11 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Peter Schulte (Universität Bielefeld)
  1. Peter Schulte (forthcoming). Perceptual Representations: A Teleosemantic Answer to the Breadth-of-Application Problem. Biology and Philosophy:1-18.
    Teleosemantic theories of representation are often criticized as being “too liberal”, i.e. as categorizing states as representations which are not representational at all. Recently, a powerful version of this objection has been put forth by Tyler Burge. Focusing on perception, Burge defends the claim that all teleosemantic theories apply too broadly, thereby missing what is distinctive about representation. Contra Burge, I will argue in this paper that there is a teleosemantic account of perceptual states that does not fall prey to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Frank Hofmann & Peter Schulte (2014). The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation? Acta Analytica 29 (3):267-284.
    Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out to be markedly different from Dretske’s meaning (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Peter Schulte (2014). Beyond Verbal Disputes: The Compatibilism Debate Revisited. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 79 (3):669-685.
    The compatibilism debate revolves around the question whether moral responsibility and free will are compatible with determinism. Prima facie, this seems to be a substantial issue. But according to the triviality objection, the disagreement is merely verbal: compatibilists and incompatibilists, it is maintained, are talking past each other, since they use the terms “free will” and “moral responsibility” in different senses. In this paper I argue, first, that the triviality objection is indeed a formidable one and that the standard replies (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Peter Schulte (2014). Can Truthmaker Theorists Claim Ontological Free Lunches? European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):249-268.
    Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher-level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower-level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher-level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. Some (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Peter Schulte (2012). How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan's Teleosemantics to the Test. Philosophia 40 (3):483-496.
    How do frogs represent their prey? This question has been the focus of many debates among proponents of naturalistic theories of content, especially among proponents of teleosemantics. This is because alternative versions of the teleosemantic approach have different implications for the content of frog representations, and it is still controversial which of these content ascriptions (if any) is the most adequate. Theorists often appeal to intuitions here, but this is a dubious strategy. In this paper, I suggest an alternative, empirical (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Peter Schulte (2012). The Difference Between Moral and Rational “Oughts”: An Expressivist Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):159-174.
    Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim “you ought to help others” is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the rational maxim “you ought to brush your teeth twice a day”. But it seems that there is a crucial difference these two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I argue that this difference is to be understood as a difference between two kinds of normativity: demanding and recommending normativity. But the crucial task is, of course, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Peter Schulte (2012). Worum geht es in der Kompatibilismusdebatte? Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 66 (2):310-334.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Peter Schulte (2011). Truthmakers: A Tale of Two Explanatory Projects. Synthese 181 (3):413-431.
    Truthmakers are supposed to explain the truth of propositions, but it is unclear what kind of explanation truthmakers can provide. In this paper, I argue that ‘truthmaker explanations’ conflate two different explanatory projects. The first project is essentially concerned with truth, while the second project is concerned with reductive explanation. It is the latter project, I maintain, which is really central to truthmaking theory. On this basis, a general account of truthmaking can be formulated, which, when combined with a specific (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Peter Schulte (2010). Plädoyer für einen physikalistischen Naturalismus. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (2):165-189.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Peter Schulte (2010). Zwecke Und Mittel in Einer Natürlichen Welt: Instrumentelle Rationalität Als Problem für den Naturalismus? Mentis.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Peter Schulte (2007). How to Link Particulars to Universals: Four Versions of Bradley's Regress Refuted. Philosophia Naturalis 44 (2):219-237.
    It is often claimed that Realism about universals is problematic because it cannot account for the relation between particulars and universals without falling prey to ,,Bradley's regress". In this article, I consider four different versions of this regress argument (the semantic regress, the explanatory regress, the ,One over Many' regress, and the truthmaker regress), each based on a different ,regress-generating' assumption. I argue that none of these arguments succeeds in refuting Realism. Still, I contend that two interesting conclusions can be (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation