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Profile: Peter Murphy (University of Indianapolis)
  1. Peter Murphy (2005). Introduction. Thesis Eleven 81 (1):3-4.
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  2. Peter Murphy & David Roberts (1999). Introduction. Thesis Eleven 56 (1):3-4.
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  3. Peter Murphy (1989). Review Articles : Between Romanticism and Republicanism: The Political Theory of Claude Lefort. Thesis Eleven 23 (1):131-142.
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  4. Peter Murphy (1995). The Birth of Humanism. Thesis Eleven 40 (1):44-67.
  5. Peter Murphy (2006). Book Review: Cytherica: Aesthetic-Political Essays in an Aphrodisian Key. [REVIEW] Thesis Eleven 87 (1):139-143.
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  6.  81
    Peter Murphy (1990). Reviews : John Keane (Ed.), Civil Society and the State (Verso, 1988); Democracy and Civil Society (Verso, 1988). Thesis Eleven 26 (1):160-167.
    Reviews : John Keane , Civil Society and the State ; Democracy and Civil Society.
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  7.  88
    Johann P. Arnason, Trevor Hogan & Peter Murphy (2003). Introduction. Thesis Eleven 72 (1):5-7.
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  8.  95
    Tim Black & Peter Murphy (2007). In Defense of Sensitivity. Synthese 154 (1):53 - 71.
    The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a (...)
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  9.  58
    Peter Murphy (1990). Socialism and Democracy. Thesis Eleven 26 (1):54-77.
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  10. Peter Murphy (2006). Introduction. Thesis Eleven 85 (1):3-5.
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  11.  62
    Anders Michelsen & Peter Murphy (2007). Introduction. Thesis Eleven 88 (1):5-7.
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  12.  74
    Peter Murphy (1994). Review Articles : The Dark Knight of Faith and the Epicurean Hero. Thesis Eleven 39 (1):105-118.
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  13. Peter Murphy (2003). Agnes Heller'S Great Society. Thesis Eleven 75 (1):96-107.
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  14. Peter Murphy (2005). The Book of the Dead: A Response to Johann Arnason. Thesis Eleven 80 (1):114-116.
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  15. Peter Murphy (1991). To Create Anew the Universe: Political Romanticism and the Promethean Vision of Roberto Unger. Thesis Eleven 28 (1):113-126.
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  16. Michael Crozier, Peter Murphy & Peter Beilharz (1996). Introduction. Thesis Eleven 46 (1):3-3.
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  17.  86
    Peter Murphy (1987). Freedon and Happiness: The Pathos of Modernity in Agnes Heller. Thesis Eleven 16 (1):40-55.
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  18.  4
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  19.  94
    Peter Murphy (1997). Introduction. Thesis Eleven 48 (1):v-vii.
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  20.  43
    Peter Murphy (1990). Radicalism And The Spheres Of Value. Thesis Eleven 25 (1):39-58.
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  21.  18
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  22.  33
    Peter Murphy (1996). Peregrini. Thesis Eleven 46 (1):1-32.
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  23.  53
    Peter Murphy (1991). Postmodern Perspectives and Justice. Thesis Eleven 30 (1):117-132.
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  24.  66
    Peter Murphy (1993). Romantic Modernism and the Greek Polis. Thesis Eleven 34 (1):42-66.
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  25.  56
    Peter Murphy (2006). American Civilization. Thesis Eleven 85 (1):64-92.
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  26.  61
    Peter Murphy (2006). A Strategy for Assessing Closure. Erkenntnis 65 (3):365-383.
    This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument for (...)
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  27.  2
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  28.  2
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  29.  2
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  30.  2
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  31.  2
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  32.  4
    Peter Murphy (forthcoming). Skeptical Effectiveness: A Reply to Buford and Brueckner. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 7 In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony Brueckner have replied to my objection. Here I review my original argument, criticize their replies, and highlight two important issues for further investigation.
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  33.  72
    Peter Murphy (2005). Closure Failures for Safety. Philosophia 33 (1-4):331-334.
    Ernest Sosa and others have proposed a safety condition on knowledge: If S knows p, then in the nearest (non-actual) worlds in which S believes p, p is true.1 Colloquially, this is the idea that knowing requires not being easily mistaken. Here, I will argue that like another condition requiring a counterfactual relation between a subject’s belief and the world, viz. Robert Nozick’s sensitivity condition, safety leads, in certain cases, to the unacceptable result that knowledge is not closed under known (...)
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  34.  6
    Peter Murphy (forthcoming). Skeptical Effectiveness: A Reply to Buford and Brueckner. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 7 In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony Brueckner have replied to my objection. Here I review my original argument, criticize their replies, and highlight two important issues for further investigation.
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  35.  88
    Peter Murphy (2008). Rewriting the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:279-284.
    The traditional way of drawing the a priori/a posteriori distinction, bequeathed to us by Kant, leads to overestimating the role that experience plays in justifying ourbeliefs. There is an irony in this: though Kant was in the rationalist camp, his way of drawing the distinction gives an unfair advantage to radical empiricism. I offer an alternative way of drawing the distinction, one that does not bias the rationalist/empiricist debate.
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  36.  42
    Peter Murphy (2006). A Strategy for Assessing Closure. Erkenntnis 65 (3):365 - 383.
    This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument (...)
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  37.  87
    Peter Murphy, Coherentism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Coherentism is a theory of epistemic justification. It implies that for a belief to be justified it must belong to a coherent system of beliefs. For a system of beliefs to be coherent, the beliefs that make up that system must “cohere” with one another. Typically, this coherence is taken to involve three components: logical consistency, explanatory relations, and various inductive (non-explanatory) relations. Rival versions of coherentism spell out these relations in different ways. They also differ on the exact role (...)
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  38.  1
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  39.  1
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  40.  1
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  41.  1
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  42.  1
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  43.  1
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  44.  1
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  45.  1
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  46.  1
    Peter Murphy (2015). Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  47.  24
    Peter Murphy (2011). Painting's Double: Andrew Benjamin's Disclosing Spaces. Thesis Eleven 104 (1):108-113.
    Andrew Benjamin’s book Disclosing Spaces (2004) presents a theory of painting. The theory is developed via a meticulous analysis of a series of individual artworks. The pivot of Benjamin’s theory of painting is the idea of relationality. The theory is critically reviewed with reference to the works of Edward Hopper, Gerhard Richter and Jacques-Louis David.
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  48.  22
    Peter Murphy & Trevor Hogan (2012). Discordant Order: Manila's Neo-Patrimonial Urbanism. Thesis Eleven 112 (1):10-34.
    Manila is one of the world’s most fragmented, privatized and un-public of cities. Why is this so? This paper contemplates the seemingly immutable privacy of the city of Manila, and the paradoxical character of its publicity. Manila is our prime exemplar of the 21st-century mega-city whose apparent disorder discloses a coherent order which we here call ‘neo-patrimonial urbanism’. Manila is a city where poor and rich alike have their own government, infrastructure, and armies, the shopping malls are the simulacra of (...)
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  49.  12
    Peter Murphy (2011). Combination, Collaboration and Creation: The Case of Jasper Johns. Colloquy 22:130-138.
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  50.  5
    Peter Murphy (forthcoming). Skeptical Effectiveness: A Reply to Buford and Brueckner. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 7 In an earlier paper, I presented a novel objection to closure-based skeptical arguments. There I argued that the best account of what makes skeptical scenarios effective cripples the closure-based skeptical arguments that use those scenarios. On behalf of the skeptic, Christopher Buford and Anthony Brueckner have replied to my objection. Here I review my original argument, criticize their replies, and highlight two important issues for further investigation.
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