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Peter Unger [43]Peter K. Unger [17]
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Profile: Peter Unger (New York University)
  1. Peter Unger, Chapter 1 of Beyond Inanity.
    During the middle of the twentieth century, maybe until about 1960 or 1970, it was generally agreed, by analytic philosophers, that pretty much all intellectually responsible philosophy was, quite as it should be, a discipline whose practitioners offered no substantial claims about the general nature of concrete reality or, at the least, none distinctively arrived at through their involvement with philosophy. This was in marked contrast with the natural sciences (and, presumably most markedly, with the more general of the natural (...)
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  2. Peter Unger, Chapter 5 of Beyond Inanity.
    Time and time again, I’ve observed that, over most of the last several decades, almost all the most salient analytic philosophers have accepted, at least implicitly, a worldview that I’ve called The Scientiphical Metaphysic or, in just a single word, Scientiphicalism. As least as far as this actual world is concerned, they’ve agreed, matters are, at least for the most part, quite as our shared Scientiphicalism has matters be.
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  3. Peter Unger, Chapter 2 of Beyond Inanity.
    Probably partly prompted by Saul Kripke’s very slightly earlier work, sometime shortly after 1970 there appeared certain apparently exhilarating propositions, primarily proposed by Hilary Putnam, and then, spurred by Putnam’s suggestions, offered by few other mainstream philosophers, none of them as prominent as Putnam himself, but each also a rather well-known analytic philosopher.[i] Flowing from these proposals, there came to be a whole new orthodoxy about how a thinking individual may, or should, (be able to) think about various concrete objects, (...)
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  4. Peter Unger, Chapter 3 of Beyond Inanity.
    Perhaps more than any other philosopher, Saul Kripke fostered the impression, still so widely prevalent today, that mainstream philosophy, even as it’s recently and currently practiced, is a pretty substantial discipline. In this matter, Kripke’s great influence stems mostly from a single work, his Naming and Necessity, a short book based on transcriptions of three lectures (the heart of the book having been previously published, in a less accessible venue.)[i].
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  5. Peter Unger, Preface to Volume.
    Just a few months ago, I finally finished my magnum opus - well, my Really Big Book, anyway - a tome whose creation had been consuming me for eight very full years. With my so recently having relinquished any very vital connection with All the Power in the World, it’s now hard, for me, to engage in substantial philosophical writing. But, that’s hardly the whole story. Even years before completing that book, I decided I wouldn’t try to supply this collection, (...)
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  6. Peter Unger (forthcoming). Our Knowledge of the Material World,'. American Philosophical Quarterly.
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  7. Peter Unger (2012). Empty Ideas. The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57):31-41.
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  8. Peter Unger (2010). Précis of All the Power in the World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):455-456.
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  9. Peter Unger (2010). Reply to James Van Cleve. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):467-475.
    James Van Cleve’s contribution consists of a brief preamble and three numbered sections; in each he characterizes some position(s) of mine. In the first two numbered sections, when characterizing my positions, most of what he says is accurate. In the preamble, by contrast, and especially in the third section, there are misleading mischaracteriza- tions. First, I’ll try to remedy that. Then I’ll reply to some questions raised in his first two sections.
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  10. Peter Unger (2010). Reply to Stephen Mumford. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):484-490.
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  11. Peter Unger (2006). Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Oxford Up.
    While well-known for his longer book-length work, philosopher Peter Unger's shorter articles have, until now, been less accessible. Collected in two volumes, Philosophical Papers includes articles spanning over 40 years of Unger's long and fruitful career. Volume two focuses on Unger's important work in metaphysics.
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  12. Peter Unger (2006). Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Oxford Up.
    While well-known for his longer book-length work, philosopher Peter Unger's shorter articles have, until now, been less accessible. Collected in two volumes, Philosophical Papers includes articles spanning over 40 years of Unger's long and fruitful career. Volume two focuses on Unger's important work in metaphysics.
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  13. Peter K. Unger (2006). All the Power in the World. Oxford University Press.
    This bold and original work of philosophy presents an exciting new picture of concrete reality. Peter Unger provocatively breaks with what he terms the conservatism of present-day philosophy, and returns to central themes from Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Russell. Wiping the slate clean, Unger works, from the ground up, to formulate a new metaphysic capable of accommodating our distinctly human perspective. He proposes a world with inherently powerful particulars of two basic sorts: one mental but not physical, the other (...)
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  14. Peter K. Unger (2006). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
    While well-known for his book-length work, philosopher Peter Unger's articles have been less widely accessible. These two volumes of Unger's Philosophical Papers include articles spanning more than 35 years of Unger's long and fruitful career. Dividing the articles thematically, this first volume collects work in epistemology and ethics, among other topics, while the second volume focuses on metaphysics. Unger's work has advanced the full spectrum of topics at the heart of philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of (...)
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  15. Peter K. Unger (2004). The Mental Problems of the Many. In D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  16. Peter Unger (2002). Science and the Possibility of Philosophy. In S. Phineas Upham & Joshua Harlan (eds.), Philosophers in Conversation: Interviews From the Harvard Review of Philosophy. Routledge.
     
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  17. Peter K. Unger (2002). Free Will and Scientifiphicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):1-25.
  18. Peter K. Unger (2000). The Survival of the Sentient. Philosophical Perspectives 14 (s14):325-348.
    In this quite modestly ambitious essay, I'll generally just assume that, for the most part, our "scientifically informed" commonsense view of the world is true. Just as it is with such unthinking things as planets, plates and, I suppose, plants, too, so it also is with all earthly thinking beings, from people to pigs and pigeons; each occupies a region of space, however large or small, in which all are spatially related to each other. Or, at least, so it is (...)
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  19. Peter Unger (1999). The Mystery of the Physical and the Matter of Qualities: A Paper for Professor Shaffer. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):75-99.
  20. Peter Unger (1999). Précis of Living High and Letting Die. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):173-175.
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  21. Peter Unger (1999). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):203-216.
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  22. Peter Unger (1999). Review: Précis of Living High and Letting Die. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):173 - 175.
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  23. Peter Unger (1999). Review: Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):203 - 216.
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  24. Peter Unger (1999). Selections From Philosophical Relativity. In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.
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  25. Peter Unger (1999). 8. The Mental Problems of the Many. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 23:195.
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  26. Peter K. Unger (1998). The Mystery of the Physical and the Matter of Qualities. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):75–99.
    For some fifty years now, nearly all work in mainstream analytic philosophy has made no serious attempt to understand the _nature of_ _physical reality,_ even though most analytic philosophers take this to be all of reality, or nearly all. While we've worried much about the nature of our own experiences and thoughts and languages, we've worried little about the nature of the vast physical world that, as we ourselves believe, has them all as only a small part.
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  27. Michael B. Burke, Hugh S. Chandler Roderick M. Chisholm, Frederick C. Doepke, Peter T. Geach, Allan Gibbard, Mark Heller, Frances Howard-Snyder, Peter van Inwagen, Mark Johnston, David Lewis, George Myro, Terence Parsons, Ernest Sosa, JudithJarvis Thomson, Peter Unger & David Wiggins (1997). Material Constitution: A Reader. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  28. Peter K. Unger (1996). Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. Oxford University Press.
    By contributing a few hundred dollars to a charity like UNICEF, a prosperous person can ensure that fewer poor children die, and that more will live reasonably long, worthwhile lives. Even when knowing this, however, most people send nothing, and almost all of the rest send little. What is the moral status of this behavior? To such common cases of letting die, our untutored response is that, while it is not very good, neither is the conduct wrong. What is the (...)
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  29. Peter Unger (1995). Contextual Analysis in Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):1-26.
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  30. Peter Unger (1992). Causing and Preventing Serious Harm. Philosophical Studies 65 (3):227 - 255.
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  31. Peter Unger (1992). Précis of Identity, Consciousness and Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):133 - 137.
    This book presents, explains and defend an account of our identity, overtime that is both (a) psychologically aimed and (b) physically based. Not advanced as analytic, or as conceptually true, the account is meant to hold "only relative to the general correctness of our contemporary view of the world". Even so, it is explained why influential contemporary thinkers--Lewis, Nozick, Padfit, Shoemaker and others--have "vastly" underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival through time.
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  32. Peter Unger (1992). Reply to Reviewers. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):159 - 176.
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  33. Peter K. Unger (1990). Identity, Consciousness, and Value. Oxford University Press.
    The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his (...)
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  34. Peter K. Unger (1988). Conscious Beings in a Gradual World. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):287-333.
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  35. Peter Unger (1987). Consciousness and Self-Identity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):63-100.
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  36. Peter Unger (1986). The Cone Model of Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):125-178.
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  37. Peter Unger (1984). Minimizing Arbitrariness: Toward a Metaphysics of Infinitely Many Isolated Concrete Worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):29-51.
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  38. Peter K. Unger (1984/2002). Philosophical Relativity. Oxford University Press.
    In this short but meaty book, Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to central problems in philosophy. As Unger hypothesizes, many of these problems are unanswerable, including the problems of knowledge and scepticism, the problems of free will, and problems of causation and explanation. In each case, he argues, we arrive at one answer only relative to an assumption about the meaning of key terms, terms like "know" and like "cause," even while we arrive at an (...)
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  39. Peter Unger (1983). The Causal Theory of Reference. Philosophical Studies 43 (1):1 - 45.
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  40. Peter Unger (1982). Toward a Psychology of Common Sense. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2):117 - 129.
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  41. Peter Unger (1980). The Problem of the Many. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):411-468.
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  42. Peter Unger (1980). Skepticism and Nihilism. Noûs 14 (4):517-545.
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  43. Peter Unger (1979). There Are No Ordinary Things. Synthese 41 (2):117 - 154.
  44. Peter K. Unger (1979). I Do Not Exist. In Graham F. Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity. Cornell University Press.
     
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  45. Peter K. Unger (1979). Why There Are No People. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):177-222.
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  46. Peter Unger (1977). The Uniqueness in Causation. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (3):177 - 188.
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  47. Peter K. Unger (1977). Impotence and Causal Determinism. Philosophical Studies 31 (May):289-305.
  48. Peter K. Unger (1975/2002). Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford University Press.
    In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is (...)
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