used by Husserl in describing the ontology of complex wholes. Sentential unity in Frege, Husserl and Wittgenstein: all have a similar explanation. As applied to linguistic expressions, the terms 'unsaturated' and 'incomplete' are ambiguous: they may mean the ontological property of Unselbständigkeit, inability to exist alone, or the property of being what categorial grammar calls a (...)
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  34. Peter M. Simons (1978). Logic and Common Nouns. Analysis 38 (4):161 - 167.
    Common nouns enter into modern predicate logic only as parts of predicates, While in lesniewski's 'ontology' they are classified together with proper nouns as 'names'. A system of natural deduction rules is presented which sharply separates proper from common nouns, Within which lesniewski's calculus is contained as a logic solely of common nouns, Together with copula, Identity predicate, Definite article, And quantifiers 'any', 'every', 'some' and 'no'. The fragment developed is closer to the natural syntax of english than either frege's (...)
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  35. Peter M. Simons (1978). Lewy on C. I. Lewis and Entailment. Analysis 38 (3):126 - 129.
    In "meaning and modality" lewy claims the only ground for rejecting disjunctive syllogism as acceptable for entailment is rejection of bivalence. Examining lewis's 'proofs' of the paradoxes of strict implication he suggests the proof of 'if a then (b or not-B)' suppresses a premiss, Restoration of which blocks the paradox, Whereas the proof of 'if (a and not-A) then b' cannot be so blocked. But the paradoxes are dual, So he should have treated them dually by restoring a suppressed disjunct (...)
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  36. Peter M. Simons (1975). Rescher on Nomic Necessity. Philosophical Studies 28 (3):227 - 228.
    (2) All X’s have to be Y’s is to be brought out by glossing the latter as a stronger, nomological generalization involving counterfactural claims, thus: (3) All X’s are Y’s and further if any z that is not an X were an X, then z would be a Y. Professor Rescher points out that while (1) is equivalent to its contrapositive..
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